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ABSTRACT
Discussions about the permissibility of students using enhancements in education are
often framed by the question, “Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs
cheating?” Some argue that students who use them are cheating because these drugs
provide an unfair advantage that violates rules of fair competition in education. Others
argue that students who use them are not cheating because these drugs are merely another
progressive educational tool such as a calculator or computer. Although the question of
cheating is interesting, it is only one question concerning the permissibility of
enhancement in education. Another interesting question is, “What kinds of students do
we want in our academic institutions?” I suggest that one plausible answer to this
question concerns the ideals of human excellence or virtues. The students we want in our
academic institutions are virtuous or at least possess certain virtues. I argue that a virtuous
student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement.
That a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of selfimprovement illustrates that under certain conditions, motivation can determine the
permissibility of using enhancements. Building upon this, I suggest a virtues-based
institutional rule for governing and guiding students’ use of cognitive enhancers in an
academic institution, for the right reasons. This “ideals of human excellence” or “virtues”
approach offers interesting and unique insights for issues of enhancement in education
(and for issues of pharmaceutical enhancement in general); it may turn out that the
uneasiness many people have about students using cognitive-enhancing drugs has less to
do with issues of enhancement and more to do with the motivation and character of
students.
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Chapter 1 Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs in Education
1. Introduction
“Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs cheating?” This question often
frames the contemporary discussion of enhancement in education about the permissibility
of students using cognitive-enhancing. For reasons of fairness, some argue that a student
who uses a cognitive-enhancing drug is cheating. For reasons of increasing productivity,
others argue that a student who uses a cognitive-enhancing drug is not cheating.
However, whether a student who uses a cognitive-enhancing drug is cheating or not, the
assumption is that most academic institutions already have in place institutional rules for
governing student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs.
In this research project, I argue that there are two problems with the contemporary
discussion of enhancement in education. First, framing the permissibility of student use
of cognitive-enhancing drugs as a question of cheating is not particularly useful. The
answers to this question do not provide conclusive reasons for whether the use of
cognitive-enhancing drugs is cheating. Second, despite the assumption of many in this
discussion, academic institutions’ current institutional rules, such as those prohibiting a
student from using illegal drugs in academic activities, do not decisively determine the
permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs for enhancement in education.
These two problems result in no advancement of contemporary discussion of
enhancement in education as well as only a cursory examination regarding permissibility
and institutional rules related to student use of enhancements in education.
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Yet it is of practical and philosophical importance that permissibility and institutional
rules concerning student use of enhancements in education are addressed. First, it is
likely that the use of cognitive-enhancing drugs among students is only going to increase.
Currently in the United States, nearly 21 million young people (ages 10 to 19 years old)
are prescribed cognitive-enhancing drugs each year, an increase of 26 percent since 2007
(Schwarz 2012). In the ten years from 1993 to 2003, the global use of cognitiveenhancing drugs increased three times, and spending on cognitive-enhancing drugs
increased nine times to $2.4 billion in 2003. The United States is 83 percent of the global
market for cognitive-enhancing drugs. From 2003 to 2007, annual use and spending on
these enhancements in developing nations exceeded 20 percent (Scheffler, et al. 2007).
Second, as our neurological understanding of human cognition advances, it cannot be
assumed that the technological means accessible for improving a person’s cognitive
capacities will only be pharmaceutical. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (which uses
electromagnetic induction to alter the magnetic field in a person’s brain) has been shown
to augment a person’s working memory (Fregni, et al. 2005). Genetic modification of
mice has been shown to enhance their memory performance with respect to retention and
has illustrated that genetic modification on mammals is possible (Tang, et al. 1999) (Tan,
et al. 2006). Moreover, recent discoveries have identified three human genes—DAT1,
DRD2, and DRD4—linked to the behaviors surrounding attention, motivation, cognitive
skill, intelligence, and violence (Beaver, et al. 2011). So it is reasonable to think that
genetic modification capable of enhancing human cognition will be available sooner
rather than later.
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The increased use of cognitive-enhancing drugs and the advancement in enhancement
technology prudently both suggest the need to address questions about the permissibility
and institutional rules regarding student use of enhancements in education. The role of
enhancements in education also is philosophically significant because education and
enhancement of intellectual capacities are valued instrumentally and as being good for
their own sakes. Whether student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs is permitted or
prohibited, current academic institutional rules need to be redesigned. This would result
in shaping the attitudes and sentiments of students about enhancements and education.
The shaping of students’ attitudes and sentiments about enhancement and education is
likely to have reverberations across social, economic, and cultural domains.
To advance the contemporary discussion of enhancement in education, this research
project addresses questions of permissibility and institutional rules regarding student use
of enhancements in education in a manner that is framed by three questions and
structured by two goals.
1.2 Questions and Goals of Research Project
This research project examines the following three questions:
1. Is student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs in education permissible?
2. Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs cheating?
3. What should be the institutional rules regarding student use of cognitiveenhancing drugs?
These three questions concerning enhancement in education serve as an operational
outline. By examining and addressing these three questions, this research project
stretches across differing fields of philosophy such as normative ethics, neuroethics, and
moral psychology. It also relies on clinical ethics, medical practices, social psychology,
and neuroscience to provide further context and substance to this project’s philosophical
3

claims.1 Since questions concern both students and institutions, this research project
works in both ideal and non-ideal theory.
1.3 Goals of Research Project
By examining and addressing these three questions, this research project has two
goals. The first is to examine and address the two problems with the contemporary
discussion of enhancement in education. These problems can best be understood and
identified by first examining how current institutional rules of academic institutions do
not decisively determine the permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs.
Since current institutional rules in academic institutions do not decisively determine the
permissibility of cognitive-enhancing drugs, I next examine the question of cheating and
how arguments that attempt to answer this question are inconclusive. Moving forward
from this first goal, my research project offers an approach for considering student use of
enhancements in education as well as the kind of institutional rules that could be used to
govern the use of enhancement in education.
The second goal of my research project concerns the type of approach I provide. I
offer a systematic approach toward enhancement in education. The typical approach for
addressing enhancement in education and the questions of cheating, permissibility, and
institutional rules is to focus on these questions one at a time and in isolation. For
instance, when questions concerning the permissibility of student use of cognitiveenhancing drug were addressed, implications for institutional rules were not addressed.
When questions concerning institutional rules to govern student use of these

1

Consider Maria Von Herbert’s response to Immanuel Kant that although his moral theory had given her a
reason not to commit suicide, it was not of much help otherwise: “I’ve read the metaphysics of morals and
the categorical imperative, and it doesn’t help a bit” (Langton 2007).
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enhancements were addressed, implications for the attitudes and sentiments these rules
would develop in students were not addressed. This is not to say that the answers to these
particular questions were wrong but rather that focusing on single questions in isolation
fails to yield a cohesive viewpoint about enhancement in education. This research project
attempts to advance a systematic, cohesive viewpoint toward enhancement in education.
A systematic approach offers a conceptual framework for elucidating the role of
cognitive-enhancing drugs in education. A systematic approach examines not only the
role of but also the implications that enhancements could have on education, institutional
rules in an academic institution, and the ethos of students. By offering a systematic
approach—even if it turns out to be wrong—this research project yields at least one way
to understand enhancement in education and to advance the contemporary discussion of
enhancement in education. With these questions and goals as frames, I now offer a brief
summary of this research project’s systematic approach.
1.4 The Ideals of the Human Excellence or Virtues-Based Approach
Instead of beginning by asking questions about permissibility, cheating, or
institutional rules regarding enhancement in education, I offer a systematic approach that
begins by asking, “What kind of students do we want in our academic institutions?” I
suggest that one plausible answer concerns the ideals of human excellence or virtues.2 3
The virtues are the properties of a person that make their possessor an ideal of human
excellence. The students we want in our academic institutions are virtuous or at least
possess certain virtues. I argue that a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive2

I use “ideals of human excellence” and “virtues” interchangeably.
The genesis of this proposal’s argument of asking a different question about enhancement in education
from the perspective of the ideals of human excellence or virtues arose from discussions of the work of
Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (Hill 1983).
3
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enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement. This indicates a motivation that
determines the permissibility of using the enhancement. In respect to the question of
whether a student’s use of cognitive-enhancing drugs in education is permissible, this
virtues-based approach holds that students in academic institutions are permitted to use
cognitive-enhancing drugs if their reasons for using these enhancements are reflective of
the ideals of human excellence.
Because it is a student’s motivation that determines the permissibility of using
cognitive-enhancing drugs, this virtues-based approach would generate the following
institutional rule: Students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for
using them are reflective of the ideals of human excellence. This rule not only governs
student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs but also provides guidance for a student to
determine which uses of cognitive-enhancing drugs are permitted or prohibited in
education.
Because this virtues-based institutional rule relies on a student’s motivation to
determine permissibility, it structures and develops the motivations of students and
shapes their ethos about the use of enhancements in education.
The aim of this virtues-based approach is to offer a way for motivation and character
to be included as relevant considerations in the discussion of enhancement in education.
In the contemporary discussion, the use of enhancements often is considered solely with
respect to their consequences for students and education as a whole; rules focus on
whether cognitive-enhancing drugs violate the institutional rules of education. However,
within this discussion, motivation and character often are overlooked as relevant
considerations for assessing not only a student’s use of cognitive-enhancing drugs but
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also in evaluating the role enhancements are to have in education. Generally speaking, it
is reasonable to think that some students have motivations for using cognitive-enhancing
drugs that are good reasons reflective of good character. Offering a way for motivation
and character to be relevant considerations in assessing student use of cognitive
enhancers brings more depth and complexity to the contemporary discussion of
enhancement in education. It also raises the interesting implication that it might not the
use of cognitive-enhancing drugs that is troubling but rather the character of the students
using them that is troubling.
1.5 Why the Ideals of Human Excellence or Virtues
As the foundation for an approach toward assessing enhancement in education, the
ideals of human excellence or virtues is likely to raise some concerns. However, the use
of the ideals of human excellence or virtues is not an indication of a failing in other
normative ethical theories; instead, the ideals of human excellence or virtues help to
explain our intuitions about certain cases of students using cognitive-enhancing drugs and
are at least one element of a normative account of enhancement in education. Moreover,
there are three reasons for thinking that the ideals of human excellence provide
interesting and unique insight into the questions and issues regarding a student’s use of
enhancement in education.
1.5.1 Different Perspective
First, the ideals of human excellence or virtues offer a different perspective for
viewing enhancement in education. Although focusing on the permissibility of certain
behaviors and actions is still important, in some situations it might be worthwhile to ask
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what sort of person would behave and act in that way. Thomas Hill (1983) provides some
illustrative examples of such situations:
Sometimes we may not regard an act wrong at all though we see it as
reflecting something objectionable about the person who does it. Imagine,
for example, one who laughs spontaneously to himself when he reads a
newspaper account of a plane crash that kills hundred. Or, again, consider
an obsequious grandson who, having waited for his grandmother’s
inheritance with mock devotion, then secretly spits on her grave when at
last she dies. The moral uneasiness which it arouses is explained more by
our view of the agent than by any conviction that what he did was
immoral. Had he hesitated and asked, “Why shouldn’t I spit on her grave”
it seems more fitting to ask him to reflect on the sort of person he is than
to try to offer reasons why he should refrain from spitting. (Hill 1983,
215)
Although it is permissible for an individual to laugh at news of an airplane crash or spit
on their grandmother’s grave, asking about permissibility does not directly illustrate why
these actions are objectionable. However, asking what sort of people would laugh at
tragedy or spit on their grandmother’s grave does, to a large degree, illuminate why these
are regarded as objectionable acts. That people laugh at others’ tragedies or spit on their
grandmother’s grave reflects poorly on that person’s character. This is not the sort of
person to admire, emulate, or even associate with.
In the context of education and a student who is using a cognitive-enhancing drug,
imagine that the use of this enhancement is permitted in education. Now consider a
student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs because it assists them in completing the
minimum number of assignments required to pass the course, allowing this student to
skip lectures and discussion sections. Although the student’s actions are permitted, it is
reasonable to think that this is not the sort of student an academic institution would want.
Alternatively, imagine that the use of cognitive-enhancing drugs is prohibited but that a
student is using these enhancements simply because this student greatly values learning.

8

The student’s actions are prohibited, but it is reasonable to think that an academic
institution would want this sort of student.
Using the ideals of human excellence or virtues to consider enhancement in
education indicates—even if vaguely—something about the sort of student to want in
education. Moreover, the ideals of human excellence or virtues help demonstrate that the
reasons a student has for using a cognitive-enhancing drug are important in assessing
enhancements in education.
1.5.2 Aspirational and Practical Value of Virtues
Another reason is that the ideals of human excellence or virtues function as
something to aspire to and also can serve as a practical guide. As something to aspire to,
the ideals of human excellence or virtues focus not only on the kind of person an
individual should be but also provide certain ideal properties that people should aim to
possess.4 For the sake of the argument, consider honesty, courage, or compassion to be
properties for a person. It is reasonable to think that even if an individual regularly failed
to meet these ideals, this person should still aspire to them. Constantly working on
developing virtues, whether by an individual or the community, is valued not only as
being instrumentally beneficial but also good for its own sake. As John Stuart Mill
succinctly notes,
The contented man, or the contented family, who have no ambition to
make any one else happier, to promote the good of their country or their
neighborhood, or to improve themselves in moral excellences, excite in us
neither admiration nor approval. (Mill 1971, 409)

4

That virtues are something to aspire to is a point emphasized through most of Julia Annas’ work, a major
influence on how I think about virtues (Annas 2006; 2011).
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In the context of enhancement in education, this virtues-based institutional rule not
only stipulates permitted reasons for students to use cognitive-enhancing drugs, but it
also stipulates the ideals of human excellence students should aspire to attain in respect to
using enhancements. Although many students are likely not to use cognitive-enhancing
drugs for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence, that some students fail to
use cognitive-enhancing drugs for these reasons does not make the ideals of human
excellence offered by this virtues-based institutional rule any less worthy of aspiration.
While virtues are the properties of a person that make their possessor an ideal of
human excellence, these virtues also function to serve as a practical guide for those who
lack virtues, serving as a point of reference for an individual to orient or guide their
behavior.
At first it is difficult to understand how the ideals of human excellence or virtues
serve as a practical guide; however, consider the uncontroversial and common practice of
using an idealization as a guide. For example, ideal gas law is a hypothesis about the
behavior of gas if it were to exist in a perfect, idealized state. Finding or even putting gas
in such a state is unrealistic and unachievable. However, ideal gas law serves as a
practical guide for other experiments. By understanding gas as it would exist under ideal
conditions, scientists orient or guide their research project and build their basis of
knowledge.
Similarly, the ideals of human excellence or virtues can serve as a practical guide for
people.5 For most virtue ethics theories, people are assumed to have had some life

5

Linda Zagzebski (2011) recently put forward an outline for an Exemplarist virtue theory in which a moral
exemplar, even if an ideal, provides an outline for a moral theory.
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experience as well as a grasp of ethical discourse and certain values.6 The virtues are then
used to orient or guide this person toward the appropriate excellence. For example, a
person with the virtue of compassion provides to charity when possible. Individuals who
lack but want to develop compassion rely on this virtue to guide them and work toward
developing the virtue of compassion by first giving to charity whenever possible.
For enhancement in education, consider the freshman undergraduate student. This
student likely was already exposed to cognitive-enhancing drugs being used for a wide
variety of reasons. This virtues-based institutional rule offers the freshman certain ideals
of human excellence or virtues as a guide toward using cognitive-enhancing drugs for the
proper reasons. Since the ideals of human excellence or virtues function as something to
aspire to and as a practical guide, a virtues-based approach provides an interesting
perspective on enhancement in education.
1.5.3 Rich and Diverse Historical Tradition
The ideals of human excellence or virtues provide a rich and diverse historical
tradition to draw upon. From Confucian philosophers to Aristotle and through to current
virtue ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse, Julia Annas, and Christine Swanton,
conceptions of the ideals of human excellences or virtues have played a role in many
areas of philosophy, particularly in normative ethics. It is often assumed that the ideals of
human excellence or virtues are thought of as independent, separate, or in opposition to
other approaches in normative ethics. This is an incorrect assumption; conceptions of
virtues have roles in normative theories that typically are taken as being on opposite
spectrums of normative ethics, such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Consider that
6

As a matter of historical note Aristotle’s lectures were given to young nobility who had already gone
through a sufficient level of education (Crisp 1997; Hughes 2001).
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Hume and Kant are on opposite spectrums of the normative ethics spectrum with regard
to the role of reason in morality, but both still provide a place for virtues within their
respective moral theories.
On one end of the spectrum is David Hume, a sentimentalist who famously stated,
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any
office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 2001, 266). A broad account of Hume would
hold that moral judgment is based on sentiments or motivations; to judge a person is to
judge their character traits. Moreover, certain character traits are taken as being virtues,
either natural or artificial, that are, roughly, socially useful.7
On the other end of the spectrum, Immanuel Kant in the Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals holds that it is reason and a human being’s rational capacities that
bind us to moral obligations:
Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground
of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example,
the command, “thou shalt not lie,” does not hold only for human beings, as
if other rational beings did not have to heed it, and so with all the other
moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the ground of obligation
here must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the
circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in
concepts of pure reason (4:389).
Yet even Kant has a conception of virtue as being the courage to act with respect to the
moral law, whether it is a perfect or imperfect duty (4:421n) (6:405).
The important point is not to highlight differences between Hume and Kant’s
accounts of reason or their conceptions of virtues; instead it is to emphasize that differing
normative approaches, specifically approaches that are often regarded as being

7

Providing an exposition of Hume’s often complicated but interesting conception of virtue is to go too far
afield. Yet at least in the Treatise, Hume’s notion of virtues is based on human sentiments and convention
(cf: Hume 2001, Part 3: 367-378).
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diametrically opposed, still include conceptions of virtues. The ideals of human
excellence or virtues need not necessarily be regarded as always being a conception that
is independent, separate, or in opposition to other approaches in normative ethics, but as a
conception that can work within most if not all normative approaches.
Moreover, ideals of human excellence or virtues have a rich and diverse historical
tradition for this research project to draw from. While the conception of virtues put
forward in this research paper shares many common features with an Aristotelian
conception, it also shares many features with Buddhist and Confucian conceptions of
virtues. Thus the rich and diverse historical tradition of ideals of human excellence or
virtues allows for this research project to put forward a conception of virtues that cannot
easily be categorized as being Aristotelian, Buddhist, or Confucian.
In the context of enhancement in education, the ideals of human excellence or virtues
provide an approach that is, prima facie, not opposed to other normative ethical theories.
By drawing upon a rich and diverse historical tradition, this research project’s conception
of the ideals of human excellence or virtues can focus on a student’s action in a manner
that, for example, a strictly Buddhist, Confucian, or Aristotelian approach on the
importance of character could not.
Therefore, because the ideals of human excellence or virtues provide a different
perspective, are aspirational and practical, and come from a rich and diverse historical
tradition, it is plausible to think that the ideals of human excellence or virtues offer an
interesting and unique perspective for issues of enhancement in education.

13

1.6 Overview of Dissertation
This introductory chapter concludes with an outline of the manner in which this
research project examines and addresses questions of permissibility, cheating, and
institutional rules and works to advance the discussion of enhancement in education.
The following chapter begins with defining and clarifying the conceptions of
enhancement, cognitive-enhancing drugs, and education. The project then examines the
permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs with regard to current
institutional rules governing use of enhancements in most academic institutions. The
argument put forward in this chapter is that because of the complexities of neurology,
pharmacology, and medical-prescribing practices for pharmaceuticals, current
institutional rules do not decisively determine the permissibility of student use of
enhancements.
Since current institutional rules do not decisively determine the permissibility of
student use of cognitive enhancers, the focus moves to the question of cheating. This
question of cheating has generated two well entrenched arguments that face difficult
challenges that illustrate that these arguments do not provide conclusive reasons for
thinking that a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs is cheating.
Chapter Three presents a virtues-based approach that offers a conception of virtues
and an account of virtuous students. According to this virtues-based approach, a virtuous
student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs and is justified in using these
enhancements because of their motivations. This virtues-based approach then formulates
a virtues-based institutional rule for governing student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs
in education. While working within the confines of ideal theory to formulate a virtues-
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based institutional rule, the conditions or disorders of prosopagnosia and psychopathy are
used to argue that the goal of academia is to attain understanding (taken as an ability to
draw upon information and apply it to one’s life) rather then to obtain knowledge (taken
as knowledge and facts). This chapter concludes with a response to potential criticisms,
arguing that the virtues offered are of significant value to persons, that academia at least
has a responsibility to foster an environment in which virtues can develop, and that even
if students are not required to develop these virtues, there are reasons for thinking that
they should.
In Chapter Four, this research project transitions from working within the realm of
ideal theory to that of non-ideal theory. With certain idealized conditions regarding
academic institutions and students no longer in place, I examine whether this virtuesbased institutional rule could work. The aim of this chapter is to highlight that even under
non-ideal conditions, this virtues-based institutional rule offers ideals of human
excellence, motivation, and character that are relevant considerations. Motivation and
character can be implemented in academic institutions operating under non-ideal
conditions to govern student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs.
A reason for implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is because students in
academic institutions have less-than-ideal psychological dispositions and are not always
compliant with institutional rules. I then provide three advantages of using this virtuesbased approach and institutional rule: it addresses concerns about the medicalization of
cognitive enhancers, it shapes students’ practical reasoning about enhancement, and it
resists oversimplifying issues of enhancement in academia.
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In the fifth chapter, I return to reexamine the question of cheating. I contend that this
virtues-based institutional rule is not only consistent with existing institutional rules and
policies but also provides a better justification for permissibility of these enhancements
than what currently exists. It offers a way to acknowledge and support concerns about
fairness and improving well-being.
In the end, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule might be incorrect.
Nevertheless, enhancement in academia involves matters concerning the value of
education, the permissibility of pharmaceutical enhancements, and the sort of character
one wants students to have. This research project, either part or all of it, might be wrong;
however, any investigation into enhancement in academia will have to consider the
motivation and character of students.
I conclude by noting that the ideals of human excellence or virtues approach can be
extended beyond the discussion of enhancement in academia. As neuroscience and
pharmacology advance, there are questions about the application and limitation of using
pharmaceuticals to augment a person’s memory and moral capacities. I contend that any
approach to pharmaceutically enhancing a person’s memory and moral capacities
encounters the problems of complexity, philosophical overextension, and potential
explanation biases. The ideals of human excellence or virtues approach can adequately
handle these problems and demonstrates that whether it is enhancement in education or
the pharmaceutical enhancement of a person’s memory and moral capacities, motivation
and character are still relevant considerations.
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Chapter 2 Cognitive Enhancers, Academia, and Rules
2.1. Defining Enhancement, Cognitive Enhancing Drugs, and Education
To understand issues of enhancement in education, I must first define the use of the
terms enhancement, cognitive-enhancing drugs, and education. Enhancement usually is
defined broadly and in respect to the treatment-enhancement distinction. According to
this distinction, treatment is the use of biomedical technologies or medical procedures to
restore persons or their capacities to proficient functioning levels. Enhancement, then, is
the use of biomedical technologies or medical procedures to augment persons or their
capacities to higher functioning levels.8 On this distinction, many hold that treatments are
necessary and morally justified since they restore a person to normal functioning levels,
whereas enhancements are not justified.
In general, there are theoretical difficulties in maintaining a sharp distinction between
treatment and enhancement; many biomedical technologies or medical procedures
considered necessary “treatments” seem more like enhancements (e.g., vaccinations and
fluoride supplementation), and many “enhancements” are not biomedical technologies or
medical procedures (e.g., exercise and relaxation techniques).9 Some philosophers such
as Allen Buchanan make a further argument that literacy and numeracy are enhancements
because in respect to human history, they are rather recent developments and, in fact,
augment persons by altering their neurology (Buchanan 2008). In light of these
theoretical difficulties, it is better to recognize the distinction between treatment and
8

While Christopher Boorse and Norman Daniels hold differing conceptions of health, disease, treatment,
and enhancement, they maintain that there is a distinction between treatment and enhancement, even if it is
often difficult to conceptualize or pin down (Boorse1981; Daniels 2000; Daniels 2008).
9
John Harris and Allen Buchanan, among others, argue convincingly that the distinction between treatment
and enhancement is at best tenuous and at worst tragically misleading (Buchanan 2000); Buchanan 2008;
Buchanan 2011; Harris 2007).
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enhancement as continuous rather than as providing distinct categories, and also perhaps
to recognize that treatment does not always have (at least prima facie) greater moral
justification than enhancement.
For present purposes, however, I accept the distinction between treatment and
enhancement as referring to the clinical use of these biomedical technologies or medical
procedures. Treatment refers to the clinical use of biomedical technologies or medical
procedures for conditions or disorders to restore persons or capacities to appropriate
functioning levels. Enhancement, then, refers to the use of biomedical technologies or
medical procedures to augment persons or capacities that function at appropriate levels to
higher functioning levels.
2.2 Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs
The biomedical technologies or medical procedures used for enhancement range
widely from genetic engineering to cosmetic surgery. The type of enhancement I focus on
is psychotropic pharmaceutical enhancement. Psychotropic pharmaceuticals are chemical
compounds used specifically to alter a person’s neurological capacities or processes
(Katzung 2009).
The psychotropic pharmaceuticals most often used for enhancement are usually those
that augment specific capacities involved in cognition: memory, affective, and executive
functions, such as working-memory and cognitive control (Singh and Kelleher 2010;
Schermer, et al. 2009; Stein 2008; Smith and Farah 2011). Among psychotropic
pharmaceutical enhancements, I focus on those that augment executive function of
cognitive control, specifically the cognitive-control capacities of focus and concentration.
I refer to these psychotropic pharmaceutical enhancements as cognitive enhancers when
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they are used to augment a person’s capacities of focus and concentration to higher
functioning levels and for a longer period.
The development and standard clinical use of cognitive enhancers is as a treatment
for conditions or disorders such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),
Learning Disabilities (LD), and narcolepsy. The chemical compounds in cognitive
enhancers do not directly target cognition because cognition is a complex interaction
between a multiplicity of mental functions and neurological processes.10 Instead, the
chemical compounds in cognitive enhancers target neurotransmitters in certain regions or
systems of the brain (Housden, Morein-Zamir and Sahakian 2011; (Katzung 2009).
By amplifying, influencing, or blocking certain neurotransmitters in the cortical and
sub-cortical systems—in a way not fully understood by neuroscience or pharmacology —
cognitive enhancers have improved the functioning of the capacities of focus and
concentration in many cases (Smith and Farah 2011; O’Reilly 2010). For persons with
ADHD and LD, the use of cognitive enhancers restores their impaired capacities of focus
and concentration to appropriate functioning levels. Since cognitive enhancers affect the
capacities of focus and concentration, they are used for persons with narcolepsy to
maintain appropriate levels of alertness and wakefulness.
While the development and use of cognitive enhancers is as treatment, there is
evidence indicating that, to some degree, cognitive enhancers do improve the capacities
of focus and concentration in unimpaired persons to higher functioning levels. The
degree to which they do so varies between individuals: for a few individuals, cognitive
enhancers actually impede cognition; for others, their capacities are augmented only
10

This conception of cognition as mental functions and neurological process is neutral in respect to theories
of mind and cognitive science debates concerning computation theory of mind, cognitive heuristics, and the
debate concerning extended and embedded mind hypotheses (Horst 2011; Herbert 2010; Levy 2007).
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slightly; and for most, the augmentation is only moderate (Mehta, et al. 2000; Housden,
Morein-Zamir and Sahakian 2011). Yet in many cases, even moderate augmentation of
focus can assist a person with declarative learning and be tremendously beneficial to their
cognition overall (Smith and Farah 2011; Sandberg, 2011; Sandberg and Savulescu
2011).
While cognitive enhancers may be used for enhancement, there are risks involved. As
pharmaceuticals, cognitive enhancers can be a stimulant, like methylphenidate (Tradenames: Ritalin™ or Concerta™) or dextroamphetamine and amphetamine (Trade-name:
Adderall™), or non-stimulant, such as modafinil (Trade-name: Provigil™).
Pharmaceutical stimulants in particular have potentially dangerous side effects.11 By
amplifying certain neurotransmitters in the cortical and sub-cortical systems, the use of
cognitive enhancers may result in emotional and aggressive behavior, anxiety, insomnia,
and—because they interact with the brain’s rewards center—dependence, severe
withdrawal, and depression (Smith and Farah 2011; Stein 2008; National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse 2005). The side effects are dangerous enough to warrant
concern whether use is for treatment or enhancement.
2.2.1 Education
Although they often have dangerous side effects and provide at best only moderate
augmentation, cognitive enhancers’ ability to augment the functioning of the capacities of
focus and concentration suggests profound implications for our lives and, in particular,
11

It does not follow from my focus on the side effects of pharmaceutical stimulants that pharmaceutical
non-stimulants are safer. Many of the side effects of non-stimulants mirror those of pharmaceutical
stimulants. Traditionally, many held that since pharmaceutical non-stimulants were not amphetamine
based, they were less dangerous in respect to addiction. However, there is a dispute on whether this is
actually true. Since empirical studies and questions on the addictiveness of pharmaceutical non-stimulants
have only recently begun, I remain neutral to the question of whether pharmaceutical non-stimulants are
less addictive than pharmaceutical stimulants.
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for our academic institutions. The central goal of my project is to elucidate the proper
role of cognitive enhancers within education and our academic institutions. Elucidating
the role of cognitive enhancers across the entire domain of education and within all the
diverse institutions in our educational system is, however, simply too difficult and broad
for one research project. For simplicity, I limit the scope of my project to the academic
institutions of colleges and universities, which I refer to as academia, and focus on
undergraduate education.
While I return to the issue of academia in subsequent chapters, I will stipulate it rather
broadly here. The goal of academia is to expose students to the sciences, arts, and
humanities, which facilitates the development of intellectual capacities. Developing our
intellectual capacities is not only prudent but also good for human well-being. Therefore,
exposing students to the sciences, arts, and humanities is both instrumentally beneficial
and good for a student’s own sake.
The achievement of, or at least the strive to achieve, this goal is done by structuring
the academic activities within academia around two aims:
1st Aim: Progressively provide students with information of greater depth.
2nd Aim: Progressively work to improve students’ skill sets of reading
comprehension, arithmetic, writing, and critical thinking.
As a student progresses through academia, the first aim structures the courses and course
levels to be progressively more challenging and complex. For example, a beginning-level
chemistry course in academia is typically more challenging and comprehensive than a
chemistry course taken in high school; moreover, as chemistry courses advance to upper
tier or graduate level, the information is of greater depth. When a student is presented
with information that is evermore demanding and intricate, then the second aim structures
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the academic activities such that the student’s skill sets must also advance. To work
through advanced chemistry, a student must consistently expand and refine their skill sets
of reading comprehension, arithmetic, and critical thinking. So activities in academia are
structured around these two aims.
Although academic institutions certainly have different measures of assessment, and
some may (rarely) not have any measures at all, I stipulate that assessment of students in
academic activities is a fundamental component of academia. It is either to a set standard,
such as assessing a student’s work against the accepted standard of chemistry, or against
the conceptual standard for students at that level, such as assessing a student’s academic
activities against what an average student at that level could achieve. This assessment of
students is in a competitive environment.
While these are the general goals and aims of academia, my research project
concentrates on the role of cognitive enhancers among students in academia. Among
undergraduate and graduate students surveyed, 20 percent reported using cognitive
enhancers, out of which 90 percent indicated that the use was for enhancement, not for
treatment (White, Becker-Blease and Grace-Bishop 2006).12 To illustrate some of the
context and considerations of undergraduate students’ use of cognitive enhancers, I
provide the following three cases.
Undergraduate students Teresa, Edith, and Oliver are studying Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations in a philosophy class. When studying Wittgenstein, which
involves the academic tasks of researching, reading, and writing, Teresa takes 10

12

That 20 percent of undergraduate and graduate students reported using cognitive enhancers is alarming
because the use of prescription stimulants for non-medical purposes among all Americans between 21 and
25 years is only 12.3 percent (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2009).
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milligrams of dextroamphetamine every four to six hours. Teresa has ADHD, and this
cognitive enhancer allows her capacities of focus and concentration to function at
proficient levels.
While studying Wittgenstein, Edith also takes 10 milligrams of dextroamphetamine
every four to six hours, but unlike Teresa, Edith does not have a condition or disorder;
instead she uses a cognitive enhancer because of her passion for philosophy. Using
cognitive enhancers enables her capacities of focus and concentration to function at
higher levels, allowing her not only to work efficiently and effectively on these academic
tasks but also to devote more of her time to learning philosophy.
The last student, Oliver, also takes 10 milligrams of dextroamphetamine every four to
six hours, but he does not take this cognitive enhancer as treatment for a neurological
disorder or because of a passion for learning philosophy. He takes it because he spent the
majority of the lectures and discussion sections posting pithy comments on Facebook and
not paying attention. He doesn’t understand the material and is using the cognitive
enhancer to improve his capacities of focus and concentration while he pulls an “allnighter” to write his final paper.
In the broadest terms, the cases of Teresa, Edith, and Oliver describe some, but
certainly not all, of the considerations and contexts involved in the use of cognitive
enhancers. Although these three cases do not account for all considerations and contexts
pertaining to the use of cognitive enhancers, they can be used to illustrate the sort of
cases that fall outside the range of my project’s interest. At the moment, my interest is not
on cases involving cognitive enhancers as a treatment. I take Teresa’s use of cognitive
enhancer as being treatment and will not consider her case or similar cases when
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explicating the role of cognitive enhancers in academia. My interest is in cases like those
of Oliver and Edith: the 90% of students using cognitive enhancers in academia where
the use is strictly for enhancement.
My project begins by evaluating whether this use of cognitive enhancers in academia
is permissible. My assessment of a student’s “act” of using an enhancement relies on a
stipulated distinction between an “act” and an “action”.13 An act is often taken in the
narrow sense of a person’s particular behavior or a singular instance, whereas an action
broadly includes the person’s act but also an account of the relevant circumstances and
considerations. In some cases, one need only rely on an act in the narrow sense when
evaluating a person, such as in murder or rape. Yet in the case of student use of cognitive
enhancers, it seems that a description of the situation and considerations, such as the
particulars of an academic environment or the reasons a student takes the cognitive
enhancer, is needed in our assessment. Thus in evaluating whether the use of cognitive
enhancers in academia is permissible, I consider the situation and a student’s reasons for
using an enhancement.
An initial way to evaluate the permissibility of student use of cognitive enhancers is
in respect to the current rules in academia. For simplicity, I take rules in academia as
referring to the institutional rules: the regulations or protocols governing students’ actions
in academia. Starting with institutional rules is important since these rules stipulate, or at
least indirectly indicate, which actions are permitted and prohibited for students.
Although I cannot provide an exhaustive account in the following section of all
institutional rules that in some way pertain to cognitive enhancers, I examine the
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Although this stipulated distinction is attributed to Christine Korsgaard, Jon Garthoff brought this
distinction to my attention (Korsgaard 2009).
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institutional rules most commonly used in evaluating the use of cognitive enhancers:
those prohibiting a student from using illegal drugs in academic activities and those
concerning cheating.
2.3 Enhancement in Academia: Institutional Rules and Permissibility
Evaluating the permissibility of Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers starts
by asking about institutional rules: “What are the regulations or codes governing student
use of cognitive enhancers in academia?” Typically the institutional rules considered as
governing student use of cognitive enhancers are (i) those prohibiting a student from
using illegal drugs in academic activities and (ii) those concerning cheating. In respect to
these institutional rules, the standard evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s cases is that in
principle, their use of cognitive enhancers is impermissible. According to the first rule,
their use of cognitive enhancer is impermissible because it involves the illegal use of a
prescription pharmaceutical. For the second rule, their use of cognitive enhancers is
impermissible because it is cheating.
I think that this standard evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers
is disputable. The institutional rule prohibiting students from using illegal drugs in
academic activities clearly stipulates that the distinction between a permitted and a
prohibited use of cognitive enhancers depends on whether a student has a legal
prescription. Yet the complexities of neurology, pharmacology, and medicine are such
that who gets a legal prescription is often rather arbitrary and an unreliable factor for
determining permissibility. Thus although one does not want students in academia to use
illegally obtained cognitive enhancers, it is not clear that having a legal prescription

25

decisively determines that the use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is
impermissible in academia.
In respect to institutional rules concerning cheating, the first problem is that there are
often no rules stipulating that the use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is cheating,
which has led the discussion of enhancement in academia often to center on the question,
“Is a student who uses cognitive enhancers for enhancement cheating?” This question of
cheating has generated two well entrenched positions that are inconclusive and thus fail
to advance the discussion of enhancement in academia.
In the following sections, beginning with the rule prohibiting a student from using
illegal drugs in academic activities, I examine current institutional rules and their
evaluations of cognitive-enhancer use, and I argue that the permissibility of student use of
cognitive enhancers is not determined decisively by these rules.
2.3.1 Institutional Rules Prohibiting a Student from Using Illegal Drugs
Most if not all academic institutions have rules that prohibit a student from using an
illegal drug during academic activities. It is illegal to use certain pharmaceuticals without
a prescription issued by a medical professional or to misuse a prescription
pharmaceutical. Misuse often is stipulated as the use of a prescription pharmaceutical
without having a prescription and—importantly—the use of a prescription
pharmaceutical to experience certain feelings (Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration 2010).
Typically the second stipulation of misuse is interpreted as the use of prescription
pharmaceuticals for “off-label” effects or purposes (“off label” means to use psychotropic
pharmaceuticals for reasons other than the “indication or usage” approved by a regulatory
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body such as the Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency). By
this conception of misuse, although persons may have a legal prescription for a
pharmaceutical, because they use it for the off-label effect of experiencing certain
feelings (e.g., to get high), it is illegal. In academia, the institutional rule prohibiting a
student from using illegal drugs during academic activities includes the off-label misuse
of a drug.
In respect to this institutional rule, the evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s cases goes as
follows. If Oliver and Edith do not have a prescription for these cognitive enhancers, then
their use is illegal. Moreover, even if Oliver and Edith have a legal prescription, their use
of these cognitive enhancers for enhancement is off label and an illegal misuse of the
pharmaceutical. Since the use of illegal drugs or the misuse of a legal prescription is
prohibited in academia, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is considered
impermissible. The conclusion is that student use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement
is impermissible because of an institutional rule prohibiting illegal drug use by students.
Provisionally, it seems reasonable that according to this institutional rule, Oliver and
Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is impermissible. If Oliver and Edith obtained these
cognitive enhancers illegally, then they are prohibited from using them. In fact, this
institutional rule holds that even if these cognitive enhancers were legally obtained,
Oliver and Edith’s use of them is to be considered a misuse because they are using this
prescription pharmaceutical for off-label effects and purposes. For the moment, I am
going to bracket this rule’s conception of misuse and the rule’s reliance on having a legal
prescription: I argue that this reliance on having a legal prescription is problematic.
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Consider that in this institutional rule, what makes a student’s use of cognitive
enhancers permissible is that they have a legal prescription. Accordingly, this rule holds
that a student with a legal prescription is permitted to use the drug, whereas a student
without a prescription is prohibited from using cognitive enhancers. However, upon
further reflection, having a legal prescription is an unreliable factor for determining
permitted and prohibited use of cognitive enhancers because obtaining a legal
prescription rests on a medical professional making a difficult diagnosis or, in many
cases, is simply a matter of a particular medical professional’s discretion regarding
enhancement.
First, consider that there is great difficulty in making an accurate diagnosis of the
conditions or disorders requiring cognitive enhancers. These conditions or disorders often
do not have an easily identifiable list of necessary or sufficient symptoms to make a
diagnosis. For example, ADHD consists of a set of heterogeneous symptoms that span
from environmental, physical, and social dimensions (Parens and Johnston 2009; Singh
2008). These symptoms do not fit within clear and distinct categories but are on a
continuum (L. Singh 2008). As a result, when a physician or psychiatrist makes a
diagnosis, they are often relying on their discretionary judgment for assessing the degree
of these symptoms.
However, this discretionary judgment in assessing symptoms and diagnosing ADHD
has been called into question in respect to consistency, precision, and validity (Singh
2008; Schermer et al. 2009). In many cases, individuals diagnosed as having ADHD may
not actually have it and, worse, some with ADHD are not diagnosed as having it. In fact,
there is also a small but growing empirical literature that suggests that some students who
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claim they use cognitive enhancers for explicit enhancement purposes may be selfmedicating an undiagnosed condition or disorder (L. Singh 2008). A medical
professional might simply misdiagnose a student and, in doing so, prescribe cognitive
enhancers to students who do not need it and also not prescribe to those that do.
Moreover, there is a dearth of guidelines for clinicians about prescribing
pharmaceuticals for enhancement. Consider that the American Academy of Neurology
(AAN) recently published a guide for neurologists recommending different approaches to
handling requests for “neuroenhancement” from healthy patients (Larriviere, et al. 2009).
Although the AAN’s guide neither promotes nor discourages prescribing cognitiveenhancers to healthy patients, it does suggest that the decision to prescribe cognitive
enhancers as an enhancement rests upon a neurologist’s discretion. In addition to the
difficulty of discretionary judgments for the diagnosis of a condition or disorder, a
neurologist could simply decide that in certain situations, it is appropriate to prescribe
patients cognitive enhancers for enhancement.
The problem in relying on having a legal prescription to determine permissibility of
students using cognitive enhancers is that obtaining a legal prescription might be the
result of something as arbitrary as which particular medical professional they consult.
Consider the following: let’s say that Oliver, Edith, and Teresa all go to see the same
medical professional. Oliver and Edith tell the medical professional that if prescribed
cognitive enhancers, their academic work will improve because their capacities of focus
and concentration will be augmented. This medical professional, who also has proenhancement sympathies, agrees and prescribes cognitive enhancers. Teresa consults the
same medical professional and her symptoms of ADHD are mistaken for those of a
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behavioral disorder. She is not prescribed cognitive enhancers and later illegally obtains
cognitive enhancers from a friend. According to the institutional rule prohibiting students
from using illegal drugs in academic activities, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive
enhancers is permissible because of a legal prescription but Teresa’s use of cognitive
enhancers is not.
Now let’s imagine a possible world, exactly like our world, except that the medical
professional whom Oliver, Edith, and Teresa visit does not have pro-enhancement
sentiments. In this possible world, the medical professional does not prescribe Oliver and
Edith cognitive enhancers but does accurately diagnose Teresa and prescribes her
cognitive enhancers. According to the institutional rule prohibiting students from using
illegal drugs in academic activities, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is now
prohibited and, because of a legal prescription, Teresa’s is permitted.
By comparing these two possible scenarios and their applications of the institutional
rule to the cases of Oliver, Edith, and Teresa, it seems reasonable to want a justification
for why Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is permissible in the first scenario
but impermissible in the second scenario. The justification is that in one possible world,
they consulted a medical professional who had positive sentiments about enhancement,
and in the other possible world, the medical professional lacked positive sentiments about
enhancement. Although this explanation of the difference between the two worlds is
accurate, it is too arbitrary to serve as a justification. The justification for why one
student is permitted to use cognitive enhancers but another is not should not stem from
the random assignment of a medical professional.
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Moreover, that Teresa, who has a condition or disorder requiring the use of cognitive
enhancers, might be improperly denied access to cognitive enhancers in some situations
should also give us pause. It does not take a possible world experiment for us to realize
that, as it stands, it is likely that many students who think they are using cognitive
enhancers as an enhancement are in fact using them as a treatment and, alternatively,
many students who think they are using cognitive enhancers for treatment are really using
them as an enhancement. Therefore, obtaining a legal prescription is not a reliable factor,
and its unreliability is a reason for thinking that the institutional rule prohibiting the use
of illegal drugs does not decisively determine that student use of cognitive enhancers for
enhancement is impermissible.
2.3.2 Misuse of a Pharmaceutical
One might object to the preceding section because in bracketing this institutional
rule’s stipulation of misuse, the rule’s ability to explain adequately why certain uses of
cognitive enhancers are impermissible has been removed. The rule’s stipulation is a
conception of misuse that always deems off-label uses of prescription pharmaceuticals to
be misuse because the medical indication of cognitive enhancers is for treatment of
certain conditions or disorders, not enhancement. Even if a medical professional is not
violating prescription guidelines, they are prescribing a pharmaceutical for off-label
effects, and this is a misuse. In cases like those of Oliver and Edith, because they are
using cognitive enhancers for enhancement, which is an off-label effect even if they have
a legal prescription, their use should be prohibited because it is for off-label purposes and
therefore a misuse.
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The problem with the objection to this institutional rule’s conception of misuse is that
it is based upon the presupposition that off-label use of prescription pharmaceuticals is
always misuse (Dresser and Frader 2009). However, such a conception of misuse is
inaccurate because off-label use of pharmaceuticals is, in fact, a common and necessary
practice in medicine. A medical professional may prescribe a pharmaceutical specifically
for the off-label effect. In the palliative care of patients in end-of-life stages, a medical
professional’s reason for prescribing certain pharmaceuticals often is explicitly for the
off-label effect (the term for a medical professional’s reasoning for prescribing
pharmaceuticals or treatments is called an “indication”). The most common reason for
using morphine is as an analgesic, but morphine’s off-label effect is the suppression of
breathing rate. In palliative treatment, morphine is a common, if not standard, form of
treatment to reduce the strain and anxiety of heavy and labored breathing and to dry out
fluids that accumulate in respiratory passages (Enck 2002). Although this use of
morphine is for the off-label effect, it certainly is not a misuse. Similarly, the off-label
effects of cognitive enhancers combined with standard treatments are increasingly
implemented in new developmental therapies for the conditions or disorders of
schizophrenia or Alzheimer’s disease (Hogarty MSW et al., 2004; Stein 2008; Housden,
Morein-Zamir and Sahakian 2011). In these cases, it is not clear that off-label use is
misuse.
One might think that the difference between using cognitive enhancers for
schizophrenia or Alzheimer’s disease and Oliver and Edith’s use is that the former is for
treatment and the latter is for enhancement. However, we should note that the
demarcation line between the clinical use of cognitive enhancers for treatment and for
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enhancement is not all that clear. Since modafinil provides alertness and energy, a
physician may prescribe it to a healthy patient without narcolepsy to help them adjust to
working different shifts (e.g., moving from a day to a night shift) or prescribe it to a
patient to prevent jetlag. In these cases, the physician is prescribing pharmaceuticals to
augment their patient’s capacities, but it seems equally plausible that they are treating a
condition or disorder whose duration is extremely short.
Further, it is plausible that a physician could prescribe modafinil as a prophylactic
treatment to prevent fatigue and inattentiveness. This use of modafinil, in fact, has gone
on for the past 30 years with combat pilots in the United States military (Caldwell, et al.
2004). One might consider the treatment of fatigue and inattentiveness as inappropriate,
but in the case of patients with multiple sclerosis, this is exactly the medical indication
for prescribing them methylphenidate, dextroamphetamine, and modafinil. The difficulty
in delineating the clinical use of cognitive enhancers for treatment and enhancement and
this rule’s inaccurate conception of misuse is another reason for thinking that the rule
does not help definitively determine that student use of cognitive enhancers for
enhancement is impermissible.
In summary, for reasons concerning the unreliability of obtaining a legal prescription
as well as holding an inaccurate conception of misuse, the institutional rule prohibiting a
student from using illegal drugs in academic activities does not decisively determine that
students’ use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is impermissible.
The preceding examination of this institutional rule is not exhaustive and one can
certainly find flaws in the argument presented. Yet even in conceding these defects, it
still seems reasonable that the argument is significant because it illustrates that many
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presuppositions about neurology, pharmacology, and medicine that this institutional rule
takes for granted are inaccurate.
The focus in the following section concerns the other institutional rule commonly
applied to evaluating students’ use of cognitive enhancers: cheating.
2.4 Institutional Rules Concerning Cheating
Often applied separately or in conjunction with other institutional rules, the rules
relevant to students’ use of cognitive enhancers include those surrounding cheating. The
basis for these institutional rules is that in academia, there are regulations or codes
governing fair competition. These are not meant to ensure that everyone will finish
academic competition equally but rather to ensure that the rules pertaining to competition
are fair (e.g., when playing golf, only counting half of my shots is not a fair competition).
Although academic competition inevitably involves inequalities because not all students
have equal academic skills, it does not follow that any action of a competing student is
permissible to compensate for unequal skill sets. Even if you are terrible at logic, you
cannot bring a logic textbook to a “closed-book” logic exam.
An institutional rule concerning cheating is a rule that stipulates which actions
constitute cheating. A factor used to determine which actions constitute cheating
considers whether the action provides the student with an unfair advantage. In the case of
cognitive enhancers, it seems plausible to think that Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive
enhancers provides them with an unfair advantage since it boosts their capacities of focus
and concentration to higher functioning levels. By using cognitive enhancers, Oliver and
Edith’s capacities of focus and concentration are operating at levels beyond those of their
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peers, violating fairness in competition in academia.14 If one applies this institutional rule
to Oliver and Edith’s cases, then their uses of cognitive enhancers are impermissible
because they are cheating (Greely, et al. 2008; Goodman 2010; Schermer 2008).15
Despite the prominence and reasonableness of thinking that Oliver and Edith are
violating an institutional rule concerning cheating, upon reflection, the problem is that
using cognitive enhancers does not easily fit within the normal paradigm of cheating.
According to Stuart P. Green (2004), cheating is “the intentional violation of a rule in
order to gain an unfair advantage over others.” Yet few academic institutions have rules
stipulating that a student is prohibited from using a cognitive enhancer for enhancement
unless it is illegally obtained. As a result, it is not clear that institutional rules concerning
cheating can apply to Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers. If Oliver and Edith
are prohibited from using cognitive enhancers, it cannot be because it violates
institutional rules concerning cheating. Thus it is also reasonable to think that
institutional rules concerning cheating do not decisively determine the permissibility of
cognitive enhancers for enhancement in academia.
At this point, the use of Oliver and Edith’s cases is in respect to academia’s
institutional rules prohibiting a student from using illegal drugs in academic activities and
to those concerning cheating. The argument is that these rules do not decisively
determine that a student’s use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement is impermissible.

14

Some will consider academia as cooperation, not competition. However, as both Stuart P. Green and
Bernard Gert have argued, cooperation does not exclude competition. For example, in a game, both parties
are competing against the other. Yet the game is still cooperative in that they are playing the same game.
One cannot play basketball against another person who is trying to play baseball. Both parties agree to play
one specific game and adhere to one set of rules and regulations. In a similar sense, academia, even if
considered in respect to cooperation, can involve competition (Green 2004; Gert 2005).
15
Although Rob Goodman and Maartje Schermer do not consider the use of cognitive enhancers as
cheating per se, both provide excellent examinations of the activities within academia in respect to
cheating, unfair advantage, and enhancement (Goodman, 2010; Schermer 2008a; Schermer 2008b).
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It does not follow from this argument that the use of cognitive enhancers is permitted in
academia; it only follows that the evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s use of these
enhancements as being impermissible can be reasonable disputed.
That academia’s institutional rules fail to determine decisively the permissibility of
student use of cognitive enhancers has led the discussion of enhancement in academia to
focus on whether, in principle, the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating. This shifts the
focus away from current or possible advances in biomedical technologies or medical
procedures, prescribing practices in medicine, and societies’ perceptions of cognitive
enhancement to center on whether the use of cognitive enhancers for enhancement in
academia is fundamentally a question of cheating. The implication of this shift in focus is
that before one is able to formulate institutional rules governing student use of cognitive
enhancers in academia, one must determine whether there the use of these enhancements
is cheating or not.
In the following sections, I examine the question of cheating, the positions that think
the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating (or not), and the ramifications this focus on the
question of cheating has had on issues of enhancement in academia.
2.5 Questions of Cheating
“Anything worth having is worth cheating for.”
—W.C. Fields
In the contemporary discussion of enhancement in academia, answering the question,
“What should be the institutional rules governing student use of cognitive enhancers in
academia?” requires an antecedent answer to the question of cheating: “Is a student who
uses cognitive enhancers for enhancement cheating?” The permissibility of students using
cognitive enhancers depends upon whether a student’s use of cognitive enhancers is
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cheating. By answering the question of cheating, one is then able to formulate
institutional rules for governing student use of cognitive enhancers in academia. If using
cognitive enhancers is cheating, then academia should have institutional rules prohibiting
students from using them; if using cognitive enhancer is not cheating, academia should
have institutional rules that permit students to use them.
It is understandable why the question of cheating frames the current discussion of
enhancement in academia. First, at least under normal conditions, cheating is wrong.
Second, if using cognitive enhancers is cheating, then it is easy to assess a student’s
discrete act (did they use a cognitive enhancer or not?). Third, the notion of cheating
encapsulates difficult and different conceptions of enhancements by regarding them as
being “positional goods” (items that provide or give a person a competitive advantage).
Finally, the question of cheating allows one easily to categorize answers to this question
in one of two positions: those who think a student’s use of cognitive enhancers is
cheating and those who do not.
The question of cheating has generated two well-entrenched positions that are
inconclusive and fail to advance the discussion of enhancement in academia. In the
following, I reconstruct in broad strokes these two positions in broad strokes. Although
this reconstruction of the two positions does not perfectly align with any particular
author’s work, it does present the central arguments about cheating. After reconstructing
a position’s argument, the challenges to the argument are presented, not as refutations but
to show that the arguments are inconclusive. That these arguments afford no conclusive
answers has prevented the discussion of enhancement in academia from advancing. In
particular, there are few approaches that provide a framework for the role of enhancement
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in academia and what academia’s institutional rules should be for governing students’ use
of cognitive enhancers.
2.5.1 Students Who Use Cognitive Enhancers Are Cheating
For those who think a student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating, their
argument is that although academia currently lacks explicit or intentional institutional
rules against the use of cognitive enhancers, there should be such a rule. Their reasoning
is that a student who uses cognitive enhancers has an unfair competitive advantage
against other students because her capacities of focus and concentration are functioning
well beyond those of non-enhanced students. This student has more energy for studying
(since cognitive enhancers are amphetamine based) and higher functioning levels of
focus and concentration, while human physiology constrains students who are not using
cognitive enhancers. Therefore, Oliver and Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is in
principle impermissible since these enhancements result in them having an unfair
competitive advantage. The implication is that there should be institutional rules
prohibiting students from using a cognitive enhancer in academia.
Neil Levy’s Ethical Parity Principle (EPP) poses a challenge for those who think a
student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating (Levy 2007). Levy develops EPP in his
discussion of extended and embedded hypotheses of human cognition. To understand
EPP, I must briefly explicate both the extended and embedded human cognition
hypotheses in cognitive science and neuroethics.
The extended cognition hypothesis holds that human cognition should be understood
as a set of internal and external mechanisms and processes; this leads many such as Levy
and Andy Clark to argue that human cognition should be understood as extending beyond
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a person’s cranium into the world (Levy 2007; Clark 2001; Horst 2011). Levy
summarizes the view:
[Human cognition] should be understood as the set of mechanisms and
resources with which we think, and that set is not limited to the internal
resources made up of neuron and neurotransmitters. Instead [human
cognition] includes the set of tools we have developed for ourselves—our
calculators, our books, even our fingers when we use them to count—and
the very environment itself as it supports cognition. (Levy 2007, 29)
In the extended cognition hypothesis, cognition is best understood as being transcranial.
In other words, even though our neurons are separated from the environment by our
skulls does not mean cognition ends there. For this hypothesis, the environment is a
constitutive element of human cognition. However, many such as Frederick Adams,
Kenneth Aizawa, and Robert Rupert oppose the extended hypothesis of human cognition
because, broadly, to account for and assess human cognition, one needs to know in what
form human cognition consists. Put otherwise, transcranial human cognition is simply too
expansive (Adams and Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2004). For those who oppose the extended
cognition hypothesis, their argument is not that the environment does not support and
assist with human cognition but that if we are to understand the nature of human
cognition, understanding it as extending into the environment is unhelpful and incorrect.
The extended cognition hypothesis is a topic of great controversy and debate in
cognitive science and neuroethics. For the purposes of my research paper, what is
important is that the embedded cognition hypothesis and EPP are conceptions that result
from the debate. In Levy’s defense of an extended cognition hypothesis, he argues that
even those who oppose this hypothesis would reasonably agree that human cognition
should be understood, at minimum, as being embedded in an environment. Unlike
extended hypothesis, the embedded cognition hypothesis holds that while human
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cognition is located within the cranium, environment scaffolding such as external tools
and props are integral to human cognition (Horst 2011; Clark 2001). Levy states:
What matters is that we acknowledge that it is the combination of our
brains and the tools and props upon which we lean that makes us so smart
... high-level cognition, the kinds of thinking that makes us [humans] the
kind of species we are, is heavily dependent on the environment. (Levy
2007, 59)
In the embedded cognition hypothesis, human cognition is understood as being situated
in an environment that supports and assists our cognition. Human cognition should not be
thought of as extending from and consisting in our environment but rather that the
environment is integral to supporting and assisting human cognition.
The embedded cognition hypothesis is not only a reasonable way to understand
human cognition—even opponents such as Frederick Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, and
Robert Rupert agree—but is also particularly relevant in the case of academia. One does
think, if only roughly, that our environment via external props such as books, calculators,
smart phones, laptops, or the Internet plays a role in supporting and assisting student
development of intellectual capacities. If the embedded cognition hypothesis is
reasonable, and I think it is, then there are not only external props (books, notebooks, and
laptops) but also internal props such as psychotropic pharmaceuticals. This means that
cognitive enhancers are internal props because they assist and support cognition by
augmenting a student’s capacities of focus and concentration.
Given that embedded cognition hypothesis is reasonable and that both internal and
external props support and assist human cognition, the important issue is to devise a way
to assess these props for permissibility. Levy offers EPP as fair way to do so:
EPP: Alterations of external props are (ceteris paribus) ethically on par
with alterations of the brain, to the precise extent to which our reasons for
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finding alterations of the brain problematic are transferrable to alterations
of the environment in which it is embedded. (Levy 2007, 61)16
According to EPP, whether a prop is internal or external is by itself irrelevant. Instead, of
importance are the reasons for why one might hold a certain prop as being permissible or
impermissible (or problematic). For example, if it is impermissible to use memoryenhancing psychotropic pharmaceuticals because they provide an unfair advantage to
some students, then it follows that the use of a smart phone would also be impermissible
for the same reason. Alternatively, if it is permissible to use memory-enhancing
psychotropic pharmaceuticals because they do not provide a student with an unfair
advantage, then it follows that the use of a smart phone is also permissible.
Returning to the issue of cognitive enhancers in academia, EPP presents a challenge
for those who think a student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating. According to
EPP, if cognitive enhancers are impermissible because they provide an unfair competitive
advantage, then many commonly accepted external props would also be impermissible
for the same reasons. Compare the internal prop of cognitive enhancers with external
props like laptops or quiet apartments. Under EPP, if it is impermissible for a student to
use cognitive enhancers because they provide an unfair advantage, then one could equally
hold that it is impermissible for a student to use a laptop or to live in a quiet apartment.
The strength of this argument is that cognitive enhancers, laptops, and quiet apartments
function in a similar manner with respect to supporting and assisting human cognition. A
laptop does not directly improve a student’s cognition, but it does support and assist with
calculations and access to resources. Quiet apartments support and assist cognition by
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Levy actually provides two versions of EPP (weak and strong), but because I remain neutral on issues of
the extended mind hypothesis, and with respect to the scope of this research project, we need only be
concerned with what he terms the weak EPP (Levy 2007).
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providing privacy and solitude for study. Similarly, cognitive enhancers support and
assist cognition by augmenting a student’s capacities of focus and concentration.
According to EPP, the reasons for deeming cognitive enhancers impermissible are
transferable to quiet apartments or laptops. By extension, the argument that students who
use cognitive enhancers are cheating also implies that students who use laptops or quiet
apartments are cheating as well.
One who thinks the use cognitive enhancers is cheating might concede that laptops
and quiet apartments do provide some students with an advantage, but this advantage is
not strong enough to be considered cheating. Although this is a plausible response, for
those who think a student who uses cognitive enhancers is cheating, the challenge is
providing conclusive reasons or formulating an argument that differentiates the
advantages of quiet apartments and laptops from those of cognitive enhancers.
A second and more difficult challenge is in distinguishing cognitive enhancers from
other commonly accepted internal props like coffee and caffeine-based energy drinks. To
illustrate, considered a modified EPP, which I refer to as EPP (internal).
EPP (internal): Alterations of internal props are (ceteris paribus) ethically
on par with other internal props, to the precise extent to which our reasons
for finding one internal prop problematic is transferrable to other internal
prop.
According to EPP (internal), the focus is on the reasons why an internal prop is
considered impermissible or problematic (or permissible) with respect to other internal
props. The current argument contends that the reason cognitive enhancers are
impermissible is because in elevating a student’s level of alertness and focus, these
enhancements provide an unfair competitive advantage. Yet coffee and caffeine-based
energy drinks are both permissible internal props that also provide students with elevated
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levels of alertness and focus. In fact, empirical studies indicate that in some cases the use
of coffee by a person whose capacities of focus and concentration functioned at average
levels was more effective in providing alertness and higher scores on cognitive tests than
was the use of cognitive enhancers (Randall, Fleck and Shneerson 2004; Wesensten, et al.
2004). According to the EPP (internal), if cognitive enhancers are impermissible for
reasons of unfair competitive advantage, then this reason is transferable to coffee and
caffeine-based energy drinks, making them impermissible as well.
Even if one concedes that coffee and caffeine-based energy drinks provide a
competitive advantage, is this a reason for holding them to be impermissible? It is
unpersuasive to think so, and the following example illustrates why. Let’s say that in
Edith’s philosophy class there are two other students of note: Corey and Ian. Corey and
Ian do not have conditions or disorders necessitating the need for cognitive enhancers and
do not use them for enhancement. On the day of the final exam, Edith takes a cognitive
enhancer in the morning, Corey drinks coffee with double espresso shots half an hour
before class, and Ian takes and drinks nothing. In comparison to Ian, Corey’s capacities
of focus and concentration augmented by coffee seem to be a competitive advantage but
are not unfair. If it is a competitive advantage but not unfair, how does it differ from
Edith’s use of a cognitive enhancer? Therefore, EPP (internal) shows that for those who
think the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating, a challenge is distinguishing how the
competitive advantage provided by coffee and caffeine-based energy drinks differ from
that of a cognitive enhancer.
A potential response could be that unlike coffee or energy drinks, cognitive enhancers
have a greater potential for abuse and are more dangerous to a person’s health. The
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difference lies in health risks for students. An argument could be that the conjunction of
competitive unfairness and risk to student health is a reason to prohibit a student from
using cognitive enhancers while permitting a student to use coffee and caffeine-based
energy drinks.
However, this potential response overlooks the acceptance of some risks to our
health in the pursuit of enhancement. Caffeine can boost our capacities of focus and
concentration, but it is highly addictive and causes headaches, anxiety, and withdrawal
symptoms. Nicotine also improves our capacities of focus and concentration, but the most
efficient delivery systems for it (cigarettes and chewing tobacco) have an established link
to cancer and are highly addictive.17 Yet there is no limit on student consumption of
coffee or caffeine-based energy drinks or their use of cigarettes and chewing tobacco
because of health risk. So prohibiting the use of cognitive enhancers on the grounds of
potential abuse, health risks, and competitive fairness seems to overlook the fact that
many commonly accepted internal props also pose problems of abuse, health risks, and
competitive fairness.
Along with potential abuse, health risks, and competitive fairness, a salient
consideration one might use to differentiate cognitive enhancers from coffee and
caffeine-based energy drinks is that cognitive enhancers are biomedical technologies
(pharmaceuticals) that are not yet commonly accepted or widely used. Although coffee
and caffeine-based energy drinks may pose problems of abuse, health risks, and
competitive fairness, a reason (one not transferable to cognitive enhancers) that they are
permitted is that they are not relatively new biomedical technologies and are commonly

17

Sadly, this link between smoking and cancer was empirically established as early as 1954 (Doll and Hill
1954).
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accepted or widely used. However, this response does not provide a reason, at least not an
in-principle reason, that differentiates cognitive enhancers from commonly accepted or
widely used products. To illustrate, return to the examples of Edith, Corey, and Ian.
Instead of coffee, Corey decides to use a Guarana-based drink. Guarana is a South
American plant whose seeds contain a higher concentration of caffeine than those of
coffee (www.drugs.com 2012). Currently, the FDA has not evaluated the safety or
effectiveness of Guarana in products, but let’s stipulate that it is stronger and provides an
augmentation of our capacities of focus and concentration that is on par with those of
cognitive enhancers. Moreover, let’s grant that Guarana poses health risks similar to
cognitive enhancers. On the day of the final exam, Edith takes a cognitive enhancer in the
morning, Corey drinks a Guarana-based drink half an hour before class, and Ian takes and
drinks nothing. In comparison to Ian, if this Guarana-based drink augments Corey’s
capacities of focus and concentration, is that not an unfair advantage? If it is an unfair
advantage, how does it differ from Edith’s use of a cognitive enhancer?
Both cognitive enhancers and Guarana-based products provide augmentation to
Corey and Edith’s capacities of focus and concentration that are greater than Ian’s
capacities. Both enhancers are not commonly accepted or widely used, pose health risks
or at least unknown health risks, and have the potential for abuse. It seems that if one
wants to prohibit cognitive enhancers because they are not commonly accepted or widely
used, then one also would have to prohibit a student from using a Guarana-based product.
Yet the fact that this argument would hold that a Guarana-based product is also
prohibited demonstrates that permissibility of a biomedical technology depends on
common acceptance or wide use. At least in principle, that some things are commonly
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accepted or widely used is not a reason that differentiates cognitive enhancers from
coffee, caffeine-based energy drinks, or Guarana-based products.
Therefore the EPP (internal) shows that for those who think the use of cognitive
enhancers is cheating, a challenge lies in providing reasons for why the advantage
provided by cognitive enhancers differs from the advantage that coffee and caffeinebased energy drinks provide. Until they can provide such reasons, their claim that these
enhancements are impermissible faces difficult challenges.
For those who think students who use cognitive enhancers are cheating, the
challenges regarding competitive advantage do not indicate that the position is
indefensible or that the countering position is correct. Instead they illustrate that this
position does not provide conclusive reasons for thinking that the use of cognitive
enhancers is necessarily cheating. Without conclusive reasons, the use of these
enhancements in academia is not in principle impermissible. Thus, for reasons relating to
cheating, it is difficult to argue that there should be institutional rules prohibiting students
from using cognitive enhancers in academia.
In the following section, I present the argument of and challenges to those who think
that students who use cognitive enhancers are not cheating.
2.5.2 Students Who Use Cognitive Enhancers Are Not Cheating
According to those who think that students who use cognitive enhancers are not
cheating, these enhancements are progressive educational tools that will result in benefits
for everyone in the long term. Thus, at least in respect to questions of cheating, one
should not create institutional rules prohibiting a student from using cognitive enhancers.

46

In this argument, while cognitive enhancers are positional goods, they are also
educational tools that maximize students’ intellectual capacities. As educational tools
have progressed, once-forbidden things such as calculators and laptops sometimes gain
acceptance and become almost mandatory. Like cognitive enhancers, calculators and
laptops maximize a student’s intellectual abilities. Cognitive enhancers differ only in that
this enhancement is a more direct (and perhaps more effective) tool for maximizing a
student’s capacities (e.g., providing higher functioning for concentration, focus, and in
some cases better spatial reasoning).
Because cognitive enhancers maximize students’ intellectual capacities more directly
and effectively, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that students who use these enhancers
might be more likely to participate in academia, which could potentially increase the
greater achievements of academia (e.g., obtaining a degree, making a scientific
breakthrough, creating new philosophical approaches, writing eloquent poetry, etc.)
(Mehlman 2004). If this is the case, then students who use cognitive enhancers likely will
have a network effect for cognitive enhancers (Buchanan 2008; Buchanan 2011). A
network effect for cognitive enhancers means that the value and importance of these
enhancements rise as increasing numbers of students use cognitive enhancers to
maximize their intellectual capacities.18 Thus, just as there was a network effect for cell
phones, there will also be a network effect for cognitive enhancers.
The overall increase in students’ use of cognitive enhancers would most likely
amplify students’ productivity, likely resulting in the creation of more new goods,
services, and scientific discoveries. Increasing students’ productivity and thereby creating

18

Allen Buchanan considers the network effect of enhancements, both genetic and chemical, as being not
only a fundamental reason for enhancing but also developing an ethics of enhancement (Buchanan 2008).
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more goods, services, and scientific discoveries will result in benefits for the students, the
university, and the general population in the long term.19 By using cognitive enhancers,
students’ productivity will increase so that they can handle their academic workload
efficiently and take more classes, which is beneficial because education is good for
human well-being. The university stands to benefit from the prestige and grants brought
in from scientific discoveries made by students. Everyone outside of academia stands to
benefit from the new goods and services that result from students’ productivity.
The analogy for cognitive enhancers and benefits is that of vaccination and herd
immunity. Just as a herd’s immunity increases when most of its members are vaccinated,
it seems just as likely that the benefits for everyone will increase with students’ use of
cognitive enhancers.20 Thus, for those who think that a student who uses cognitive
enhancers is not cheating, cognitive enhancers are merely a progressive educational tool
that will likely end in benefits for everyone in the long term.
The strength of this argument is in the sensibleness of two of its claims. First, it seems
plausible that cognitive enhancers really are progressive educational tools that allow
students to maximize their intellectual capacities. Although initially prohibited,
calculators and computers provide sheer computational power allowing students to
maximize their intellectual capacities. Similarly, if we allow a student’s specific
capacities of focus and concentration to operate at higher functioning levels, then it seems
more likely that a student will be able to maximize their intellectual capacities.
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Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, Daniel Wikler, and Maxwell J. Mehlman have argued
that the potentiality for benefiting everyone’s utility is a relevant consideration when discussing
enhancement (Buchanan, et. al 2000; Buchanan 2008; Buchanan 2011; Mehlman, 2004).
20
Allen Buchanan also uses this analogy but in respect to the dangers of foregoing enhancement
(Buchanan, 2008).
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Second, the claim that through more students maximizing their intellectual capacities,
there are greater chances of students creating new goods, services, and scientific
discoveries also seems sensible. Allowing the use of cognitive enhancers also seems
likely to increase the goods, services, and scientific discoveries well into a student’s postacademia career (Sandberg and Savulescu 2011). Thus the use of cognitive enhancers is
not cheating and one should not create rules prohibiting their use in academia.
Yet there are challenges to this argument. First, it follows an implicit form of
argumentation that Erik Parens refers to as an argument from precedence:
We’ve always used means A to achieve end A; means B also aims to
achieve end A; therefore means B is morally unproblematic. For example,
we’ve always increased the teacher/child ratio and reduced classroom size
(means A) to enhance student performance (end A); Ritalin (means B)
also aims to achieve enhanced student performance (end A); therefore
using Ritalin is morally unproblematic. (Parens 1998)
The trouble with having the form of the argument from precedence is that the
emphasis is on achieving a certain end, overlooking the fact that means to an end do
matter. As Dan Brock points out,
In many valued human activities, the means of acquiring the capacities
required for the activity are part of the very definition of the activity and
transforming them transforms and can devalue the activity itself. (Brock
1998, 58)
It is true that arguing that a reduced classroom size enhances student performance
provides precedence for Ritalin, which also enhances student performance. However,
there are many means for achieving an end that one would find unacceptable—even if
these means did actually achieve a certain end. Threatening to physically harm your child
is one method to motivate a child into studying, which likely would augment your child’s
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academic performance.21 But threatening to harm your child to enhance academic
performance devalues the activity of education. Thus, while the argument from
precedence is not a direct criticism of the use of cognitive enhancers in academia, it does
suggest a need for further examination of the ends this position seeks to achieve. The
question is whether the argument given by those who think that students who use
cognitive enhancers are not cheating devalues the goal of academia.
The challenge is that the argument devalues the goal of academia as much as it holds
a myopic conception of academia. Although it is true that there are many academic
activities and disciplines in academia that directly facilitate the creation of better goods,
services, and scientific discoveries, we should note that not all academic activities and
disciplines do so. As a whole, academia is intended to expose students to a multiplicity of
areas (e.g., the sciences, arts, and humanities), while this argument seems to view
academia in instrumental terms. There is nothing wrong with viewing academia in
instrumental terms, but doing so does not accurately represent all the reasons we value it.
We value academia not only because a student versed in the arts and humanities as well
as the sciences is socially valuable but also because being versed in these activities and
disciplines is often a good thing for human well-being. Put otherwise, the value of
education is often for its own sake. Academia is thought to make a person better even if it
does not result in new goods, services, or scientific discoveries. While this argument
explains an important aspect of academia, that students who use cognitive enhancers may
improve, it still does not capture many of the reasons for valuing academia. To argue that
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I say unnecessary because fear can be a good motivator. Yet there is a difference between an appropriate
use of fear as a motivator, such as a parent telling a child, “if you don’t do well in this semester’s grades,
I’ll reduce your allowance,” from an inappropriate use of fear as a motivator, such as a parent telling a
child, “if you don’t do well, I’m going to hit you.”
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students who use cognitive enhancers are not cheating because they potentially produce
more goods, services, or scientific discoveries does not account for why we value
academia.
Another related challenge that is likely to arise from holding a myopic conception of
academia concerns the implications of future technological advancements. If the value of
academia is taken solely to be for the creation of better goods, services, and scientific
discoveries, then it is reasonable that technological advances such as “uploading”
academic information directly into a student’s brain can also be taken as a progressive
educational tool. Simply uploading directly into a student’s brain may result in students
producing better goods, services, and scientific discoveries, but this goes against the idea
that academia is as much a process of development as it is an achievement. This myopic
conception of academia in the argument that a student who uses cognitive enhancers is
not cheating likely will lead to challenges from certain potential technological
advancements.
So far, the two positions’ arguments answering the question of cheating have been
reconstructed and their challenges presented. Challenges have been raised for each
position, but neither argument has been refuted. Nonetheless, these challenges indicate
that neither position provides conclusive reasons as to whether the use of cognitive
enhancers is cheating; as a result, they do not advance the discussion of enhancement in
academia.
While these two positions do not advance the discussion, they do demonstrate the
importance of relying either on the considerations of rules (e.g., rules prohibiting
cheating actions) or consequences (e.g., the use of cognitive enhancers results in benefits
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for everyone), or a combination of the two, to evaluate a student’s use of cognitive
enhancers. Any approach for determining the permissibility of cognitive enhancers needs
to consider rules. In addition to rules, an approach must be sensitive to the consequences
of students using cognitive enhancers. That the use of cognitive enhancers provides
benefits for everyone or alternatively harms students by exposing them to dangerous side
effects are substantial reasons in assessing their permissibility.
Although rules and consequences are two important considerations, there is another
consideration that can assist in the evaluation of a student’s action: motivation, or the
reason(s) a student has for using a cognitive enhancer.22 The reasons why a person acted
in a particular way often provide clarity and assist in the evaluation of their action.
Consider rules that prohibit stealing and the bad consequences of theft. If a person is
caught stealing food from the cafeteria, the initial assessment is that the student’s action
was wrong. But if it turns out that the person’s motivation for stealing food was because
she could not afford any food, then it seems her motivation is an important consideration
in the evaluation of her action.
Even if minimally, motivation also provides clarity and assists in evaluating a person.
Imagine that Bogart sends flowers to his girlfriend Izzy once a month. One can evaluate
Bogart’s action in respect to rules (one has a duty to make one’s partner happy),
consequences (the relationship usually is better after a partner sends or receives flowers),
or both. Yet Bogart’s motivation for sending flowers can provide clarity and assist in our
assessment of him. If his motivation in sending flowers is love, one would hold a high
evaluation of him; however, if Bogart’s motivation in sending flowers is out of the guilt
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My account of motivation, as reason or reasons for acting, remains neutral on motivations, reasons, and
the internalism and externalism debate.

52

he feels from his monthly infidelity, our evaluation of him would not be so nice. A
person’s motivation is significant person because an individual’s reason for acting does
change the assessment of them. As illustrated by Kant’s remarks on good will,
motivations matter: “It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even
out of it which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will” (4:393).
Motivation provides clarity and assists not only in the evaluation of a person but in an
evaluation of that person’s character.23 Compositionally, a person possesses many
differing properties and qualities, but a person’s character refers to the combination of all
of these properties and qualities in that individual (Homiak 2011). An assessment of a
person’s character is not in regard to moral worth but rather an assessment of the kind of
person he or she is. As it is a combination and embodiment of all of these properties and
qualities, an individual’s character is something that is built up and expressed over time
through choices and actions.
It is difficult to distinguish motivation from character clearly; however, an
individual’s reason for acting is often as reflective of their character. Moreover, that an
individual acts for certain motivations rather than for other reasons also is indicative of
their character. Consider that if Bogart’s monthly motivation for sending flowers to Izzy
is for reasons of love, then these motivations are reflective of Bogart having good
character and being the kind of person one admires. Alternatively, if his motivations for
sending flowers are reasons of guilt over his monthly infidelity, then these motivations
are reflective of Bogart having bad character and being the kind of person one despises.
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This sense of character I interchangeably refer to as a person’s character, character of a person, or simply
character.
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Whether in the evaluation of actions, people, or character, motivation is a significant
consideration.
In respect to students and cognitive enhancers, motivation is a consideration that
impacts the evaluation of students using these enhancements. To illustrate, let’s reexamine Oliver and Edith’s cases. Oliver’s motivation for using cognitive enhancers is to
make up an assignment because of improper study habits. Typically, this is not a good
reason and does not reflect well on Oliver’s character. Even if the use of cognitive
enhancers in academia is wrong based on an all-things-considered judgment, one can still
hold that Oliver’s motivations reflect poorly on his character.
Now contrast Oliver’s motivation with Edith’s motivation: Edith uses the cognitive
enhancer so she can devote all of her spare time to learning philosophy. Generally
speaking, one would consider this a good reason, an indicator that Edith has good
character. Again, even if the use of cognitive enhancers in academia is wrong based on an
all-things-considered judgment, one can still hold that Edith’s motivation reflects a good
attitude and character. Motivations are a significant consideration because they
differentiate Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers from Oliver’s, and even if Edith’s
motivation may not justify her use of cognitive enhancers, they do indicate that she has
good character, even if minimally. Any approach attempting to advance the discussion of
enhancement in academia must account not only for considerations of rules and
consequences but also for motivations.
That academia’s current institutional rules do not decisively determine the
permissibility of student use of cognitive enhancers and that arguments about whether the
use of cognitive enhancers is cheating are inconclusive prevent the discussion of
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enhancement in academia from advancing. That the discussion has not advanced beyond
the question of cheating is a reason why there are few systematic approaches that provide
a framework to elucidate permissibility and stipulate what academia’s institutional rules
should be for governing student use of cognitive enhancers. In addition, any approach
attempting to advance issues of enhancement in academia faces the task of appropriately
balancing the value of academia and enhancement with the considerations of rules,
consequences, and motivations.
In the following chapter, I offer an approach for advancing the discussion of
enhancement in academia that provides a framework for elucidating student use of
cognitive enhancers and stipulates institutional rules for governing these enhancements in
academia. This approach towards enhancement in academia is from the perspective of the
ideals of human excellence or virtues. This virtues-based approach contends that one kind
of student to want in academia is the virtuous student or, at minimum, one possessing
certain virtues. A virtuous student may choose to use cognitive enhancers for reasons of
self-improvement, and that cognitive enhancers is permissible under certain conditions.
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Chapter 3 Ideals of Human Excellence
To begin, put aside⎯for the moment⎯issues pertaining to enhancement in academia,
permissibility, and institutional rules.24 Instead, begin by asking, “What kinds of students
do we want in our academic institutions?” One plausible answer concerns the ideals of
human excellence or virtues. One kind of student we want in our academic institutions is
a student who is virtuous or, at least minimally, possesses certain virtues. In the following
paragraphs, I offer an account of virtue that serves as an outline for which my account of
virtuous students fills in the details.25
Conceptually, virtues are the properties of a person that make their possessor an ideal
of human excellence (Aristotle 1984; R. M. Adams 2006; J. D. Wallace 1978; Tzun
1963; Zagzebski 1999). Broadly speaking, these virtues are character traits, emotional
tendencies, or dispositions to think, feel, and act in certain ways. The motivational
structures (character traits or emotional tendencies) are stable and enduring, and the
dispositions (thoughts, feeling, and actions) are regular and reliable.26 A virtue requires a
strong connection between a person’s motivational structures and dispositions. A person
with the virtue of compassion has a character trait to comfort those in need and is
successful in providing such comfort. This person consistently thinks, feels, and acts in
ways to comfort other people; a single compassionate action does not mean a person has
24

Elements of this chapter were published as “Ideals of Student Excellence and Enhancement” in
Neuroethics (Enck 2012).
25
My account shares and draws upon many common features in an Aristotelian conception of virtue. Yet
strictly speaking my account is not an Aristotelian conception of virtue, as evident in the reliance on
Confucian and Buddhist conceptions of virtues later in the chapter.
26
I use the terms motivational structures, character traits, and emotional tendencies interchangeably. The
reason for the varying use is that while all refer to a conception of stable and enduring properties of
persons, in some cases one term better fits the context in which I am describing a virtue. For example, in a
broad overview, motivational structure often works best, whereas in a situational context character trait or
emotional tendency is more apt.
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the virtue of compassion. Although one may have several reasons for consistently acting
compassionately, to have the virtue of compassion requires that at least one of the reasons
for acting compassionately is to provide sympathy or alleviate suffering. One cannot
attribute the virtue of compassion to someone who does not reliably think, feel, and act to
provide comfort or to someone who lacks the sufficient motivation of sympathy (or of
alleviation of suffering) for their actions.
The connection between motivational structures and dispositions in virtues
necessitates that the exercise of virtue is through practical reasoning: the process of
reasoning involved with deliberating upon and then undertaking certain acts (Annas
2006; J. R. Wallace 2009). A virtuous person, or one possessing certain virtues, has
attained practical wisdom. As I use it, practical wisdom is the ability to consider the
relevant information presented in a given situation and then to exercise discretionary
judgment to act accordingly in that situation. The Confucian philosopher Xunzi
characterizes a virtuous person’s [or gentleman or sage in his terms] practical wisdom in
a similar way.
[H]e cannot be subverted by power or the love of profit; he cannot be
swayed by the masses; he cannot be moved by the world. He follows this
one thing in life; he follows it in death. This is what is called constancy of
virtue. He who is such constancy of virtue can order himself, and having
ordered himself, he can then respond to others. He can order himself and
respond to others—this is what is called the complete man. It is the
characteristic of heaven to manifest brightness, of earth to manifest
breadth, and of the gentlemen to value completeness. (Tzun, Encouraging
Learning 1963, 23)
A virtuous person has practical wisdom for acting accordingly in a given situation and,
possessing a strong connection between motivational structures and dispositions, does so
for the right reason. That a virtuous person acts accordingly for the right reasons is a
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reflection on their character. It is a virtuous person’s actions that are reflective of
excellence. As Aristotle notes, “we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most
closely bound up with excellence and to discriminate characters than actions do,” but it is
this excellence of character that is of most importance (NE 3.2 1111b5-6).
One reason to want virtuous students in academia is that it is of great importance in
our lives that a person’s actions and motivations are strongly and appropriately
connected. We place great value on having good character. When raising children,
parents not only want them to think, act, and feel in certain ways but, importantly, to do
so for the right reasons as a matter of character. This isn’t surprising since we value (and
want) physicians and soldiers to think, act, and feel in ways strongly connected to
compassion or honor. One would want students in academia whose character is such that
they think, act, and feel in certain ways for the right reasons.
Consider the cases of Vincent and Mark, two students in a course on Buddhism.
Vincent wants to understand Buddhism’s tenets of Four Noble Truths and anattā (the
concept of no-self) because these tenets challenge Vincent’s belief system. For Vincent,
learning about a multiplicity of viewpoints provides a wider and deeper range of options
for assessing his own life. Mark also wants to understand Buddhism’s tenets of Four
Noble Truths and anattā but not because these views challenge his belief system or
because they permit a wider and deeper range of options for self-assessment. Instead,
Mark simply to pass the course with a good grade. In this case, although we would
typically regard both Vincent and Mark’s dispositions as being permissible, one prefers a
student with Vincent’s motivation because the desire to understand a challenging belief
system is indicative of character. Therefore, when considering the kind of student we
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want in academia, the motivations students have for their academic projects connote their
character. Our belief in the importance of character is a reason for wanting students in
academia to be virtuous or to possess certain virtues.
One might object and argue that although he lacks a good motivation for his
dispositions, indicating a poor attitude and character, Mark is not doing anything
impermissible. This certainly is true, but a student who lacks the proper motivation is not
the kind of student we want in academia. One wants students to think, act, and feel in
certain ways and to have good reasons for doing so. Given a choice about the kind of
students preferred in academia, it seems plausible that we want students who are virtuous
or, at least minimally, possess certain virtues.
3.1 Virtues of Students
With respect to virtuous students, at a minimum one would want these students to
possess the virtues of seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs. Seeking
understanding is a structuring virtue: a character trait that organizes and configures one’s
activities (Adams 2006). In seeking understanding, a student has the motivational
structure to organize and configure his dispositions to seek greater comprehension of the
human experience. This virtue motivates a student to structure activities so that he can
draw upon and make connections about accurate beliefs between diverse academic
domains and disciplines. One of the goals of academia is to expose students to the various
disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities, so
students with this virtue can draw upon and make connections between many diverse
disciples.
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It is reasonable to want students to possess this character trait. Considering the goals
of academia and, more broadly, the kind of creatures humans are—social animals
possessing advanced cognitive capacities—seeking understanding is an ideal of human
excellence. Assume that Edith has this virtue and is also taking the course in Buddhism.
She is motivated to comprehend Buddhism and has the dispositions to connect
Buddhism’s conception of loving-kindness to her own and other’s experiences in life. As
a matter of character, Edith’s character trait is not only that of an ideal student but is also
an ideal of human excellence.
A second virtue is that of seeking accurate beliefs, beliefs that correctly
represent/depict the world/reality. A student with this virtue has the character trait to
pursue accurate beliefs actively. Seeking accurate beliefs usually is considered a good
thing: scientists, police detectives, physicists, and historians are nearly universally
commended for seeking accurate beliefs. So it seems quite natural to think that one would
also want students, as a matter of character, to seek accurate beliefs because they are not
only a mark of excellence in thought but also conducive to the goals of academia.
Still, one may object that seeking accurate beliefs is not of such significance to be
considered an ideal of human excellence: a person who reads an entire phonebook or
counts every blade of grass in their yard is seeking beliefs that correctly represent/depict
the world/reality. Yet one is hesitant to claim that this person’s practice of seeking
accurate beliefs is a display of human excellence.
However, this objection overlooks two important considerations. First, although
reading phonebooks or counting blades of grass are instances of seeking accurate beliefs,
they do not seem to be related to an ideal of human excellence. By examining each
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instance’s aims or ends, we easily distinguish instances of seeking accurate beliefs to
achieve human excellence from ones that do not. The aim or end of an instance of
seeking accurate beliefs is directed or guided by the particular domain it resides in. In the
cases of students possessing this virtue, the aims or ends of seeking accurate beliefs are
directed by academia. That we value education for its own sake—because it makes a
student better even if it doesn’t result in new goods, services, or scientific discoveries—
suggests that there are some instances of seeking accurate beliefs that academia would
exclude. An individual may value reading phonebooks or counting blades of grass, but it
is not clear that the information and facts gleaned from these instances of seeking
accurate beliefs are something academia would value. In respect to the goal of academia,
reading phonebooks and counting blades of grass are not the kinds of activities promoted
in academia because it is not clear that they provide instrumental benefits, are good to a
student’s well-being, or are something to be valued for their own sake.
The second consideration that this objection overlooks is that in academia there is a
value in getting things right, that a person having accurate beliefs is both instrumentally
beneficial for helping people navigate the world and valuable as accurate beliefs for their
own sake.
To explicate, I need to make a quick illustrative detour. In the United States, there is
an ongoing argument concerning the teaching of evolution as part of the high school
science curriculum. Some citizens want creationism to be included and taught alongside
evolution in high school science.27 There are many reasons for being against the inclusion
of creationism in a high school science class, but one reason it is problematic is because it
27

One might argue that “intelligent design” is not creationism. The burden for this argument is in showing
how claiming a divine force intelligently designed or guided our evolution differs from arguing that a deity
created the universe. Intelligent design is simply creationism by another name.
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is an inaccurate belief. In a rough and broad sense, creationism does not provide students
with accurate beliefs about the world they inhabit. One need not object to creationism’s
religious overtones, only to the inaccuracy of creationism’s belief system. Consider that
our intuitions about inaccuracy would be the same if instead of creationism, there was a
moment to teach a theory of phlogiston or a “paleo-contact” theory of human
development in our high school science curriculum.28 29 Our intuitions indicate that we
value persons having accurate beliefs as being instrumentally beneficial for their own
sakes. Therefore, returning to the question of whether seeking accurate beliefs is a virtue,
if one thinks that it is good for persons to have accurate beliefs, then it is reasonable also
to think that it is good, as a matter of character, for a student actively to seek out accurate
beliefs in their lives.
I should note that this is not to claim that all of a person’s beliefs need to be accurate
or that holding an inaccurate belief is always bad—self-deception often has its benefits
(“this is a good dissertation”)—but in respect to getting things right, we value seeking
accurate beliefs for its own sake.
That we value seeking accurate beliefs as a virtue for students relates to the goal of
academia. Students are to be exposed to different and varying disciplines in the sciences,
arts, and humanities to facilitate their development of intellectual capacities. The
information provided to them from the sciences, arts, and humanities progressively gets
more challenging and in-depth. A student with the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs is
likely to participant actively in her education. The student with this virtue is also going to
28

Thomas Kuhn uses the theory of phlogiston and its eventual replacement by oxygen as a central example
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970).
29
The “paleo-contact” theory of human development, also known as “Ancient Aliens,” was popularized by
Erich von Däniken in the book Chariots of the Gods? but has long since been discredited by science
(Schick and Vaughn, 2011).
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be diligent in assessing the accuracy of her beliefs while seeking to find more accurate
beliefs. So one wants students in academia to possess this virtue.
Therefore, if one kind of student we want in academia is a student who is virtuous,
then it is reasonable that these virtuous students, at a minimum, possess the virtues of
seeking understanding and accurate beliefs.
3.2 Virtuous Students and Enhancement
Returning to the issue of student use of cognitive enhancers, one can ask whether a
virtuous student would use cognitive enhancers or not.30 I argue that for reasons of selfimprovement, a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive enhancers. In considering
whether to do so, a virtuous student, having practical wisdom, would properly account for
the relevant information and considerations in a given situation. In a given situation, there
might be relevant considerations pertaining to rules in academia (were these cognitive
enhancers obtained legally or not?), consequences of using these psychotropic
pharmaceuticals (health benefits versus risks), and motivations. It seems likely that in
many situations, a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive enhancers for selfimprovement.
In general, the augmentation of one’s capacities of focus and concentration to higher
functioning levels is an improvement. Typically, enhancements result in 10 to 20 percent
improvement in a given task (Sandberg 2011, 79). For virtuous students, this 10 to 20
percent improvement is significant because with their capacities of focus and
concentration operating at higher functioning levels, these students could more efficiently
and effectively work on academic activities. By focusing and concentrating for greater
30

For brevity, I will use the term virtuous student to refer to “virtuous students or, at least minimally,
students possessing certain virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs” when possible.
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periods of time and by efficiently and effectively working on their academic activities
(arts, sciences, and humanities), a virtuous student would be able to seek understanding
and further pursue beliefs that accurately represent reality. That an enhanced virtuous
student is seeking understanding and accurate beliefs could (possibly) lead to new
scientific discoveries and the creation of better goods and services. More importantly,
even if they do not result in new scientific discoveries and the creation of better goods
and services, an enhanced virtuous student seeking understanding and accurate beliefs is
better for his own well-being. Thus for these reasons of self-improvement, a virtuous
student may choose to use cognitive enhancers.
Consider Edith, a virtuous student. Edith wants to take as many classes as possible on
a wide variety of topics. Her course workload is large, and she also has a part-time job.
Edith wants to make the most of her academic career, and for these reasons of selfimprovement she uses cognitive enhancers. These cognitive enhancers improve her
capacities of focus and concentration to higher functioning levels, resulting in her being
able to work efficiently and effectively through her course workload. This is important
because her part-time job limits the amount of time she is able to study. The use of
cognitive enhancers also allows Edith to pursue, improve, and develop her overall
intellectual capacities, further allowing her to appreciate and connect with her own and
other’s life experiences. So Edith may choose to use cognitive enhancers in academia for
reasons of self-improvement.
I contend that one kind of student we want in academia is a virtuous students or, at
least minimally, one possessing the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs,
and that this type of student may choose to use cognitive enhancers for reasons of self-

64

improvement. This account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers has three
advantages. First, the issue of enhancement is conceived in respect to the kind of students
we want in academia. Second, the virtuous student’s use of cognitive enhancers is for
reasons of self-improvement, which is consistent with both common-sense intuitions
concerning education and differing normative theories on the importance of intellectual
development. Third, this account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers is
consistent with considering advancements in cognitive enhancement as having the
potential to impact the world profoundly.
The first advantage of my account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers is
that it conceives of the issue of enhancement in regard to the kind of students we want in
academia by connecting the proper use of enhancements to the student’s motivation. The
kind of student we want in academia is one who, as a matter of character, acts for the
right reasons, and this extends to the use of enhancements. The virtuous student is not
using these cognitive enhancers solely to amplify productivity in academic activities.
While a student using cognitive enhancers for reasons of amplifying productivity would
likely result in the creation of more new goods, services, and scientific discoveries, we
don’t value students going through academia solely for the commercial benefits that may
be produced from academic activities. Exposing students to the arts, sciences, and
humanities is good for its own sake regardless of whether doing so leads to the creation
or bettering of goods, services, or scientific discoveries. That a virtuous student’s use of
cognitive enhancement is for reasons of self-improvement—to seek understanding and
accurate beliefs—is consistent with our argument that academia is valuable for its own
sake. By connecting the use of enhancements with motivations, this account of the
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virtuous student and cognitive enhancers approaches issues of enhancement in academia
from the perspective of the kind of student we want in academia.
The second advantage of this account of virtuous students and cognitive enhancers is
that it is consistent with our common-sense intuitions concerning education as well as
with differing normative theories that hold that the improvement or development of
intellectual capacities is of significant value. Consider that in the United States, citizens
are all legally required to undergo a minimal level of some form of education because of
the value we place on developing intellectual capacities. Beyond this minimal level of
education, it is common to praise and facilitate those who continue to improve or develop
their intellectual capacities. Persons are praised for going back to school to finish a
degree, for participating in intellectual events or conferences, or for attending a book club
meeting. Moreover, public libraries and educational opportunities are provided and
subsidized by communities to facilitate the improvement or development of citizens’
intellectual capacities, showing that this is a prominent and shared value of community
members.
The importance of intellectual self-improvement or the development of intellect is a
shared point among normative theories. Many differing normative theories contend that a
person does have an imperfect duty to improve or develop intellectual capacities. In the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that a person has an imperfect duty for the
improvement or development of one’s “natural powers” of reason, logic, memory, or
imagination; certain consequentialist theories such as welfarist accounts of
consequentialism could be construed as arguing such an imperfect duty (Kahane and
Savulescu 2009; Crisp 2006; 6:445; 6:390). Although Kant and consequentialist theories
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differ in their conceptions of imperfect duties (for consequentialists there is wide latitude
of situations and actions for a person to fulfill this duty, whereas for Kant—at least in the
Metaphysics of Morals—a wide and imperfect duty for intellectual development is not
morally required but is meritorious), there is agreement that improving or developing
one’s intellectual capacities is a good thing to do.31 Therefore, an advantage of my
argument that a virtuous person may choose to use cognitive enhancers for reasons of
self-improvement of intellectual capacities is that it is consistent with common-sense
intuitions and differing normative theories.
Finally, this account of the virtuous student and cognitive enhancers is consistent with
the view that advancements in cognitive enhancement have the potential to impact the
world profoundly. An indication of the magnitude of this impact is the amount of funding
the United States military provides for studying and researching advancements in the
neuroscience of cognitive enhancement. At first it might seem odd to consider U.S.
military funding as an indication of the potential that advances in cognitive enhancement
could have. However, considering that military funding has played a central, often
substantial, role in many if not all of our technological advances in the last 100 years
(space exploration, aviation, medicine, computer science, and the Internet), this
connection is clearly founded (Jacobsen 2011). In 2011, the military’s Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (commonly referred to as DARPA) spent $240
million on neuroscience research for cognitive enhancement (much of it likely going to
their “Continuous Assisted Performance” program), while the U.S. Army spent $55
million, the Navy $34 million, and the Air Force $24 million on similar studies and
31

The preceding account of imperfect and perfect duties draws upon both Michael Stocker and Thomas
Hill, Jr.’s work on of Mill and Kant’s conceptions of perfect and imperfect duties in the Metaphysics of
Morals (Stocker 1967; Hill Forthcoming).
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research programs for cognitive enhancement (Moreno 2004) (Tennison and Moreno
2012).
In Human Enhancement, Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu provide a quote from a
2008 U.S. military proposal that summarizes the potential the military sees in cognitive
enhancement:
The world contains approximately 4.2 billion people over the age of
twenty. Even a small enhancement of cognitive capacities in these
individuals would probably have an impact on the world economy rivaling
that of the Internet. (Savulescu and Bostrom 2011, 20)
Whether advances in cognitive enhancement come to the level of fruition that the US
military predicts is an open question. Yet from the amount of funding the military spends
annually, it is reasonable to think that advances in cognitive enhancement have the
potential to impact the world profoundly. This account of the virtuous student and
cognitive enhancers is consistent with such a view and, importantly, provides a
framework linking this potential to the kind of character we want students in academia to
possess.
3.3 Cognitive Enhancers Cheapen the Experience of Academia
An objection against this account of virtuous students and their use of cognitive
enhancers for self-improvement is that the use of cognitive enhancers cheapens the
experience of academia. Because cognitive enhancers allow a student’s intellectual
capacities to function at higher levels, these students—even if virtuous—are bypassing or
“shortcutting” the academic workload, thus cheapening a student’s experience of
academia (President's Council On Bioethics 2003; Sandel 2007). An analogy to this is a
mountain climber who reaches a difficult summit but instead of climbing, he or she
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reaches the summit by helicopter.32 The mountain climber does reach the summit (a goal
of mountain climbing), but by using a helicopter, the climber cheapens his or her
experience of reaching the summit. The use of a helicopter disconnects the climber from
the experience of reaching the summit: the climber didn’t overcome great odds, work
diligently, and experience the highs (and lows) of mountain climbing. Similarly, a student
using cognitive enhancers cheapens the experience of academia because he or she
bypasses the highs and lows of an academic workload because their intellectual capacities
function at higher levels. A student who does not experience the low of grappling with a
difficult subject or the high of completing an assignment on a difficult subject cheapens
his or her experience of academia. Thus, for this objection it need not matter that the
student is virtuous, only that he or she is missing the important, material experiences of
academia.
However, this objection is misguided because it rests on the presupposition that using
cognitive enhancers directly augments a person’s cognition. Cognition is the complex
interaction between a multiplicity of mental functions and neurological processes. In
respect to overall cognition, the use of cognitive enhancers—by affecting
neurotransmitters in the cortical and sub-cortical systems—augments the capacities of
focus and concentration (Smith and Farah 2011; O’Reilly 2010). Yet cognitive enhancers
do not bypass or “shortcut” the workload or the experience of academia. A student using
cognitive enhancers still has to do the same amount of academic work, but in augmenting
32

Maartje Shermer doesn’t think that this analogy works as an argument against cognitive enhancers, but
uses this example for the purposes of illustrating how cognitive enhancers could (possibly) be considered as
cheapening a person’s pursuit, achievement, or experience of an academic ideal. The President’s Council
on Bioethics has presented similar arguments about enhancements, although not construed in terms of
“cheapening experience” but rather in respect to the authenticity of a person’s decisions. Specifically the
issue is whether the use of Prozac as an enhancement could negatively infringe on the authenticity of a
person’s decisions (Schermer 2008a; President's Council On Bioethics 2003).
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his or her capacities of focus and concentration, they are simply using these capacities
more efficiently and effectively.
Achievement in academia ultimately rests upon the student. Whether using cognitive
enhancers or not, a student still has to make a decision actually to do the work. It is true
that cognitive enhancers do directly affect a student in ways that a laptop or quiet
apartments do not, yet the decision to do the academic work is the antecedent condition
for academic success. Simply using cognitive enhancers or any enhancement does not
guarantee academic success (e.g., just as one can have the fastest, most advanced laptop
but use it primarily for watching TV, one can also use cognitive enhancers not to study
but as an energy boost for playing video games or late night socializing). A student who
uses cognitive enhancers must still make the decision to work; thus, this student will still
have to work through an academic workload, experiencing certain highs and lows, and
thus have a full—not cheapened—experience of academia. Furthermore, that the student
is virtuous means that their reasons for using cognitive enhancers are not as an attempt to
bypass or shortcut the academic experience but for reasons of self-improvement.
3.4 Permissibility
I have argued rather broadly that virtuous students may choose to use cognitive
enhancers for reasons of self-improvement. This section returns to the question of
permissibility. If a virtuous student, or one possessing the virtues of seeking
understanding and accurate beliefs, chooses to use cognitive enhancers, does that make
the use of cognitive enhancers in academia permissible? I think that in fact it does make
the use cognitive enhancers permissible.
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Before explicating this claim, its negative aspects need to be clarified. This claim is
not that a virtuous student would always choose to use cognitive enhancers, but that the
situations and reasons a virtuous student would consider to justify the use of cognitive
enhancers are rather limited. In academia, a virtuous student has the practical wisdom to
judge the situations and the reasons for when to use or not use cognitive enhancers. There
are many rules, consequences, and motivations that a virtuous student would judge as
reasons against using cognitive enhancers.
Imagine that Edith is preparing to write her final paper for the Wittgenstein course.
There are many rules, consequences, and motivations that Edith would judge as reasons
against using cognitive enhancers. She may choose not to use cognitive enhancers if these
enhancements were illegally obtained from acquaintances, family members, other
students, or an Internet order. The potential harmful side effects, the withdrawal
symptoms, and the lack of long-term, empirical medical evidence concerning the health
risks might be reasons Edith chooses not to use cognitive enhancers. Alternatively, it
could turn out that the use of cognitive enhancers is likely to result in little or no
enhancement for her. Finally, Edith may choose not to use cognitive enhancers if she
lacks good motivations for using them. As a virtuous student, Edith would not think of
using cognitive enhancers to rectify irresponsible study habits, to competitively beat other
students like Oliver and Teresa, or to overcome the ennui of academic activity. Since
these students have traits that make them an ideal of human excellence, they find it
imperative to possess a sufficiently good reason for using cognitive enhancers.
In her consideration of her motivation, Edith, who has practical wisdom, accurately
accounts for her strengths and weaknesses when deciding on an action. She acts
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accordingly in situations because she has properly assessed her abilities as a
consideration. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu states the importance of understanding not
only your own but also your enemy’s strengths and weakness before acting:
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never
be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your
chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and
of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril. If you know
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in
every battle. (Tzu 1963, 84)
One need not engage in war or battle to understand that many situations end poorly
because people often inaccurately account for their strengths and weaknesses as
considerations when acting. This inaccurate accounting is a distinctive feature of practical
reasoning gone astray and a common reason for poor performance in an academic
activity. Students often fail courses because they overestimate their skill sets or, more
likely, do not recognize that some of their skill sets such as arithmetic, reading
comprehension, or writing are weak.
However, a virtuous student does recognize that she possesses weaknesses as well as
strengths. By identifying and acknowledging weaknesses, the virtuous student can
properly account for them as a consideration and act accordingly. For example, Edith
may realize that while taking cognitive enhancers will augment her capacities of focus
and concentration, this augmentation will not improve her writing skills. Thus Edith does
not take a cognitive enhancer while writing her final paper because she has accurately
accounted for her strengths and weaknesses and realized that what she needs is help to
develop her writing skills, not an augmentation of her capacities of focus and
concentration.
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Related to accurately accounting for one’s strengths and weaknesses is the
consideration of self-acceptance. By acceptance of the self, I mean that a person has
come to an understanding and acceptance of their ability; it is an acknowledgment and
recognition of one’s abilities and character. In a selection from the Tao Te Ching, the
Confucian philosopher Lao Tzu describes this kind of self-acceptance.
Fame or integrity: which is more important? Money or happiness: which is
more valuable? Success or failure: which is more destructive? If you look
to others for fulfillment, you will never truly be fulfilled. If your happiness
depends on money, you will never be happy with yourself. Be content
with what you have; rejoice in the way things are. When you realize there
is nothing lacking, the whole world belongs to you. (Tsu 1988, 44)
A person with self-acceptance navigates through the circumstances and situations of life
but is content with who they are as a person. In other words, he is not tempted by success,
a moment, or even enhancement to act out of character. A virtuous student, in having
practical wisdom, possesses self-acceptance.
Self-acceptance is important because even virtuous students may find themselves in
circumstances in which performing well at an academic activity would seem to require
that they act in ways that reflect poorly on their character. Imagine that Edith, being
virtuous and possessing self-acceptance, is struggling through a statistics course. In a
short time period, she has to finish a difficult final project. In addition, this final project is
weighted such that the faster she turns in her project, the more points she will receive.
Edith has two options: (i) she can take a cognitive enhancer and augment her capacities
of focus and concentration so that it is possible to work through all the algorithms to
finish her final project as fast as possible, ensuring a higher grade; or (ii) she does not
take a cognitive enhancer and attempts to work through and understand the material,
meaning it will take longer to finish and, as a result, lower her grade.
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In this example, the circumstance that Edith does not excel in this activity does not
mean that she will act inappropriately. A virtuous student is not always an “A student” or
excellent at every academic activity, but their actions always are indicative of good
character. A remark attributed to the great martial artist Rickson Gracie summaries this
point: “Sometimes, you don’t have to win. You cannot win. But that has nothing to do
with losing.”
What is important about virtuous students and self-acceptance is that it allows for a
virtuous student always to act in a manner that reflects excellence of character. In this
case, if Edith has self-acceptance, then she chooses not to take a cognitive enhancer,
which results in a lower grade but allows her to learn the material. Edith’s decision not to
use a cognitive enhancer is one that reflects admirably on her character. In particular, her
action is illustrative of the kind of character one wants a student in academia to possess.
Aristotle notes:
If activities are, as we said, what determines the character of life, no
blessed [virtuous] man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts
that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we
think, bears all the chances of life and becomingly and always makes the
best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the
army at his command and a shoemaker makes the best shoes out of hides
that are given to him; and so with all other craftsman. And if this is the
case, the happy man can never be miserable —though he will not reach
blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam. (NE 1.10
1101b33- 1101 a71)
In academia, one would prefer a student with lower academic achievement but good
character to a student with poor character but good academic achievement. That a
virtuous student has self-acceptance allows them to understand that what is of most
importance is not merely doing well on an exam or achieving a certain grade but striving
to learn in a way consistent with possessing good character.
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Since the situations in and reasons for which a virtuous student would choose to use
cognitive enhancers are rather limited, my argument is not that a virtuous student always
chooses enhancement. Nevertheless, because a virtuous student chooses to use cognitive
enhancers after assessing the relevant information and considerations in a situation and
for reasons of self-improvement, then the use of cognitive enhancers is permissible under
certain conditions in academia. This permissibility rests upon the central tenet of my
virtuous student account: the connection between motivational structures and dispositions
necessitates that a virtuous student has a sufficiently appropriate reason for acting. One
would not be troubled (or at least be troubled less) by a virtuous student’s use of
cognitive enhancers because, generally speaking, they have good reasons for using these
enhancements. Thus, the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers depends upon
students’ motivations. Put another way, a student’s reasons determines the permissibility
of using cognitive enhancers.
To illustrate how a student’s reasons for using cognitive enhancers determines
whether their use is permissible, let’s reevaluate Oliver and Edith’s cases. In Oliver’s
case, his reason for choosing to use cognitive enhancers is to make up an assignment
because of improper study habits. This does not seem to be a good reason for a student to
use cognitive enhancers. Because Oliver’s reason for acting, his motivation, does not
reflect well on his character and is not indicative of human excellence, it is possible to
consider his use of cognitive enhancers as impermissible. Now consider Edith’s case: her
reasons for using cognitive enhancers are to gain a better understanding of Wittgenstein
and for her love of philosophy. Wanting to better comprehend the material and achieve
intellectual development does seem to be a good reason for a student to use cognitive
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enhancers. Edith’s reasons for using cognitive enhancers reflect good character and,
importantly, are indicative of human excellences.
This evaluation of Oliver and Edith’s motivations is done rather broadly. Yet the
point is to illustrate that if the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers is dependent on
a student’s motivations, then certain motivations do justify student use of cognitive
enhancers whereas others do not. This account of virtuous students and cognitive
enhancers has done two things: first, it provides the general framework of the ideals of
human excellence for use in examining issues of enhancement in academia, which begins
with the kind of students one wants in academia. The permissibility of students using
cognitive enhancement then rests not only on considerations of rules and consequences
but also on motivations. Second, the motivations of virtuous students do justify the use of
cognitive enhancers as being permissible in academia. The implication from this account
of virtuous students and cognitive enhancers is that in academia, the use of cognitive
enhancers is permissible under the condition that students have a proper motivation for
using them.
That a virtuous student (or person) likely has never existed and that most of us clearly
lack virtue implies if that a virtues-based approach is to advance the discussion of
enhancement in academia, then it is necessary for it to formulate institutional rules to
govern student use of cognitive enhancers. However, this virtues-based approach faces
two related concerns about formulating institutional rules. The first concern is whether a
virtues-based approach can formulate institutional rules for governing student use of
cognitive enhancers when permissibility depends on a student’s motivation. Assuming
that a virtues-based approach could formulate institutional rules, the second concern is in
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relation to the strength of these rules. Institutional rules are not meant for governing the
virtuous but rather for governing those who lack virtues; that is, everyone else.
3.5 Ideal Conception of Academia and Institutional Rules
To answer these concerns sufficiently, I provide an ideal conception of academia.
This conception stipulates certain idealized conditions pertaining to academia and
students (Rawls 1999; Simmons 2010). In this ideal conception, I formulate institutional
rules to govern the use of cognitive enhancers and address these two concerns.
Elucidating a virtues-based approach from within an idealized framework yields a
theoretical view that I use toward enhancement in academia under non-ideal conditions in
subsequent chapters. For the remainder of this chapter, the work is in ideal theory and
within an ideal conception of academia.
The ideal conception I provide works within the following stipulated framework.
First, in this ideal conception, the goal, aims, and assessment of academia are as follows.
The goal of academia is to expose students to the sciences, arts, and humanities.
Activities in academia are structured by two aims: progressively providing students with
information of greater depth and improving their skill sets. Students’ academic activities
are assessed by an accepted standard in a competitive environment. Second, academia on
the whole is modeled on contemporary academic institutions in the United States, and the
assumption is that these exist under reasonable and fair social conditions. Third,
academia has made its institutional rules and rationales for these rules public. Finally,
students in this ideal conception of academia are compliant with the goal, aims,
assessment, and competitive environment of academia; additionally, these students have
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the requisite intellectual capacities and moral psychology. While not vicious, these
students do lack virtues.
3.6 Ideal Conceptions of Academia
With the framework stipulated, I now put forward two differing interpretations of an
ideal conception of academia: the first interprets the goal of academia in respect to
knowledge, whereas the second interprets the goal in respect to understanding. In the first
interpretation, students in academia are exposed to different and varying academic
disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities and
to obtain knowledge. As I use it, knowledge refers to the collection of information and
facts acquired through education. In the second interpretation, students are exposed to
different and varying academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to
develop their intellectual capacities and to attain understanding. Minimally,
understanding is an ability to draw upon and connect information and facts from diverse
domains and apply this information and facts to one’s own experiences.
The first interpretation has two advantages; first, one need not include the virtue of
seeking understanding as a minimal virtue for students to possess. Although it certainly
would be a good virtue for students to possess, the virtue of seeking understanding is
rather demanding since it requires not only having knowledge but also exercising a
sophisticated capacity with this knowledge. If the goal of academia is to expose students
to different and varying academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities so that
they will develop intellectual capacities and obtain a collection of information and facts,
it is simply easier to claim that a student only needs the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs.
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The second advantage is in respect to enhancement: that cognitive enhancers only
augment the capacities of focus and concentration and cognition is directly conducive to
the goal of academia. These enhancements augment the capacities related to the
collection of information and facts, making it more likely a student will obtain
knowledge.
The first interpretation of the goal of academia is a reasonable ideal conception of
academia, but despite the advantages provided by this interpretation, I am going to use
the second interpretation. Although an aspect of developing a student’s intellectual
capacities is obtaining knowledge, academia is oriented for students to achieve or at least
strive to achieve for more than obtaining knowledge. We want students to draw upon,
make connections between, and then apply the information and facts given in academia to
their lives.
While explicating this conception of understanding, I argue in the following section
why one should think of the goal of academia in respect to understanding rather than to
knowledge.
3.6.1 Ideal Conceptions of Academia: Understanding Rather than Knowledge
To demonstrate why I think one should interpret the goal of academia in respect to
understanding rather than to obtaining knowledge, consider the neurological
condition/disorder of prosopagnosia (National Institute of Neurological Disorders and
Stroke 2007). Agnosias are neurological conditions in which a person has difficulty with
recognizing or is unable to recognize certain objects, shapes, smells or persons, but
without memory loss or impairment to their specific ability (National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke 2007). Prosopagnosias are one type of agnosia in
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which an individual has no impairment of their visual abilities or their memory but has
difficulty recognizing, or is unable to recognize, faces—often the faces of persons close
to them such as spouses, parents, or their children (Levy 2007). For example, a patient
with prosopagnosia may see that an individual is a woman wearing a green dress who is
5’4” and blue eyes, an aquiline nose, and brown hair. This patient’s memory is not
impaired, and he knows that he is married to a 5’4”woman with blue eyes, an aquiline
nose, and brown hair. Yet it is not until this individual speaks to the patient with
prosopagnosia that he is able to recognize the individual as his wife.
Prosopagnosia may seem like an odd example, but it differentiates my conception
of understanding versus obtaining knowledge. This patient has the relevant information
and facts and for all intents and purposes, he has knowledge about his wife. However,
what the patient is unable to do or lacks the ability to do is to connect and apply this
knowledge to his experiences. In respect to my research project, the point of using
prosopagnosia is that this patient seems to have knowledge but lacks understanding.
What the disorder of prosopagnosias makes clear is that while a person possessing
information and facts is important, something that is often overlooked is the significance
of being able to draw upon, make connections with, and apply this knowledge to one’s
life.
With respect to an ideal conception of academia, it is reasonable to expect that its
goal should be interpreted in respect to understanding. We want students in academia to
be exposed to different and varying academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and
humanities to develop their intellectual capacities and to draw upon, make connections
with, and apply the information and facts from these different and varying academic
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disciplines to their lives. That academia is valuable instrumentally and for its own sake is
consistent with its goal of attaining understanding. Consider the following illustration:
Teresa is a student in academia who is taking a course in human physiology. She just
finished her midterms, which covered the topics of nutrition and the human immune
system. After a day of midterm exams, Teresa goes to her local grocery store to shop for
food. While shopping, she passes a stand selling Airborne™. This product states that
because it contains large amounts of vitamin C, it can prevent a person from getting a
common cold. Drawing upon, connecting with, and applying the information and facts
from her human physiology course, Teresa knows that although vitamin C may mildly
ameliorate the duration or intensity of a common cold, it has not clinically been proven to
prevent an individual from getting a common cold (Doheny 2008) 33 Teresa decides not
to buy this product.
This example may strike some as pedestrian, but consider what Teresa did. She drew
upon, connected, and then applied information and facts she learned in academia to her
own life experience. This behavior is why we value academia for students. One might
think that this example merely shows some sort of consumer transaction and does not
accurately represent the value in academia. However, if the situation and product were
something else, such as Teresa deciding whether to buy shark cartilage as a treatment for
cancer or deciding whether or not to use a vaccine on her newborn infant, then the level
of importance certainly increases. Yet the value of Teresa drawing upon, making
connections, and then applying information and facts she learned in academia to her own
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Misleading claims is not something unique to Airborne™. Other products such as Pfizer’s vitamin line
Centrum™ has faced similar concerns and criticism about its “colon health” or “energy boost,” and the
majority of supplements for athletic performance are unregulated (Hensley 2012; Epstein and Dohrmann
2009).
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life experience would not change. Teresa attaining understanding is both instrumentally
beneficial and good for its own sake. Therefore, it is reasonable that the goal of an ideal
conception of academia should be to expose students to different and varying academic
disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities and
to attain understanding.
3.6.2 Two Worries About Understanding
There are two worries that understanding, as I conceive of it, must navigate. The first
is that this conception of understanding seems to suggest that the value of understanding
is only in application. Alternatively, the second worry is that by encapsulating other
values of understanding besides applicable ones, this conception of understanding
becomes too broad and runs the risk of being too vague to adequately interpret the goal of
academia. I address both of these worries and in doing so provide greater detail to this
conception of understanding.
The first worry is that while this conception of understanding is broadly accurate, it
may focus too heavily on understanding as mere ability or application. If understanding is
thought of strictly as ability or if it focuses too much on application, then this conception
of understanding treads dangerously close to being merely instrumentally valuable.34 The
problem (similar to the argument for those who think the use of cognitive enhancers is
not cheating) is that we clearly don’t value understanding solely for its instrumental
purposes. The value of understanding is not as subsequent ability or in its application, but
as something good for its own sake. Like education, understanding is good for its own
sake because it makes a student a better person, regardless of other uses. One might point

34

Jon Garthoff brought this concern to my attention.
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to Teresa’s case as illustrating only the instrumental value of understanding. In her case,
understanding is only valuable because she applied it to the situation and avoided buying
sham products, not because it was good for its own sake. If understanding is then only
instrumentally valuable and the goal of academia is interpreted in respect to attaining it,
the worry is that this conception of understanding ultimately misrepresents the value of
academia in this ideal conception.
At least to me, it is not clear why thinking of understanding as a kind of ability or
focusing on its application to a student’s experience implies (or is dangerously close to
implying) that it is only instrumentally valuable. This worry seems to imply that if the
value of something is as a kind of ability or application, then its value is solely
instrumental. Yet this seems incorrect: there are some abilities that are still abilities
valuable for their own sake, even if we focus on them with regard to their application or
practical use.
Consider psychopathy, a mental condition or disorder in which a person lacks a
cognitive-affective ability for empathy or remorse and is identified by callous and
exploitive behavior (L. J. Cohen 2011; Schouten and Silver 2012). A person with
psychopathy knows a wide range of information and facts concerning other persons,
including that other persons have emotions, can feel pain and pleasure, and have goals
different from their own. Yet a psychopath lacks the cognitive ability to connect this
information and facts about other persons and apply them to their own actions effectively.
Psychopaths are often charming and endearing but simply lack the ability to connect with
other persons in such a way that allows them to think of other persons as having any
value besides being objects for the psychopath’s own use. In the case of psychopaths, it is
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instrumentally bad that he or she lacks the cognitive-affective ability to connect with
others, but it is also bad for its own sake for persons who are psychopaths that they lack
this ability. Put otherwise, one thinks that being a psychopath is bad not only because it
likely leads to callous and exploitive behavior but also for its own sake because this
person lacks a pivotal component of the human experience: connecting with others is a
constitutive element of what it means to be human.
Similarly, although I often talk about understanding as a kind of ability or valuable in
application in broadly instrumental or situational terms, understanding is still something
that we value for its own sake. A student who attains understanding is better off as a
person even if they do not use that understanding for instrumental benefit. Analogous to
this is the case of a person who obtains an educational degree that does not provide any
instrumental or economic benefits, such as philosophy or art history. Although most
people would think that a student studying these has made a poor life choice in terms of
career objectives, these same people likely would not say that it wasn’t at least good for
its own sake for a student to receive that degree. Whether this student ever gets a job or
advances the discipline of art history or philosophy, attaining the degree was good for
them to do. In the same way, although this conception of understanding is most often
couched in terms of instrumental benefits, it is still good for its own sake.
To make it a reasonable interpretation of the goal of an ideal conception of academia,
a point I concede to this worry is that this conception of understanding needs to be filled
out further to answer why understanding is valuable for its own sake. To do so, I must
navigate the second worry, that in endeavoring to encapsulate fully the value of
understanding in academia, I run the risk of making understanding so broad that it
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becomes too vague. Consider what happens if one thinks of understanding solely as
comprehension of the human experience or fostering connections with others but not
within the context of some kind of ability or application. It seems true that these are good
things but they offer little clarity as to why the goal of academia should be interpreted in
this way.
In respect to this worry, I contend that conceiving of understanding as ability or
application does not exclude incorporating more value-laden conceptions such as
comprehending the human experience and fostering connections with others. In fact,
having the ability to draw upon, make connections with, and apply information and facts
to one’s own experience is at least one way to attempt to comprehend the human
experience. Moreover, that one connects information and facts and then applies them to
one’s life experience does seem to foster connection with others.
Therefore, if this conception of understanding navigates these two worries, it seems
reasonable and consistent with our values to interpret the goal of academia in respect to
understanding and not knowledge in this ideal conception. Even though explicating a
conception of understanding is difficult and my conception falls short of encapsulating all
the senses and values of understanding, one can still hold that it is what we want students
in academia to strive to attain.
3.7 Ideal Conception of Academia As Understanding and Virtues
In this ideal conception of academia, students are exposed to different and varying
academic disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities to develop their intellectual
capacities and to attain understanding. Although there are no virtuous students, the kinds
of students to want are virtuous students or, minimally, those who possess the virtues of
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seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs. These virtues are consistent with the
aims that structure academic activities: first, progressively providing students with
information of greater depth; second, working to improve students’ skill sets such as
reading comprehension, arithmetic, writing, and critical thinking; and third, making them
consistent with assessment against a set standard.
In this ideal conception of academia, although not vicious, students lack virtue. Since
these students lack virtue, this virtues-based approach must formulate an institutional rule
to govern student use of cognitive enhancers.
In the following, I formulate a virtues-based institutional rule and address two
previously raised concerns about (i) an institutional rule for governing student use of
cognitive enhancers when permissibility depends on a student’s motivation, and (ii) the
strength of this institutional rule in governing students who lack virtues.
3.8 Virtue-Based Institutional Rule
This virtues-based approach generates the following institutional rule.
Students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for using
them are reflective of ideals of human excellence.
I contend that this virtues-based institutional rule functions to govern student use of
cognitive enhancers in two ways. First, it functions to govern student use of cognitive
enhancers by indicating permitted and prohibited uses of cognitive enhancers. Second, it
provides guidance for students who lack virtues.
In detail, the first way this rule functions to govern student use of cognitive enhancers
is by indicating which uses of these enhancements are permitted and prohibited. The
permissibility of using cognitive enhancers is determined by a student’s motivation
relative to the ideals of human excellence. The following examples broadly illustrate
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permitted and prohibited uses of cognitive enhancers. A student would be prohibited
from using a cognitive enhancer if the reason is to make up for irresponsible study habits,
to competitively beat other students, or to work through a boring academic activity.
These reasons are not reflective of ideals of human excellence. A student would be
permitted to use a cognitive enhancer if the motivation is for self-improvement, seeking
understanding, or seeking accurate beliefs.
An initial worry might be that this virtues-based institutional rule is too vague.
Yet it seems that persons are often and without controversy governed by vague rules.
Consider children and certain rules in kindergarten. In a kindergarten class, there might
be a rule that states, “Students should be nice to other students.” This rule is vague, but is
it so vague as to be unable to govern students? I think not, in part because this rule does
indicate the condition for determining a permissible act: being nice. To determine
whether an act is nice or not, a student has to consider whether an act is pleasant or polite.
It is true that children at this age may not fully comprehend all the aspects of what it
means to be nice because there might be some acts they cannot determine as being nice,
or the children incorrectly believes certain acts such as pulling hair to be nice when they
are not. Still, this rule indicates the condition of being nice as determining a permissible
act. It seems rather uncontroversial that part of a child’s development in kindergarten is
for him to strive to determine what constitutes a nice act. That the rule is vague does not
seem to be a problem.
Similarly, while this virtues-based institutional rule is vague, it does indicate the
condition for determining permissibility: motivations that are reflective of ideals of
excellence. In particular, this rule stipulates that the condition determining the
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permissible use of cognitive enhancers is motivation relating to self-improvement, or the
virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. In this ideal conception of
academia, the goal is the development of a student’s intellectual capacities and the
attainment of understanding; thus the goal suggests that a student should at least strive to
establish what it means to act for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence.
Still, one might wonder how a student thinking about the ideals of human excellence
helps to determine what is a permissible use of cognitive enhancers. In fact, what this
student is looking for is whether a certain use of a cognitive enhancer is permissible or
not. Consider that in a meta-analysis of thirteen studies surveying students on their use of
cognitive enhancers, the most commonly selected reason for using cognitive enhancers
concerned the improvement of “concentration” or “attention,” “academic assignments,”
“grades,” and “intellectual performance” (Smith and Farah 2011). Are these motivations
to be taken as reflective of the ideals of human excellence? If a student uses cognitive
enhancers for such reasons, is it permissible?
The virtues-based institutional rule handles this concern because this rule functions to
govern student use of cognitive enhancers by providing guidance for students who lack
virtues. It is clear that a virtuous student (or person) even in this ideal conception of
academia does not exist; yet it does not follow that a student who lacks virtues cannot
rely on this virtues-based institutional rule to help them resolve a situation. That a
virtuous student chooses to use cognitive enhancers for reasons indicative of human
excellence, in turn, provides guidance for students who lack virtue for the use of
enhancements by providing them with an ethical outlook.35 An ethical outlook is not a
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Timothy Chappell also invokes the notion of an ethical outlook, but while our notions are roughly
similar, he employs the notion of ethical outlook as a critique of contemporary academic moral theory,

88

decision-making procedure but a mental first-person perspective that an individual uses
in attempting to conceive of a resolution to a particular situation.
For a moment, put aside this ideal conception of academia and consider the many
occasions in which people in non-ideal situations invoke conceptions of virtuous persons
to help determine a resolution. A physician may ask, “What would a virtuous physician
do?” a soldier, “What would a virtuous warrior do?” and a teacher, “What would a
virtuous teacher do?” Although a virtuous person likely has never existed and because
most of us clearly lack virtue, contemplating a virtuous agent is to deliberate on finding a
solution from a different perspective. The Stoic Epictetus suggests adopting such an
ethical outlook as strategy to prepare one’s self for situations of great importance:
When you are about to meet somebody, in particular when it is one of
those men who are held in very high esteem, propose to yourself the
question, ‘What would Socrates or Zeno have done under these
circumstances?’ and you will not be at a loss to make proper use of the
occasion. (Epictetus 1952–56, sec. 33.12–13)
By situating one’s mental perspective to that of a virtuous person, as John McDowell
contends, “A conception of right conduct is grasped, as it were, from the inside out”
(McDowell 1997).36 In a given situation, by asking, “What would a virtuous person do?”
a person attempts to determine a solution from the perspective of someone whose actions
and motivations in a situation are reflective of human excellence as a matter of character.
In invoking the conception of a virtuous person, a resolution to a particular situation is
gained because a person recognizes that a virtuous physician’s character is beneficence, a
virtuous soldier’s character is honor, and a virtuous teacher’s character is fairness. In

whereas my notion of ethical outlook is used solely to facilitate the project of providing a virtues-based
approach to issues of enhancement in academia (Chappell 2009).
36
For McDowell, adopting this ethical outlook is the necessary approach one takes in answering the
question of how one should live (McDowell 1997).
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everyday life, people use a conception of a virtuous person as an ethical outlook for
determining a solution to a particular situation. This ethical outlook is unique in that
whatever the resolution may be, a person’s actions and motivations are to be in harmony
and reflective of a certain kind of character.
Returning to the ideal conception of academia and a student who lacks virtues,
reflection on the virtuous student guides one toward a solution in a particular situation
concerning the use of enhancements that is indicative of the attitudes and character of the
kind of student one would want in academia. This virtues-based institutional rule first
emphasizes that a student’s dispositions may need to be aligned with the proper
motivational structures. Second, it provides an ethical outlook to use for determining
permissible uses of cognitive enhancers for a student who lacks virtues.
To illustrate, imagine that Oliver, a student who lacks virtues, has to write a term
paper on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and is considering using cognitive
enhancers. Wanting to use cognitive enhancers, Oliver takes his motivations to be
improvement of “concentration” or “attention,” “academic assignments,” “grades,” and
“intellectual performance.” Yet Oliver is uncertain whether these motivations as currently
stated would make his use of cognitive enhancers permissible. The motivations of
“improve concentration” or “academic assignments” do not provide that much
illumination in respect to determining permissibility.
To figure out permissibility, Oliver adopts the ethical outlook of a virtuous student
who, at a minimum, possesses the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs.
From this mental perspective Oliver judges the relevant information in his particular
situation: rules, consequences, and motivations. In respect to rules, Oliver considers
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whether there are any rules that prohibit his use of the cognitive enhancer, such as
whether these cognitive enhancers were procured illegally. Next Oliver considers the
consequences of using cognitive enhancers. What is the ratio of reward to risk? Is the
paper worth potential short–term health risks, such as headaches and jitteriness, or for
long-term risks, such as withdrawal? As a virtuous student would, Oliver would also
consider whether there are other options besides using cognitive enhancers, such as going
to a quieter place or starting the assignment early and working on it progressively.
Although Oliver’s motivations are currently indeterminate for establishing
permissibility, it would take very little probing on his part to find out. Do his motivations
reflect the ideals of human excellence such as self-improvement, seeking understanding,
or accurate beliefs? Do they reflect well on his character as a person? Would a virtuous
student have these as motivations, or would a virtuous person think these are good
reasons? Oliver would also consider whether he is being realistic about the strengths and
weaknesses of his academic skill set. Would using cognitive enhancers help to improve
his writing or just ignore a more fundamental problem about his writing ability?
From the ethical outlook of a virtuous student, Oliver works through a process of
practical reasoning to determine whether his use of a cognitive enhancer is permissible.
In adopting this ethical outlook, it is likely to think that Oliver would at a minimum
conclude that the use of cognitive enhancers for reasons pertaining to lack of study
habits, merely getting ahead of classmates, or completing a tiresome academic activity
does not reflect well on his character.
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3.8.1 Limitations of a Virtues-based Institutional Rule’s Ethical Outlook
By providing an ethical outlook, this virtues-based institutional rule does guide
students who lack virtues in respect to the proper use of cognitive enhancers. However, as
the following questions illustrate, there are reasonable limitations and constraints
regarding the guidance provided by the ethical outlook of a virtuous student. First, when
deciding whether to use a cognitive enhancer, must students who lack virtues always
adopt the ethical outlook of a virtuous student? No. In many cases, a student, even one
who lacks virtues, can decide if her motivation for using a cognitive enhancer is
reflective of ideals of human excellence. It is only when students are confronted with a
situation in which they are unsure of motivations and permissibility that they adopt this
ethical outlook. Second, when a student who lacks virtues adopts this virtuous student
ethical outlook, will he or she always be guided to the “correct” answer? On one hand, if
the “correct” answer is taken in the broad sense of a student who lacks virtues and is
guided to use cognitive enhancers for reasons reflective of the ideals of human nature,
then yes, it does. On the other hand, if the “correct” answer is taken in the narrow sense
of providing an answer to every particular situation and circumstance, then no, it does
not. Adopting a virtuous student ethical outlook does not mean that a student who lacks
virtues always will be guided to the correct answer or best course of action.
3.8.2 Difficulty of Arriving at Correct Answers
It is important to note that demanding a virtuous student ethical outlook to arrive
always at the correct answer or course of action in this narrow sense is unreasonable and
excessively demanding. The flaw is not with a virtuous student ethical outlook or for that
matter with a decision-making procedure; instead the flaw is in thinking that any ethical

92

outlook or decision-making procedure could always arrive at a correct answer. That life
provides many different, complicated, and difficult situations suggests it is unreasonable
and excessively demanding to think an ethical outlook or decision-making procedure
could answer them all.
For example, consider the difficulty that any ethical outlook or decision-making
procedure has in arriving at the correct answer or best course of action in providing
sympathy to grieving persons. We have all either given (or been on the receiving end) of
awkward hugs, conducted irrelevant conversations about the weather, or provided a
grieving person with excessive amounts of food. Whether one adopts the ethical outlook
of a virtuous person or the decision-making procedures based on maximizing happiness
or acting out of respect for persons does not guide one to a single correct answer or
course of action. Moreover, regardless of the level of subtlety and delicacy involved,
there are situations in which no action can ever be successful in providing comfort to
grieving persons.
From what I can draw upon from working as a clinical ethicist, the clearest examples
are situations involving telling parents that sustained treatment of their child is no longer
medically appropriate (or consoling them after their child has passed away). My point is
not that these situations are a reason for rejecting an ethical outlook or even a decisionmaking procedure. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that there are reasonable
limitations and constraints on always arriving at a correct answer. One is misguided to
think that any ethical outlook or decision-making procedure can always arrive at correct
answer in this narrow sense.
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3.8.3 The Necessity of Mistakes
Another reason that demanding that a virtuous student ethical outlook always arrives
at a correct answer is misguided is that it overlooks the importance of students making
mistakes in academia. For a student to develop their intellectual capacities and attain
understanding requires making mistakes. Students make academic mistakes, such as
getting an answer wrong on a test. These academic mistakes are facilitated by the two
aims and assessment of students. When a student makes an academic mistake, it is a
teacher’s responsibility not only to point out the correct answer but also to explain why it
is the correct answer. In pointing out the student’s error and providing an explanation of
why, the teacher facilitates the development of a student’s intellectual capacities and
hopefully moves them closer to attaining understanding.
Of equal if not greater importance is that students will make ethical mistakes in
academia such as violating an institutional rule. Academia is prepared for such mistakes
because it has processes and procedures such as judicial affairs and boards whose
responsibility is to provide appropriate punishment for students and to explain the
importance of an institutional rule. Academia is not only prepared but expects students to
make these ethical mistakes because it is an element of student development. Although
many students are caught plagiarizing every year, most academic institutions do not expel
students for their first offense. Academia expects a certain level of plagiarism among
students because of poor judgment on a student’s part. For a student caught plagiarizing,
the process and procedures of going through judicial affairs allows for a student to be
punished (such as by being failed in the class or exam) in a manner that explains the
importance of proper citation and the value of respecting others’ work. Whether it is
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academic or ethical, a student who never makes a mistake is a student who never can
develop his intellectual capacities or attain understanding.
Significant value is attributed, rightly so, on a person erring and having the prudence
to admit it. Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s Hagakure shows the significance of admitting one’s
shortcomings by a story concerning a debate about the potential promotion of a man on a
royal council:
At the time when there was a council concerning the promotion of a
certain man, the council members were at the point of deciding that
promotion was useless because of the fact that the man had previously
been involved in a drunken brawl. But someone said, “If we were to cast
aside every man who had made a mistake once, useful men could probably
not be come by. A man who makes a mistake once will be considerably
more prudent and useful because of his repentance. I feet that he should be
promoted.” Someone else then asked, “Will you guarantee him?” The man
replied, “Of course I will.” The others asked, “By what will you guarantee
him?” And he replied, “I can guarantee him by the fact that he is a man
who has erred once. A man who has never once erred is dangerous.” This
said, the man was promoted. (Tsunetomo 2002, 14)
It is both instrumentally benefical and good for its own sake that a person (or student)
makes a mistake and learns from it. It is unreasonable in regard to the goal of academia to
demand that a virtuous student ethical outlook always arrive at the correct answer or
course of action in this narrow sense because students would be unable to develop their
intellectual capacities or attain understanding. By acknowledging reasonable limitations
and constraints on ethical outlooks or even on decision-making procedures, this virtuesbased institutional rule does provide guidance for students who lack virtues in respect to
the proper use of cognitive enhancers.
Therefore, in an ideal conception of academia, this virtues-based approach formulates
an institutional rule that governs student use of cognitive enhancers, with a student’s
motivation being the condition that determines permissibility. Moreover, this virtues-
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based institutional rule’s reliance on an account of virtuous students as an ethical outlook
does provide strong guidance for students who lack virtues.
Nevertheless, there are two problems that this virtues-based approach and
institutional rule must face. First, even in this ideal conception of academia, it seems
unlikely that all students who lack virtues would follow this institutional rule. While
students in this ideal conception are compliant with the goal, aims, assessment, and
competitive environment of academia, it is inevitable and sensible to think that although
many students will follow this rule, some will not. In these instances, students’
motivations for using cognitive enhancers would not be reflective of the ideals of human
excellence. The problem is that if some students in an ideal conception of academia will
not follow a virtues-based institutional rule, does that suggest that a virtues-based
approach toward issues of enhancement in academia will inevitably fail?
The second problem is that even if this virtues-based institutional rule were to be
successfully implemented, does this virtues approach substantially advance issues of
enhancement in academia beyond questions of permissibility? The virtues-based
approach argues that cognitive enhancers are permissible but that these enhancements do
not directly augment cognition or the attaining of understanding; it seems unreasonable to
think that this entails both ideal and non-ideal theory reconceptualization of issues of
enhancement in academia. These two problems suggest that a virtues-based approach to
issues of enhancement in academia will at worst fail or at best fail to advance the
discussion of enhancement in academia in an interesting way.
Although these are legitimate problems for any approach attempting to provide a
general framework for advancing issues of enhancement in academia, I do not think they
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apply to this virtues-based approach. There is another way in which a virtues-based
institutional rule can govern student use of cognitive enhancers; it can structure and
develop the motivations of students in academia. As I argue in the following, if a virtuesbased institutional rule structures and develops the motivations of students in this ideal
conception, then it shapes the ethos of students. The ethos of students comprises the
attitudes and sentiments they hold in light of academia’s institutional rules and informal
pressures.37 I contend that with this virtues-based approach’s institutional rule, even if
some students do not follow it, it does more than establish permissibility: it shapes the
ethos of students who lack the virtues found in the virtuous student and thus advances the
discussion of enhancement in academia.
3.9 Structuring and Developing Students’ Motivations
To understand how a virtues-based approach’s institutional rule can shape the ethos of
students, I briefly return to two elements introduced in the first chapter of this research
project: the embedded cognition hypothesis and features of institutional rules. First, the
embedded cognition hypothesis holds that while cognition is located within our cranium,
our environment is also integral to human cognition. As Andy Clark writes:
The central idea is that understanding what is distinctive about human
thought and reason may turn out to depend on a much broader focus than
that to which cognitive science has become most accustomed: a focus that
includes not just body, brain, and the natural world, but the technological
props, aids and scaffolding (pens, paper, PC’s, institutions…) which our
biological brains learn, mature and operate. (Clark 2001, 15)
That the environment is integral to human cognition is clear. Yet if pens and laptops are
external props that can support and assist human cognition, it then also seems reasonable,
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This conception is derived from G.A. Cohen’s conception of ethos in his criticism of John Rawls (Cohen
1997).
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as Clark mentions, to think that institutions support and assist our cognition.38 While this
research project is not about human cognition or cognitive science, what I take from the
embedded cognitive hypothesis is that institutions are not only integral to the processes of
cognition but also integral to the way persons think. Put otherwise, institutions are
integral in shaping the attitudes and sentiments of persons. Henceforth my focus is on
how academia shapes the attitudes and sentiments of students concerning the use of
cognitive enhancers.
One way academia shapes the ethos of students is through its institutional rules. In the
first chapter, I broadly stipulated the features of institutional rules as the regulations or
protocols that govern students’ actions by stipulating or directly or indirectly indicating
which actions are permitted and prohibited. These features of institutional rules are action
guiding: student’s actions are directed in respect to these rules. In guiding the actions of
persons, institutional rules can structure and develop motivations in two ways: as creating
expectations of a pattern of behavior or as an internalized institutional rule.
In these two ways, academia’s institutional rules structure and develop the
motivations of students, which in turn shape the ethos of students. Consider how
institutional rules governing the use of cell phones shapes the ethos of students in
academia. Most students share the attitude and sentiment that absent mitigating reasons,
using a cell phone during class is improper.39 Anyone who has worked recently with
students in academia might disagree. Yet even during a lecture it is rare that a student
38

To be clear, Clark and other embedded (or extended) cognition theorists are working within the realm of
cognitive science: explaining the process and ways in which human cognition works. While my research
project does take environmental scaffolding (external props) as integral to human cognition, my research
project is not one of cognitive science (Clark 2001; Levy 2007).
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Notice that even if this is the ethos of students regarding cell phones, it does not mean that students are
always forbidden from using cell phones during class or that there is never a reason for a student to use a
cell phone under this rule.
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answers or makes a phone call during class. Most often, students use their cell phones for
text messaging. For the sake of argument, let’s say that text messaging does fall within
the purview of this rule. In fact, the majority of students are not texting during class, and
those who do often attempt to conceal (even if poorly) their texting. Students who are
texting attempt to conceal it because the ethos of students regarding texting during class
is not positive. Thus academia’s institutional rule prohibiting the use of cell phones
during class does shape the attitude and sentiment of students.
The question of importance then is whether a virtues-based institutional rule can
shape the ethos of students who lack virtue with respect to using cognitive enhancers. In
the following, I elucidate the two ways institutional rules can structure and develop
motivations and then how these rules would shape the ethos of students regarding the use
of cognitive enhancers.
3.9.1 Virtues-Based Rule and Expectations of Behavior
The first and most common way is by creating expectations of a pattern of behavior.
In that students have expectations of a certain pattern of behavior, institutional rules
direct student interactions. To illustrate, if there is an institutional rule for driving on the
right side of the road, a person has the expectation that under normal conditions, other
drivers will drive on the right side of the road.40 One’s expectation that other persons will
drive on the right is a reason for one to drive on the right. According to economists Avner
Grief and Christopher Kingston, these institutional rules create expectations of behavior
and motivations, thereby reinforcing this rule (Grief and Kingston 2011).

40

This example is used both in Avner Greif and Christopher Kingston’s work on economic modeling of
institutions and in Jon Garthoff’s work on the role of rules in moral judgment (Grief and Kingston 2011;
Garthoff 2012).
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In academia, institutional rules provide expectations of a pattern of behavior and, in
directing student interactions, structure and develop a student’s motivations. In academia,
a rule prohibiting a student from using a cell phone during class time structures students’
motivations. The students’ motivation is that this institutional rule is a reason for not
using their cell phone, and other students do not use their cell phones in class either, so
one can attribute this rule as their motivation to also avoid using a cell phone in class.41
Moreover, for some students, this institutional rule structures and develops a secondorder motivation: civility.42 It is a social courtesy, an institutional rule of etiquette, to the
professor who is lecturing and to other students who are listening to the lecture for one
not to use a cell phone in class. In providing expectations of a pattern of behavior and
directing interactions with other students, institutional rules structure and develop the
motivations of students.43
This virtues-based institutional rule governing student use of cognitive enhancers
holds that students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for doing so
reflect ideals of human excellence. This rule shapes the ethos of students in the following
ways. First, by indicating permitted and prohibited uses of cognitive enhancers, this rule
is action guiding and directs students’ interactions, which sets an expectation for a pattern
of behavior. It becomes expected that at least one reason students have for using
cognitive enhancers and a reason one attributes, even if incorrectly, to other students for
using cognitive enhancers reflects the ideals of human excellence. The expectation is that
41

While it might turn out this is not the student’s reason for not using their cell phone, attributing this
institutional rule as one their motivation does not seem to be unreasonable.
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Civility was considered to be the most important mark of a society by Samurai culture and its code of
honor (Tsunetomo 2002).
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Avner Grief and Christopher Kingston focus on this aspect of institutional rules and motivations by
studying and creating an economic model of institutions called “institutions-as-equilibria” (Grief and
Kingston 2011).
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student use of cognitive enhancers is motivated by ideals of self-improvement, seeking
understanding, or seeking accurate beliefs. Moreover, by making motivation the
condition of permissibility, this virtues-based institutional rule also can be seen as
shaping the ethos of students by endorsing a hierarchy of motivations. Via the
permissibility condition, this virtues-based institutional rule develops, cultivates, and
endorses certain motivations such as self-improvement, seeking understanding, and
seeking accurate beliefs while discouraging other motivations such as getting high,
finishing a boring academic activity, or making up for poor study habits.
When students’ behaviors follow an expected pattern and their motivations are
developed, cultivated, and endorsed in reference to the ideals of human excellence, their
attitudes and sentiments are more firmly shaped regarding the use of cognitive enhancers.
The attitude and sentiments of students would regard proper use of cognitive enhancers
(for reasons of the ideals of human excellence) as being good or admirable, whereas
improper use of cognitive enhancers (such as making-up for poor study habits) would be
regarded with distain. The ethos of students is shaped to regard the use of cognitive
enhancers as an action that is indicative of a student’s character. In general, students
would view students who broke a virtues-based institutional rule with contempt.
In viewing such a student with disdain and thinking that it reflects poorly on their
character, the ethos of students regarding the improper use of a cognitive enhancer is in
many ways analogous to the ethos of students regarding inappropriate language in class.
Students view other students who consistently use inappropriate language during class
with disdain and often think it reflects poorly on that student’s character. It need not
matter that inappropriate language is a prerequisite for student life outside the classroom.
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Within the context of academic activities, there is an expected pattern of behavior that
structures and develops students’ motivations, and the attitude and sentiments of students
is such that the use of inappropriate language is discouraged.
3.9.2 Internalized Virtues-Based Institutional Rule
The second way institutional rules can structure and develop the motivations of
students is when these rules are internalized, meaning that a rule becomes an element of a
student’s psychology. The kind of institutional rules that structure and develop the deep
(second-order) motivations of students are, as I refer to them, internalized institutional
rules. An example is the honor code for cadets at the United States Military Academy at
West Point. The honor code states, “A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those
who do." This institutional rule not only stipulates which acts committed by students are
impermissible (lying, cheating, stealing, or toleration of these acts) but also structures and
develops a cadet’s motivations; honor is a reason for acting accordingly. An honor code
such as West Point’s is an internalized institutional rule that sets the range of permissible
actions.
As I use the term, honor is to respect or highly regard something or someone. Taken
in this way, to honor a person or institution is to respect it and, alternatively, people and
institutions also honor a person by respecting this individual (Appiah 2010). The
conditions that govern honor are stipulated by an honor code:
An honor code says how people of certain identities can gain the right to
respect, how they can lose it, and how having and losing honor changes
the way they should be treated. (Appiah 2010, 175)
In academia, honoring students means to hold them in high respect or esteem. One
function of honor codes is that they indicate the conditions such as certain scholarly,
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artistic, or athletic achievements under which students may be honored (Appiah 2010).
For example, being placed on the honor roll or having designations of summa cum laude
or magna cum laude conferred upon graduation means that a student has met certain
conditions and thus academia is honoring them.
The second function of honor codes is that they indicate the conditions under which
students may lose the respect of academia or other students. If a student fails to maintain
a minimal level of proficiency in academic performance such as failing too many courses
or having a low GPA, or if a student engages in certain actions while in academia such as
cheating or being deceitful, this student is not shown respect. For Cadets at West Point,
lying, cheating, stealing, or toleration of these actions are the conditions for loss of
respect and expulsion from the academic institution.
By indicating the conditions for gaining or losing respect, honor codes are
institutional rules that govern and guide students’ actions. Honor codes then not only
govern and guide the behavior of students by setting the conditions for gaining or losing
respect, but they also structure and develop a motivation for following these codes. 44
Honor can become a motivation for students. Gaining the respect of an academic
institution, a professor, or peers can become a reason to act in certain circumstances such
as working twice as long on an assignment, pulling an all-nighter studying, or seeking
peer review of an assignment.
Honor is also a reason for acting because certain actions such as working twice as
hard or seeking peer review reflect well on students’ characters. If developed properly,
honor is not only a reason for acting but can become a stable character trait for regular
44

It should be noted that not all institutional rules are of the kind that can be internalized. It is not clear that
a person can (or should) internalize institutional rules concerning driving on the right side of a road.
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and reliable multi-track thoughts, feeling, and acts. For example, if cadets at West Point
internalize an honor code, living honorably becomes a way of life as a matter of
character.
Returning to enhancement in academia, in an ideal conception of academia, the ethos
of students can be shaped if this virtues-based institutional rule (student use of cognitive
enhancers is only permitted for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence) is
internalized. This rule stipulates which uses of cognitive enhancers are permitted and
prohibited. If students internalize this rule, it directly structures and develops their
motivations: the ideals of human excellence are always the reasons for using cognitive
enhancers. By internalizing this rule, seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are not
simply reasons for using cognitive enhancers. When developed properly over an
academic career, they become stable character traits for regularly and reliably thinking,
feeling, and acting in certain ways. Thus this virtues-based institutional rule directly
facilitates the development of the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs in
students who lack them.
This virtues-based institutional rule shapes the ethos of students to consider that, as a
matter of character, the use of cognitive enhancers should always reflect the ideals of
human excellence. It is only for reasons of self-improvement or the virtues of seeking
understanding and accurate beliefs that one should use cognitive enhancers. For an
internalized virtues-based rule, unlike a virtues-based rule that creates an expectation for
student behavior, the emphasis is on the use of cognitive enhancers as one clear
indication of a student’s character, to a much higher degree. This ethos of students would
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hold the improper use of cognitive enhancers as an indication that the student does not
possess the kind of character one wants from students in academia.
To illustrate, reconsider Oliver and Edith’s cases. Oliver’s motivation for using
cognitive enhancers is to make up an assignment because of improper study habits. This
reason for using cognitive enhancers is impermissible and reflects poorly on Oliver’s
character. Edith’s motivation for using cognitive enhancers is to seek understanding. This
reason makes her use of cognitive enhancers permissible and indicates good character. In
this ideal conception of academia, under an internalized virtues-based institutional rule,
both a particular academic institution and the ethos of students within it would regard
Edith as the right kind of student and Oliver as the wrong kind of student to have in
academia.
Initially, one might think that the ethos resulting from this internalized virtues-based
rule is rather severe, but consider that this ethos is similar to the attitude and sentiments
students have about the use of hate speech in academia.45 In general, students regard
those students who use hate speech not only as having poor character but also as the kind
of student one does not want in academia. The ethos of students is shaped by an
internalized virtues-based institutional rule that likewise considers those students who use
cognitive enhancers for reasons other than the ideals of human excellence as the wrong
kind of student for academia.
An internalized virtues-based institutional rule for governing student use of cognitive
enhancers facilitates the development of certain virtues and shapes the ethos of students
who lack these virtues so that the proper use of cognitive enhancers is always a matter of
character. This internalized virtues-based institutional rule shapes the ethos of students
45
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who lack virtues into mirroring the attitude and sentiments that virtuous students have
regarding the use of cognitive enhancers.
Whether a virtues-based rule is taken as an institutional rule that creates expectations
for patterns of student behavior or as an institutional rule to be internalized by students,
students’ motivations are structured and developed. This virtues-based rule shapes
attitudes and sentiments of students such that the use of cognitive enhancers is seen as a
reflection of their character. Therefore, a virtues-based institutional rule that permits
students to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for doing so are reflective of the
ideals of human excellence would change student use of cognitive enhancers in
academia. By re-conceptualizing the use of enhancement in academia as an issue of
student character, this virtues-based institutional rule advances issues of enhancement in
academia.46
3.10 Three Concerns About Shaping the Ethos of Students
In previous sections, I answered the question of whether a virtues-based institutional
rule can shape the ethos of students who lack virtue in respect to using cognitive
enhancers for the right reasons. I argued that whether taken as an institutional rule that
creates an expected pattern of behavior or as an internalized institutional rule, a virtuesbased institutional rule does shape the ethos of students. However, there are three
immediate concerns that both explications of this virtues-based rule are likely to
encounter. First, I argued that the ethos of students is to be shaped in regards to a virtuesbased institutional rule. At a minimum, this means that the ethos of students is shaped in
respect to the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs; yet one might worry
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about whether or not these virtues are of such significant value that we want academia (or
for that matter any institution) to shape the ethos of students in regards to them. Second,
it is reasonable to hold that an ideal conception of academia has the goal of developing
students’ intellectual capacities and attaining understanding. Moreover, it is reasonable
that academia’s institutional rules—as regulations or protocols governing students’
actions—structure and develop the motivations of students and shape the ethos of
students. The problem is that this virtues-based institutional rule is not just shaping the
ethos of students; it is actively attempting to facilitate the development of virtues in
students. In striving to help students attain understanding, it is unfair to task academia
further with the responsibility of developing virtues in students who lack them. Finally,
there might be a worry that this virtues-based approach makes an implicit normative
claim that students who lack virtues not only have to follow this virtues-based
institutional rule but also in some sense have an obligation to develop these virtues.
Each of these concerns addresses a different facet of this virtues-based institutional
rule or the context in which the rule is taken. I conclude the chapter by addressing these
concerns, further clarifying this virtues-based approach.
3.10.1 Are the Virtues that Significant?
To address the concern of whether these virtues are of such significant value that one
would want to shape the ethos of students in respect to them, I temporarily move outside
of ideal theory. To demonstrate the significant value of these virtues, I argue that one
would want everyone, not solely students in academia, to possess these virtues. That
these virtues are valuable enough to want all persons to possess them is a substantial
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indication of their value and thus why we should shape the ethos of students toward these
virtues.
In respect to the virtue of seeking understanding, first consider the importance of
having a motivation to seek greater comprehension of the human experience in a person’s
life. An illustrative example is the role that seeking greater comprehension of the human
experience has in medical ethics consultations. In many medical centers, if patients, their
families, or hospital staff members are troubled by a particular treatment plan, they have
the right to call an ethics consultation. In these consultations, a clinically trained ethicist
or consultation team is called to examine, assess, and provide a recommendation for
resolving the problem (Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade 2010). What distinguishes an ethics
consultation from other consultations in the medical system (legal, medical, or
psychological) is that these situations are often about values (Beauchamp and Childress
2009). However, in many cases it is not actually a dispute about value but rather a lack of
comprehension.
One impetus behind the implementation of these clinical ethics consultations is the
motivation to seek greater comprehension of the human experience. In doing so, one is
able to foster connections between persons. For example, a physician might recommend a
palliative treatment for a cancer patient, but the patient may choose to reject this
treatment plan. Initially, it might appear that there is a conflict between the physician’s
duty of beneficence and the patient’s autonomy. One of the first things that an ethics
consultant attempts to resolve is to ensure that both parties understand the relevant
information. In this example, the patient rejects palliative care for fear of addiction. A
resolution may occur when the patient is provided with information and comes to
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understand that the use of opioids during palliative treatment poses little risk of addiction
(Enck 2002; Seppala and Rose 2010; Dresser and Frader 2009). Another resolution might
be to provide information to the medical professional: as long as the patient is competent
and possesses decision-making capacities, he always has the right to refuse treatment
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009).47 It seems that even if providing this information does
end the conflict, it was good to do because it provided patients and medical professionals
with relevant information and fostered a connection.
Possessing the motivation to seek greater comprehension of the human experience is
significant for persons because it can lead to resolutions of conflicts as well as foster a
connection with other persons. Martha Nussbaum contends that the comprehension of the
human experience fosters a connection with other persons by allowing for a respectful
dialogue to begin (Nussbaum 1997). Jonathan Glover contends that a pivotal factor in
many historical atrocities was a general lack of comprehension (taken as moral
imagination) of other persons (Glover 2001).
Moreover, it is not simply the motivation of seeking greater comprehension of the
human experience and the connection it fosters with others that makes this virtue
something that all persons should possess. It is of significant value that a person is able to
draw upon, make connections, and apply information to their lives. Consider that all too
often, people do not draw upon, connect, or apply information in their lives enough. For
example, eating more than the daily recommended caloric amount can often lead to
obesity, and many items on a fast-food restaurant menu greatly exceed the dailyrecommended caloric intake for the average person (Schlosser 2001). According to the
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2009 to 2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 37.7% of adults in the
United States are obese (National Center for Health Statistics 2012). Some of the health
conditions directly related to obesity are heart disease, stroke, type-2 diabetes, and certain
types of cancers (National Heart Lung and Blood Institute 1998). In 2008 alone, the cost
of medical treatments relating to obesity and its related conditions was estimated at $147
billion (Finkelstein, et al. 2009). Yet despite the prevalence of information and facts
about fast food, caloric intake, obesity, and obesity-related health conditions, 17% of
adults eat at a fast-food restaurant two to three times a week (Alfano 2009). It seems that
people commonly do not draw upon, connect, and apply this information to their lives. It
would be better, both instrumentally and for its own sake, if more people sought
understanding. Thus seeking understanding is not only a virtue for students to possess in
an ideal conception of academia, but it is also a virtue that one would want all persons to
possess.
The significance of wanting all persons to possess certain virtues extends to the virtue
of seeking accurate beliefs. We would want all persons to seek beliefs that accurately
represent the world because finding accurate beliefs is a vital component in the
accumulation of knowledge. Consider that knowledge, whether provided in academia or
elsewhere, is consistently accumulated and passed on to future generations. The passing
on of knowledge to future generations is imperative to our development. As Neil Levy
points out, “If each generation had to start afresh, we would not still be in the Dark Ages;
we could never get near advanced as the Dark Ages” (Levy 2007, 43). I would add that
without consistently assessing our knowledge, even if a generation was able to
accumulate enough knowledge to be in the Dark Ages, it is likely that much of its
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information and facts would be greatly flawed. Knowledge is not static but needs to be
continuously developed, accumulated, and assessed. If a person has the motivation and
dispositions to seek accurate beliefs, they likely are going to assess and evaluate not only
the information and facts presented to them as canon but also their own beliefs and belief
systems. That a person has the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs is instrumentally good
for its own sake because persons are less likely to pass on inaccurate beliefs (for example,
the beliefs that a human being can be the property of others, that skin color is a relevant
distinction between human beings, or that women possess inferior cognitive capacities in
comparison to men). These beliefs and the systems they belonged to have, over time,
been assessed by persons (and students) who sought out ones that more correctly depicted
the world. It is significant to think life is better off with accurate beliefs and, as such, it is
not only students in academia we want to possess the virtue of seeking accurate beliefs,
but all persons.
Therefore, virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are significant
enough to want everyone to possess them, and this is a substantial reason for shaping the
ethos of students in academia in regard to them. Moreover, because cognitive enhancers
have the potential to impact the world and academia profoundly (for the focus of this
research project), this potential is a reason to want these virtues to shape the ethos of
students regarding their use.
One possible way to mitigate the negative effects that advances in cognitive
enhancers might generate is to emphasize the link that students who use these
enhancements have with the ideals of human excellence as a reflection on a student’s
character. If the general attitudes and sentiments of students are that improper use of
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cognitive enhancers reflects poorly on their character, these attitudes are a mechanism to
safeguard against the abuse of cognitive enhancers.
3.10.2 Is it Academia’s Responsibility to Facilitate the Development of Virtues?
The second concern about this virtues-based institutional rule is that it is not simply
shaping students’ ethos but that it is actively attempting to develop virtues in students
who lack them. The concern is not that these virtues or the development of these virtues
in students is bad; rather it is that the development of virtues is too burdensome of a
responsibility for academia. Even in an ideal conception of academia as striving to attain
understanding, academia has many responsibilities, and the task of developing virtues in
students who lack them is simply too much.
I grant that holding academia responsible for the development of virtues is too much
of a burden. The development of a virtue ultimately is dependent upon an individual
student, and no amount of structuring or social pressure can force a student to develop a
virtue if he or she does not want to.48 Still, even if academia is not responsible for the
development of virtues in students who lack them, it doesn’t follow that academia has no
role in the development of virtues. Institutions have an active role in developing virtues
in persons, as evidenced by Julia Annas, who refers to this as the embedded context of
virtues: virtues are developed and exercised in “a particular family, city, religion, and
country” (Annas 2011, 52). To varying degrees, the environment, community, and
institution all have an active role in the development of an individual’s virtues. Does this
mean that students living in ideal circumstances will always develop virtues? No, because
even when living in ideal circumstances, the development of virtues depends upon that
48
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individual, and for a multiplicity of reasons, it might not happen. Conversely, does this
mean that individuals living in adverse conditions such as extreme poverty are unlikely to
develop virtues? Yes, but as Julia Annas points out,
[I]t is important, though, not to confuse the fact we do not expect virtue
here [persons living in extreme poverty], which is reasonable, with the
different thought that these people are incapable of virtue. (Annas, 2011,
31)
Although an individual’s environment, community, and institution are not sufficient
conditions for developing a virtue, they do have a role in developing virtues in an
individual.
According to philosophers ranging from Aristotle to the Confucian philosopher
Xunzi, education traditionally has been viewed as having the most active role in the
development of virtues. In fact, Xunzi argued that it is the role of education that is
fundamental in developing an individual (a gentleman or sage to Xunzi) into the
standards of human excellence (Schofer 1993, 123; Tzun 1963a; Tzun 1963b). Human
nature, according to Xunzi, is inherently bad because our innate “natural” characteristics
lead us to strife and disorder, and it is only through education, which he refers to as
“learning,” that humans develop better characteristics: “Man’s nature is [bad]49; goodness
is the result of conscious activity” (Tzun 1963d; Robins 2009).50 Conscious activity is
when “the mind conceives of a thought and the body puts it into action.” Yet for Xunzi, it
is not mere reflection: “I once tried spending a day in thought but I found it of less value
than a moment of study.” Instead, conscious activity is “when thoughts have been
accumulated sufficiently, the body is well trained, and then action is carried to
49

Burton Waton’s translation is that “Man’s nature is evil.” However, many scholars believe that such a
translation, while not entirely inaccurate, presupposes a dichotomy between good and evil that
misrepresents Xunzi’s philosophical thought and Confucian ethical theory in general.
50
(CF: Tzun 1963a; 1963b; 1963c; 1963d; Schofer 1993)
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completion” (Tzun 1963c, 139-140; Tzun 1963a, 16). Thus conscious activity refers not
only to an individual’s motivational structures and dispositions, but it is also considered a
means to development these capacities.51
It is the role of education to develop these capacities through conscious activity.
Education for Xunzi includes:
[T]he studying of texts, practicing ritual, being conscious of good and
associating with good and learned people, and concentrating on the
qualities of a Confucian sage. (Schofer 1993, 118)
In Encouraging Learning, the metaphors of straightening wood or sharpening metal
illustrate the active role education has in developing an individual into standards of
excellence:
The gentlemen says: learning should never cease. … A piece of wood as
straight as a plumb line may be bent into a circle as true as any drawn with
a compass and, even after the wood has dried, it will not straighten out
again. The bending process has made it that way. Thus, if wood is pressed
against a straightening board, it can be made straight; if metal is put to the
grindstone, it can be sharpened; and if the gentlemen studies widely and
each day examines himself, his wisdom will become clear and his conduct
without fault. (Tzun, Encouraging Learning 1963, 15)
For Xunzi, education not only actively develops a person’s capacities but also puts people
in the proper environment by surrounding them with others whose ethos reflects the
importance of education. The reason is that the ethos of those in education is crucial in
the development of human excellence:
[A student] no matter how fine his nature or how keen his mind, must seek
51

Xunzi provides his complex notion of conscious activity in detail in the following passage: “When the
emotions are aroused and the mind makes a choice among them, this is called thought. When the mind
conceives of a thought and the body puts it into action, this is called conscious activity. When thoughts
have been accumulated sufficiently, the body is well trained, and then action is carried to completion, this
is also called conscious activity. When one acts from considerations of profit, it is called business. When
one acts from considerations of duty it is called [moral] conduct. The faculty which allows man to have
understanding is knowledge. Understanding which is practically applicability is also called knowledge. The
understanding, which makes man capable of something, is an ability. Capability which has practiced
application is also called an ability” (Tzun 1963c, 139-140).
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a worthy teacher to study under and good companions to associate with.
(Tzun, Man's Nature is Evil 1963, 170)
In many respects, Xunzi’s account of education mirrors this virtues-based approach
and the claims of a virtues-based institutional rule shaping the ethos of students. Xunzi’s
position provides a reasonable basis for holding that academia does have an active role in
the development of virtues in students who lack virtues. Since academia has such an
active role in the development of virtues in students, then at a minimum, it seems
reasonable that academia can also facilitate the development of virtues in students who
lack them.
One way for academia to facilitate the development of virtues regarding the use of
cognitive enhancers is by instituting a virtues-based rule. A virtues-based rule entails that
when students have the chance to use a cognitive enhancer, they will exercise their
practical reasoning; if they follow this virtues-based rule, they will act for reasons within
the ideals of human excellence. This in turn works not only to shape the ethos of students
regarding the use of cognitive enhancers but also to facilitate the development of virtues
in that student.
One might wonder if instituting a virtues-based institutional rule really does facilitate
the development of virtues in students who lack them. If the development and exercise of
a virtue are through practical reasons, then it is reasonable to think that it would.
Consider that the developmental process of virtue is often analogized with the
development of a skill (Annas 2011). The skill analogy posits that developing a virtue
requires training, practice, and time, similar to a skill. This skill analogy not only mirrors
developmental notions in both Aristotle and Xunzi’s conception of virtues, but it also
suggests that the development of virtue can occur in academia parallel to the
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development of a student’s skill set of reading comprehension, arithmetic, writing, and
critical thinking. For academia to achieve, or at least strive to achieve, its goal is to
structure academic activities so that they progressively provide students with information
of greater depth and progressively attempt to improve this skill set in students. The
development and refinement of this skill set does not occur overnight or in a single
moment of inspiration, but over a process. For example, a student learns to be a writer by
writing, and if this student does it well, then over time he or she becomes a good writer.
Similarly, throughout a student’s academic career, if he or she continually faces
opportunities for using cognitive enhancers, and this student exercises practical reasoning
by following a virtues-based institutional rule, then this is a method of facilitating the
development of certain virtues. Or if the virtues-based rule is an internalized institutional
rule, then academia facilitates the development of virtues by making the use of cognitive
enhancers for reasons pertaining to the ideals of human excellence a way of life for a
student. In both cases, instituting a virtues-based rule in academia, at minimum,
facilitates the development of virtues in students who lack them.
In this ideal conception of academia, it seems clear that even if academia does not
have a responsibility to develop virtues in students who lack them, it still plays an active
role in the development of virtues. That academia has such an active role in the
development of virtues suggests that, at a minimum, it can facilitate the development of
virtues in students who lack them.
3.10.3 Students and the Development of Virtues
The final concern is about the relationship between students and the development of
these virtues in this virtues-based approach. The value of the ideals of human excellence
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or virtues is essential to a virtues-based approach and virtues-based institutional rule.
Herein lies the concern: Does a student who lacks virtues have an obligation to develop
these virtues? Consider that the conception of virtues I offered contends that virtues are
instrumentally beneficial, good for their own sakes, properties that make their possessor
an ideal of human excellence, and properties a student should aspire to attain. This
virtues-based institutional rule stipulates that the only permissible use of cognitive
enhancers is for reasons reflective of these ideals of human excellence. Because of the
value of the virtues and their role as the focal point from which permissibility is
determined by this virtues-based institutional rule, it is reasonable to infer that a student
who lacks virtues may have an obligation to develop these virtues.
Although a reasonable inference, the concern is that this virtues-based approach
cannot claim that a student who lacks virtues has a moral obligation, in the sense of being
morally required, to develop these virtues. To argue that a student has a moral obligation
to develop these virtues, I would need to have provided a fuller ethical account in respect
to conceptions of the right and the good as well a theory of right action.52 However, this
virtues-based approach has avoided providing a fuller ethical theory and a theory of right
action; thus it cannot claim that a student who lacks these virtues is morally required to
develop these virtues.
As articulated, concern about this virtues-based approach not providing a fuller
ethical theory or theory of right action is in fact consistent with the claims of this virtuesbased approach toward enhancement in academia. First, in respect to the ideals of human
excellence, it is reasonable to think that there are both moral and non-moral human
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A theory of right action concerns what determines or what properties make an action morally right or
wrong (Copp 2006).
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excellences. I acknowledge that the difference between the moral and non-moral
properties of human excellences is not categorical but continuous and assume a clearer
division between moral and non-moral human excellences than likely exists.
Nevertheless, it is still reasonable that seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs
can be taken as non-moral marks of human excellence. This virtues-based approach is
not, then, claiming that a student is morally obligated or that to be morally good, a
student has to develop these virtues, only that the virtues of seeking understanding and
seeking accurate beliefs are non-moral ideals of human excellence.
Second, this virtues-based approach is not offering a theory of right action. In respect
to the use of cognitive enhancers in academia, because current institutional rules do not
decisively determine the permissibility of using these enhancements, this virtues-based
approach asked whether a virtuous student, or one possessing the virtues of seeking
understanding and accurate beliefs, choosing to use cognitive enhancers makes the use of
cognitive enhancers in academia permissible. I argued that it does, but it is not the
virtuous student’s possession of these virtues that makes it permissible; rather it is the
virtuous student’s motivations that make it permissible. The scope of this claim is on the
condition of permissible student use of cognitive enhancers, not on virtues or motivation
as determining or being properties that make actions morally right or wrong.
Although this virtues-based approach is not a full ethical theory and does not provide
a theory of right action, it is reasonable to wonder whether a student who lacks virtues
has any sort of obligation to develop these virtues. Although this approach holds the
virtues of students as being instrumentally beneficial, good for their own sakes, properties
that make their possessor an ideal of human excellence, and properties a student should
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aspire to attain, students do not have an obligation to develop them. However, while this
approach does not articulate a student as having an obligation to develop these virtues, it
is still sensible to hold that a student who lacks virtues should develop these virtues.
If we think seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs are properties of
human excellence and that these properties are conducive for students to attain
understanding, then a student who lacks them should develop them. The necessity of the
claim that a student who lacks virtues should develop them is in relation to the ideals of
human excellence and the goal of academia. If we think that seeking understanding and
seeking accurate beliefs are properties of excellence for humans and that the goal of
academia is instrumentally beneficial and good for its own sake, then it is conducive for
persons to seek it. Considering the kind of creatures humans are—social animals that
possess an advanced rational capacity—then seeking understanding and seeking accurate
beliefs allow a student to be better able to understand, navigate, and appreciate the world,
life’s experiences, and their interactions with others, and it is conducive to the goal of
academia. These are strong reasons for students to develop these virtues. While this
virtues-based approach cannot say that a student who lacks virtues has an obligation, it is
still possible for this virtues-based approach to hold that a student who lacks virtues
should them, in the sense that it is an ideal human excellence and conducive to the goal of
academia.
Nevertheless, the contention that a student who lacks virtues should work to develop
them is restricted and constrained in two ways. First, the scope of my claim is extremely
narrow, restricted to students in an academic institution and not extended further. Second,
according to this virtues-based approach, a student who lacks virtues has done nothing
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incorrect or wrong if he or she does not attempt to develop these virtues. To understand
how this virtues-based approach can hold that a student who lacks virtues has done
nothing incorrect or wrong by not attempting to develop these virtues yet still thinks a
student should develop them, consider an analogous case from Buddhism. In Buddhism,
two major doctrines are the Four Noble and the Noble Eightfold Path (Bryom 1976).53
The first and fourth of the Four Noble Truths hold that (i) life is suffering and (ii) the
path to the cessation of suffering is the Noble Eightfold Path.54 If a person wants to end
suffering, then it is necessary for them to follow the Noble Eightfold Path; yet a person is
not required to do so or wrong if he or she does not follow the eightfold path. Instead, this
person has not taken the first step toward the cessation of suffering.
Similarly, seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are properties of human
excellence and conducive for students in academia. The development of these virtues is
something that a student who lacks virtues should seek to do. Yet students who lack
virtues have not done anything incorrect or wrong if they do not attempt to develop these
virtues. Instead, they have not taken the steps to develop properties that are ideals of
human excellence and conducive to the goal of academia. Although these students might
not be successful, according to this virtues-based approach, they have done nothing
wrong.
Although this final concern is accurate in that this virtues-based approach cannot
claim that a student has an obligation to develop these virtues, it is reasonable that this
53

The Four Noble Truths: 1. Life means suffering. 2. The origin of suffering is attachment. 3. The cessation
of suffering is attainable. 4. The path to the cessation of suffering. The Noble Eightfold Path: 1. Right View
2. Right Intention 3. Right Speech 4. Right Action 5. Right Livelihood 6. Right Effort 7. Right
Mindfulness 8. Right Concentration
54
As a theory of conduct, the Noble Eightfold Path encompasses principles for guidance in respect to
wisdom (taken as proper understanding of the cause of suffering), ethical conduct, and mental development
(proper orientation of one’s mental outlook).
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virtues-based approach can at least claim, albeit in a restricted and constrained sense, that
students who lack virtues should develop them because they are ideals of human
excellence and conducive for students in academia to possess.
In responding to this final concern about this virtues-based approach’s claims
concerning the relationship between the virtues and students, as well as the
accompanying concerns of this virtues-based approach not being a full ethical theory or
providing a theory of right action, I have shown that this virtues-based approach scope is
focused on enhancement in academia and makes rather modest claims. There still may be
a concern that approaching enhancement in academia from a virtues-based approach is
still too radical. However, consider another approach taken in regard to enhancement,
Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg, and Guy Kahane’s welfarist approach (Savulescu,
Sandberg and Kahane 2011; Kahane and Savulescu 2009). In this approach, issues of
human enhancement are best understood in respect to human well-being.
Welfarist definition of human enhancement: Any change in the biology or
psychology of a person which increases the chances of leading a good life
in the relevant set of circumstances. (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane
2011, 16)
For the welfarist approach, it is permissible for persons to use enhancements for reasons
of maximizing their well-being, allowing them to live a good life. Relying on Rawls and
Buchanan’s notion of “all-purposes goods,” this welfarist approach claims that there are
traits of persons that are valuable regardless of the kind of life a person wants to live.
Intellectual capacities are one such all-purpose good (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane
2011, 11).55 In respect to issues of enhancement in academia, a welfarist approach would
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The works that Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg, and Guy Kahane’s relied on for positional goods
were those ofAllen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, and John Rawls (Allen
Buchanan, et al 2000; Rawls 1999).
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hold that it is good for student well-being to have their cognitive capacities enhanced
because even moderately augmenting a student’s intellectual capacities may help the
student to live a good life.
Yet this welfarist approach would also agree that other issues such as health risks,
particular academic institutions, impact on student attitudes, and other relevant
considerations all need to be factored in. In this respect, both the welfarist approach and
the virtues-based approach I have offered are similar in that student use of cognitive
enhancers requires all considerations to be accounted for and, often enough, there are
strong reasons against certain students using cognitive enhancers. The difference between
this welfarist approach and the presented virtues-based approach is that the welfarist
approach takes consequences as the main consideration for determining permissibility,
whereas this virtue-based approach does not. My point is not that a virtues-based
approach is superior to Savulescu, Sandberg, and Kahane’s welfarist approach or that
their approach is wrong, but rather that their approach and this virtues-based approach
can be understood as illuminating different aspects and ways of grasping a normative
account of enhancement. It might turn out, and this virtues-based approach would then
agree, that if the use of enhancements always leads to people living a better life, then we
should always use enhancements. Alternatively, it might turn out (and Savulescu,
Sandberg, and Kahane’s welfarist approach would likely agree) that if the use of
enhancements always leads people to develop terrible dispositions or character, then we
shouldn’t use these enhancements.56 Therefore, although this virtues-based approach and
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Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that rather than focusing on cognitive enhancement,
the focus of the future development of enhancement technology should be on moral enhancement
technologies. These moral enhancement technologies focus on augmenting the moral character of
humanity. However, many, most notably John Harris, disagree with Persson and Savulescu’s position. I
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the welfarist approached do differ, a virtues-based approach is no more radical than a
welfarist position because both are attempting to illuminate different aspects and ways of
understanding an account of enhancement.
In this chapter, this virtues-based approach has attempted to put forward a framework
for the permissibility of student use of cognitive enhancers in academia as well as to
formulate institutional rules for governing student use of cognitive enhancers in
academia. This virtues-based approach makes an effort at appropriately balancing the
value of academia and cognitive enhancers in respect to considerations of rules,
consequences, and motivations. The approach does advance the discussion of
enhancement in academia by focusing issues of enhancements in academia on the
motivations and character of students in academia.
Moreover, I argued that the goal of academia should be interpreted in respect to
understanding and that a virtues-based approach can formulate strong institutional rules
for governing student use of cognitive enhancers in academia. This virtues-based rule can
be instituted in two ways that shape the ethos of students in respect to the use of cognitive
enhancers in academia. Used either way, this rule shapes the ethos of students regarding
the use of cognitive enhancers such that students regard the use of cognitive enhancers in
the same manner that virtuous students do.
One might contend that even if this virtues-based approach were to work in ideal
theory, the fact that certain idealized conditions no longer hold suggests that the approach
fails under non-ideal conditions. I think, however, that the challenges are incorrect. In
fact, the advantage of a virtues-based approach is that while the virtues are something to

agree with Harris’ argument that Persson and Savulescu fail to consider that education is the greatest moral
enhancement for humanity (Persson and Savulescu 2008; Harris 2011).
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aspire to, they are also practical. According to Xunzi, a mark of good theory is its ability
to be implemented into our practices:
One may sit down and propound such a theory, but [if] he cannot stand up
and put it into practice, nor can he extend it over a wide area with any
success. How, then, can it be anything but erroneous? (Tzun Man's Nature
is Evil 1963, 163)
In the following chapter, this research project moves from ideal into non-ideal theory and
provides further details on a virtues-based institutional rule being implemented in
academic institutions existing under non-ideal conditions.
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Chapter 4 Ideals of Human Excellence in a Non-ideal World
4.1 Non-ideal Conditions
This research project now moves from ideal into non-ideal theory. The virtues-based
institutional rule formulated and defended in the previous chapter was within a
conception of academia existing under idealized conditions. By moving into the realm of
non-ideal theory, the focus shifts to this rule being implemented in a conception of
academia that exists under “less than happy” conditions (Rawls 1999, 216).
A non-ideal conception of academia exists under the following non-ideal conditions.
First, while this conception of academia is still modeled on existing institutions in the
United States, these academic institutions operate under social conditions that are not
always fair and reasonable. One of these non-ideal social conditions is that for many
people, the goal of academia is not to attain understanding but for commercial or
economic placement of students. Second, in these academic institutions, students do not
possess ideal psychological dispositions but rather a range of psychological
dispositions57—from never virtuous to occasionally vicious—so that students are not
always compliant with institutional rules.
The first aim of this chapter is to examine the implementation of this virtues-based
institutional rule in a non-ideal conception of academic institutions and students. Even
under non-ideal conditions, this virtues-based institutional rule could govern and guide
student use of cognitive enhancers in a way that relies on considerations of motivations
and character. Offering a way for motivation and character of students to be relevant
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I use the term “psychological dispositions” as an attempt to indicate that these students do not possess
virtues or even character traits.
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considerations in non-ideal environment results in shaping how students think about the
use of enhancements; this is a reason for administrators, faculty, and staff working in
academia to consider implementing this virtues-based rule in current academic
institutions. Moreover, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule not only is able
to handle misconceptions resulting from the medicalization of cognitive enhancers and to
shape the way students think about the use of enhancements, but they also resist
oversimplification of the issues and considerations regarding enhancement in academia.
Before beginning, I need to stipulate what this chapter’s aims are not. First, this
chapter is not arguing that this virtues-based institutional rule is the only or most feasible
institutional rule to implement for governing student use of cognitive enhancers. Relying
on the ideals of human excellence does not yield a single determinate answer for issues of
enhancement in academia. Nevertheless, I suggest that the complexity of issues in
enhancement in academia is such that we need to resist oversimplification. In the end,
that the ideals of human excellence do not yield a single determinate answer is an
advantage of a virtues-based approach and institutional rule. It is not just that academic
institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff would want students to use enhancements in
the permitted ways; they would want students to have the right reasons for using them.
Second, while a central focus of this chapter is the character of students, this research
project is not attempting to settle the psychological and philosophical questions regarding
the existence of character and character traits. For this virtues-based institutional rule, a
conception of character helps to explain the reasons why students act in certain ways in
particular situations. While I think that character and character traits do exist, the
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conception of character offered in this chapter is not an argument for conclusively
establishing their existence.
This chapter brings to a close the examination of this virtues-based approach and
institutional rule in ideal and non-ideal theory. This research project clearly allows for
motivation and character to be relevant considerations that can govern student use of
cognitive enhancers. Implementing this virtues-based institutional rule likely will change
the way that students think about the use of enhancements. It offers a sensible and mature
approach to issues of enhancement in academia.
To achieve these aims and bring this research project to a conclusion, the following
section begins with an examination of the general perception that most people have as
being the goal of academia.
4.2 The Goal of Academia
Many people in the United States do not consider the goal of academia to be attaining
understanding. Instead, the general perception among people is that the goal of academia
is commercial or economic in nature; specifically, the goal is to expose students to the
arts, sciences, and humanities to develop their intellectual capacities to secure future
employment.
There are several reasons this perception of the goal of academia is so prominent.
First, the environment in most contemporary academic institutions is thoroughly
competitive. This competitive environment is for students and faculty. The structure of
undergraduate and graduate education is competitive: students in undergraduate courses
are assessed against an accepted standard and against other students; graduate students
are assessed against an accepted standard and other graduate students, and they must also
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compete for funding and mentorship from faculty. The hiring and work structure of
faculty in academia is also competitively structured: positions are divided into tenure and
non-tenure tracks. This competitive structure reinforces, even if indirectly, the opinion
among many students and people outside of academia that the goal of academia is not
really about attaining understanding but is a competitive endeavor about securing future
employment.58
Moreover, academia has policies that encourage the perception that commercial or
economic considerations are prioritized in academia. These policies include but are not
limited to the promotion and emphasis on research and grant programs that are most
economically beneficial for the institution; the creation of ties with corporations and
businesses through fellowships and internships; and most explicitly, the selling of
merchandise, licensing, and television rights for an academic institution’s athletic
programs. Policies that emphasize commercial and economic considerations are found
even in departments in the arts and humanities, not just in athletics and the sciences.
Consider that a department that does not develop or retain a certain number of majors or
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It is easy to illustrate the failures in academia that are a result of this competitive structure by examining
academic philosophy. To get tenure, an individual first must have a tenure-track position and second needs
time for research to produce a certain amount of quality publications. For this individual in a tenure-track
position to do their research, this person cannot be teaching a full load of classes. An academic institution
then hires lecturers (non-tenure-track teaching positions) or uses graduate students to teach undergraduate
courses. Most lecturer positions are low paying and not tenure track. Many lecturers also want to get
tenure-track positions and, on top of teaching undergraduate courses, are attempting to do their own
research to secure a tenure-track position. If a graduate student is teaching either to keep their funding or to
get a future job, they must also engage in their own research, which means that at a certain point, many
graduate students must decide to focus on teaching or researching.
Now consider all this from the perspective of undergraduate students. Most undergraduate students only
encounter tenured faculty for one or two classes late into their academia career. The majority of
undergraduate students’ education in philosophy is learned from lecturers and graduate students. Most
tenured faculty, lecturers, and graduate students in philosophy have never had any formal training in the art
and methods of teaching. Moreover, in academic philosophy there is a prevailing interest in not teaching
philosophy to undergraduate students but rather to “engage and grapple with theoretical problems at a
higher level that might have no practical implications.” Although not all faculty, lecturers, graduate
students, and departments in philosophy hold this view, most do.
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number of Ph.D. students in a program faces severe budgetary constraints for future
development. Striving to retain a certain number of majors and, specifically, Ph.D.
students leads departments to recruit students despite a complete lack of future
employment. Consider the state of affairs in philosophy and the subsequent recruitment
of Ph.D. students. Philosophy is in the midst of its worst job market in the last fifty years.
Many research-one philosophy departments openly recruit students into Ph.D. programs
even though students’ chances of getting a job are minuscule.59
For all of these reasons and likely more, the perception that the non-ideal goal of
academia is commercial or economic in nature has proliferated. Whether accurate or not,
the perception works against implementing this virtues-based institutional rule because in
some instances, following this rule conflicts with this goal. If the goal of academia is for
commercial or economic placement, then there are motivations for using cognitive
enhancers such as to competitively beat other students, which would be consistent with
this goal but would not be permitted under a virtues-based institutional rule. A virtuesbased institutional rule, then, does not allow competitively beating other students as a
permissible reason for using cognitive enhancers.
To respond, consider that institutions can have multiple goals. Take, for example, the
National Football League (NFL). The NFL can have goals commercial or economic in
nature, such as being a profitable business, as well as an ideal of human excellence, the
athletic excellence of the game of football. The NFL certainly meets its commercial or
economic goal of being a profitable business since the average NFL football team is
worth $1.4 billion dollars (Badenhausen 2011). Yet the NFL strives to achieve an ideal
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This is particularly disturbing because the number of Ph.D.s on welfare has increased substantially, but
acceptance into Ph.D. programs has not declined (Patton 2012).
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goal of human excellence in the game of football. The NFL achieves, or at least strives to
achieve, this goal by implementing certain guidelines, rules, and codes for both the onand off-field conduct of its players, coaches, and owners.60 Even if these guidelines,
rules, and codes inhibit some profit, they work to preserve the ideal of excellence in the
game of football. The NFL is illustrative of an institution that has both economic and
ideals of human excellence goals.
It is reasonable to take academia as another institution that has the goals of
commercial or economic placement of students and ideals of human excellence.
Academic institutions do exist under non-ideal conditions and, by virtue of the market
system, it is sensible that commercial or economic placement of students is one goal. Yet
it is not clear as to how the goal of attaining understanding is inconsistent with the goal of
commercial or economic placement of students. Understanding is an ideal of human
excellence that students should seek to attain, but understanding as an element in one’s
intellectual capacities is also important in a commercial or economic system. As Anders
Sandberg and Julian Savulescu argue,
Cognition [taken as intellectual capacities] is both a consumption good–it
is often desirable and happiness promoting to have well-functioning
cognitions–and a capital good that reduces risks, increases earning
capacity, and forms a key part of human capital. (Sandberg and Savulescu
2011, 96)
Developing one’s intellectual capacities to attain understanding rather than simply obtain
knowledge is valued not only for its own sake but also for instrumental benefits like
securing future employment. Simply knowing information and facts but not connecting,
drawing upon, and applying these facts results in people who have a mental outlook
60

For example, players cannot use banned substances or modify their equipment; team owners are
prohibited from spending unlimited amounts of money on recruiting players; and trades between teams are
only valid when done within a sanctioned time period and under certain financial limits.
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similar to that of a psychopath. The goal of developing students’ intellectual capacities
and attaining the ability to connect, draw upon, and apply information and facts to one’s
experience is a goal of academia that would also be consistent with the goal of
commercial or economic placement of students. Thus academia can be understood as
having these two goals.
While these are the two goals of academia, it is reasonable to think that attaining
understanding is the primary goal and commercial or economic placement of students is
the secondary goal. Generally speaking, while commercial or economic placement of
students is an important goal, having the ability to connect, draw upon, and apply
information and facts to one’s experience is a particular characteristic to want in
employees. A remark attributed to Warren Buffet illustrates this:
Somebody once said that in looking for people to hire, you look for three
qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy. And if they don't have the
first, the other two will kill you. You think about it; it's true. If you hire
somebody without the first, you really want them to be dumb and lazy.
Understanding as an ability is not only important to have in an employee, but it also
plays a key role in other elements of a commercial or economic system. There is some
empirical evidence in social psychology that persons involved in commercial or
economic transactions are often not content if these transactions are not fair to other
parties involved, even while financially beneficial to themselves. In addition, economic
studies have shown that an increase in income does not correlate to an increase in
happiness (Tabibnia, Satpute and Lieberman 2008; Easterlin 1974; Easterlin 1994). So in
general, even if one goal of academia is commercial or economic placement of students,
it is likely more important that academia assists in achieving, or striving to achieve, the
second goal of attaining understanding.
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With regard to student use of cognitive enhancers, there are reasons for thinking that
the primary goal of academia should be attaining understanding because it offers an inprinciple limitation on the use of enhancements in a way that the goal of commercial or
economic placement of students does not. Consider that by virtue of pharmacology, the
use of cognitive enhancers does not directly enable a student to attain understanding. This
suggests an in-principle limitation on students using them. Although the use of cognitive
enhancers has been shown to augment moderately an individual’s capacities of focus and
concentration, these enhancers cannot, at least by themselves, enable a student to achieve
or attain understanding. Moreover, student use of cognitive enhancers has not been
shown to provide long-term improvement in academic activities (Smith and Farah 2011;
Enck, Bossaer and Enck Forthcoming 2013).
If commercial or economic placement of students was taken to be the primary goal of
academia, then the use of cognitive enhancers might not be considered an educational
tool or prop assisting or supporting in the development of understanding; instead,
cognitive enhancers might be considered as a tool or prop assisting or supporting
productivity. The key feature of cognitive enhancers might not be that they can
moderately enhance the capacities of concentration and focus but that these
enhancements provide alertness and wakefulness to those who are sleep deprived. When
a person is sleep deprived their performance drops; typically, an individual’s ability to
perform certain tasks decreases 30 to 45 percent after the first night of sleep deprivation
and 50 to70 percent after a second night of sleep deprivation (Angus and Heslegrave
1985). With the goal of academia taken to be commercial or economic placement of
students, cognitive enhancers are likely to be considered as tools or props for assisting a
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student in gaining future employment because they provide elevated levels of alertness
and wakefulness.
However, taking this as the primary goal of academia faces two problems. Similar to
the common misconception that cognitive enhancers always directly augment cognition,
the first problem is that alertness and wakefulness are not the same as being productive.
While cognitive enhancers can assist students with being alert and awake, this does not
mean that the student is engaged in academic activities rather than socializing, partying,
or playing video games. Moreover, it does not mean that because a student is alert,
awake, and focused on an academic activity that the student definitely comprehends that
academic activity.
The second problem is that cognitive enhancers are a schedule II drug. The risks
involved with using these cognitive enhancers range from emotional and aggressive
behavior, anxiety, and insomnia to depression, addiction, and withdrawal (Seppala and
Rose 2010). If the use of cognitive enhancers is to assist and improve a student’s level of
alertness and wakefulness, then there are pharmacological agents or mechanisms
available that are far less risky.
Understanding is an essential characteristic for persons to have in a market system,
and attaining understanding has an in-principle limitation on student use of cognitive
enhancers. These are reasons for holding that even under non-ideal conditions, the
primary goal of academia should be attaining understanding and the secondary goal
should be commercial or economic placement of students.
Taking attaining understanding as the primary goal of academia works to orient
institutional rules for governing student use of cognitive enhancers and orienting students
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themselves toward the proper goal of academia. If attaining understanding is the primary
goal of academia, then no conflict would occur if students were to follow this virtuesbased institutional rule.
In addition, while an academic institution does not have a responsibility to ensure that
students actually attain understanding, an academic institution does have the
responsibility to implement institutional rules that facilitate students in striving toward
this goal. Taking the primary goal of academia as attaining understanding is more likely
to result in cognitive enhancers being considered as an educational prop or tool. If this is
the case, then it is important that when students use these cognitive enhancers as
educational props or tools, they are using them for the right reasons. This virtues-based
institutional rule is at least one institutional rule that not only facilitates academia’s goal
of attaining understanding but also works toward ensuring students use these cognitive
enhancers for the right reasons.
However, even if attaining understanding is the primary goal of academia and a
virtues-based institutional rule does facilitate that cognitive enhancers are used for the
right reasons, students are not idealized, virtuous students. In the current concept of
academia, students do not possess the psychological dispositions of ideal, virtuous
students and, in many cases, they are not always compliant with institutional rules. In the
following section, I consider the challenge posed to this virtues-based institutional rule by
non-ideal students.
4.2.1 The Challenge of Non-ideal Students
The challenge for this virtues-based institutional rule is that students do not possess
the psychological dispositions of an ideal, virtuous student, and they are not always
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compliant with institutional rules. That students in this concept of academia are not ideal
may suggest to some that it is implausible for this virtues-based institutional rule to be
implemented in non-ideal theory. This further implies that because this virtues-based
institutional rule cannot be implemented in non-ideal theory, it is not likely to be any help
to academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff currently working in academia.
To begin, it is reasonable to grant that a virtuous student has never existed and that
students in academia in non-ideal theory could never be virtuous. Moreover, it is also
reasonable to acknowledge that whether a person exists in non-ideal theory or in the
actual world, no person is ever an ideal of human excellence or virtuous. Yet the fact that
students in this conception of academia do not possess the psychological dispositions of
an ideal, virtuous student and that they are not always compliant with institutional rules
are the reasons for academia to implement this virtues-based institutional rule. This
virtues-based institutional rule has three elements—ideals of human excellence,
motivation, and character— that would be particularly useful in governing and guiding
non-ideal students. In the following sections, I examine each of these elements, beginning
with the ideals of human excellence, in respect to non-ideal students.
4.2.2 Ideals of Human Excellence for Students
By stipulating that the permissible use of a cognitive enhancer is for reasons of
seeking understanding or seeking accurate beliefs, this virtues-based institutional rule
provides students with ideals of human excellence to aspire to and strive towards.
Students should aspire towards attaining the virtues of seeking understanding and
accurate beliefs because they are ideals of human excellence. It does not follow that if
students are unable to attain these virtues, then these ideals of human excellence are any
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less aspirational. First, since students do not possess the psychological dispositions of an
ideal, virtuous student and are not always compliant with institutional rules, the
importance of the ideals of human excellence is that they designate what an ideal,
virtuous student would be like, such as, at a minimum, possessing the virtues of seeking
understanding and seeking accurate beliefs. By designating the virtues of an ideal,
virtuous student, this virtues-based institutional rule provides a goal or model for nonideal students to aspire towards.
The importance of having an ideal person as a goal or model to aspire towards is
illustrated by Abraham Lincoln’s response to the question of whether it was better to
consider George Washington as perfect or fallible:
Let us believe, as in the day of our youth, that Washington was spotless: it
makes human nature better to believe that one human being was perfect:
that human perfection is possible. (Whitney 1892, 45-46)
The value of students aspiring towards these ideals of human excellence is not only that
these virtues are instrumentally beneficial and good for their own sakes, but that by
undertaking the process of developing these virtues, students will find them good and
instrumentally beneficial even if they cannot fully attain these virtues. Students, in fact all
people, fall short of perfection; yet students need ideals of excellence to aspire and strive
towards, even if they cannot be attained.
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even
glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always
landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better
country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias. (Wilde 2007, 247)
That these non-ideal students lack the psychological dispositions of an ideal, virtuous
student and are not always compliant with institutional rules can be considered reasons to
implement this rule in non-ideal academic institutions. Although it is unlikely for these
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non-ideal students to attain these ideals of human excellence or virtues, this does not
mean that these ideals of human excellence are not aspirational or not worth striving
toward.
4.2.3 Motivations of Non-Ideal Students
Another reason for academia to use this virtues-based institutional rule is that it offers
a standard for using cognitive enhancers. Generally speaking, good reasons for using
cognitive enhancers are for self-improvement, seeking understanding, or seeking accurate
beliefs. These reasons are not only conducive to the goal of academia, but they are also
comparably better reasons for a student to use cognitive enhancers than for reasons of
competitively beating other students, completing a boring activity, or obtaining a certain
grade on a particular assignment. Since students do not possess ideal psychological
dispositions and are not always compliant with institutional rules, these students are not
likely to use cognitive enhancers for good reasons. This virtues-based institutional rule
brings to the student’s attention that there are good reasons for using cognitive enhancers
and offers a standard of good reasons for these students to rely on. Moreover, even if this
standard for using cognitive enhancers, composed of reasons reflective of the ideals of
human excellence, does not help a student decide whether his or her motivation is
permissible, this virtues-based institutional rule provides the ethical outlook of a virtuous
student as a guide to a non-ideal student.
One might think that adopting the ethical outlook of a virtuous student cannot be
helpful to these students since they do not possess ideal psychological dispositions. Yet
the students’ lack of ideal psychological dispositions would be a reason for advocating an
institutional rule that promotes adopting an ethical outlook. This ethical outlook attempts
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to find resolutions to a dilemma of whether or not to use a cognitive enhancer by
considering the question of permissibility directly and in respect to the acts and
motivations of an ideal, virtuous student in that situation. To think either that adapting
this ethical outlook couldn’t help a student because this student does not have an ideal
psychological disposition or that this ethical outlook is silly because a virtuous student
wouldn’t be in this position misunderstands what this ethical outlook attempts to provide
to students. As Rachana Kamtekar points out:
Critics who complain that this is useless advice because Socrates or Zeno
wouldn’t be in these circumstances or because if one could figure out what
Socrates or Zeno would do, then one wouldn’t need to think of their
response at all are missing the point. Socrates and Zeno also find
themselves in difficult situations (in love with Alcibiades, shipwrecked),
and thinking of Socrates or Zeno or whoever else can put one in mind of
possibilities for action that wouldn’t otherwise have occurred to one.
(Kamtekar 2004, 487)
The ethical outlook of a virtuous student allows for non-ideal students to find a solution
to whether or not to use a cognitive enhancer from a perspective they likely would not
have considered before.
By offering a standard of good reasons against which to use cognitive enhancers as
well an ethical outlook for helping students to clarify their reasons for using cognitive
enhancers, this virtues-based institutional rule assists non-ideal students to possess, or at
least to know, the right reasons for using cognitive enhancers.
4.2.4 Character of Non-Ideal Students
According to this virtues-based institutional rule, choosing to use cognitive enhancers
for reasons pertaining to the ideals of human excellence rather than for other reasons is
reflective of a student having good character. In respect to the use of cognitive enhancers,
this rule provides a way for non-ideal students to understand that the use of enhancements
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reflects on their character. By linking the use of cognitive enhancers to a student’s
character, this virtues-based institutional rule holds that a student’s reason for choosing to
use an enhancement illuminates the sort of character they possess. That these students’
psychological dispositions are not ideal means that if this virtues-based institutional rule
is implemented, then these students could eventually come to understand that although
certain acts may be beneficial in the moment, these acts can damage their character in the
long term.
This virtues-based institutional rule’s three elements—the ideals of human
excellence, motivation, and character—function in a manner that makes this rule prudent
to implement in a conception of academia where students are not ideal. Now consider
that if this virtues-based institutional rule that creates an expected pattern of behavior
were implemented, then it would likely shape the ethos of non-ideal students.
If this virtues-based institutional rule was implemented as an institutional rule that
creates an expected pattern of behavior, then this rule not only provides a standard for
these non-ideal students to use cognitive enhancers but also provides an expectation that
at least one reason that students have for using cognitive enhancers is reflective of the
ideals of human excellence. Moreover, the expectation is that the use of cognitive
enhancers by other students is also motivated by reasons of self-improvement, seeking
understanding, or seeking accurate beliefs. This virtues-based institutional rule is likely to
result in being taken as a group norm with the establishment of carry-over behavior for
students. According to Daniel Feldman, carry-over behavior results from the
establishment of a formal or informal group norm:
Such carry-over of individual behaviors from past situations can increase
the predictability of group members’ behavior in new settings and
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facilitate the task accomplishment. For instance, students and professors
bring with them fairly constant sets of expectations from class to class. As
a result, students do not have to relearn continually their roles from class
to class; they know for instance, if they come in late to take a seat quietly
at the back of the room without being told. Professors also do not have to
relearn continually their roles, they know for instance not to mumble,
scribble in small print on the blackboard, or to be vague when making
course assignments. (Feldman 1984, 52)
This virtues-based institutional rule provides carry-over behavior for students. In thus
providing an expected pattern of behavior and motivations structured and developed by
the ideals of human excellence, the rule likely would change even non-ideal students’
ethos regarding the proper use of cognitive enhancers. The ethos of these non-ideal
students would, in time, come to regard a student who uses cognitive enhancers for
reasons not reflective of the ideals of human excellence with disdain and as having poor
character. These non-ideal students would also come to regard a student who uses
cognitive enhancers for reasons that are reflective of the ideals of human excellence as
reflective of good character and as the kind of student wanted by other students and
academic institutions.
If this virtues-based institutional rule were an internalized institutional rule, while
these students may not initially possess the psychological dispositions of an ideal student
and may not always comply with institutional rules, they could change over the course of
an academic career. These non-ideal students come to appreciate the importance of
seeking understanding and seeking accurate beliefs as the necessary reasons to have when
using a cognitive enhancer. Moreover, this virtues-based institutional rule shapes the
ethos of all non-ideal students so that there is not only an expectation for student behavior
but also an emphasis on the use of cognitive enhancers as being indicative of a student’s
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character. The ethos of these students would regard the improper use of cognitive
enhancers by another student as evidence of the type of character ill-suited for academia.
However, there will be three challenges in implementing this virtues-based
institutional rule in the non-ideal conception of academia. First, this rule may shape the
ethos of students by developing and structuring the motivations of students, but it relies
too heavily on the notion that students will refrain or restrain themselves from using
cognitive enhancers for certain reasons because of how it would reflect on their character.
Character is something students accumulate through their actions, but it is not something
that regulates their actions. Second, a student’s motivation—the condition that
determines whether their use of cognitive enhancers is permissible — is not readily
accessible or easily identifiable to academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff.
This means that a student’s motivation cannot be a relevant consideration and also cannot
be the condition that determines permissibility. Finally, even if motivations and character
are considered as relevant considerations for assessing student use of cognitive
enhancers, there is no manner in which academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and
staff could enforce this virtues-based institutional rule.
I address these challenges and, in doing so, offer more details on this virtues-based
institutional rule working in a non-ideal conception of academia and in currently existing
academic institutions.
4.3 Character and Students
According to this virtues-based institutional rule, the use of a cognitive enhancer is an
action that reflects on the character of a student. This virtues-based institutional rule
relies on a conception of character that is an active element of a student’s practical
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reasoning. Yet conceptually, character is something that accumulates over the course of a
person’s life, or in this case a student’s academic career, via her actions, but it is not
something that refrains, restrains, or motivates a student to act in certain ways.
To respond, I think it is possible to consider a student’s character as having more of
an active role in a person’s practical reasoning than one would typically think because
character is often a reason for acting. To begin, let’s investigate character and reasonresponsiveness. Conceptually, character is the representation of a person’s non-mortal
worth. A person’s character is not only an individual composite of all her properties and
qualities, it is also something that is constituted by an individual’s previous choices,
attitudes, behaviors, and values.61 This suggests that at a certain point, an individual takes
an active role regarding certain choices, attitudes, behaviors, and values. Under normal
conditions, it makes no sense to hold that a person did not have an active role in the sort
of character he possesses.
Now it might turn out that a person is not completely responsible (possibly legally or
morally) for their character. For example, an individual growing up in abhorrent
conditions involving extreme child abuse is a consideration that mitigates her
responsibility for the sort of person she has become. Yet even in these cases where an
individual is not responsible for the sort of person he is, it does not necessarily mean that
this individual was completely passive or inactive in his choices, attitudes, behaviors, and
values. A person does have an active role, even if minimally, in the formation of his
character.
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That a person’s character is constituted by their choices, behaviors, and values is why this conception is
analogous to the philosophical notion of “self,” which furthermore spans across issues of self-conception,
autonomy, agency, and practical identity (Bratman 2000; Korsgaard 2009; Velleman 1997).
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Next, as I have assumed throughout this research project, it is plausible to hold that
persons are reason-responsive, meaning that a person is responsive to a broad range of
rational consideration (McKenna 2009).62 In respect to practical reasoning, a person
deliberates on undertaking certain acts, is responsive to a broad range of rational
considerations, and then undertakes a certain act. If a person has an active role regarding
her character and is reason-responsive, then it is sensible to think that persons often do
act for reasons of character. In other words, character can be at least one kind of rational
consideration in a person’s practical reasoning.
A person might refrain from or do certain acts because of how these acts affect their
character. Consider that it is for reasons of character that a person refrains from acting in
certain ways such as laughing at someone’s tragedy or spitting on the grave of an enemy,
even though these are permissible. To laugh at tragedy or spit on the grave of an enemy is
an act that reflects poorly on an individual’s character and, in turn, this is a reason against
doing it. Alternatively, it is for reasons of character why a person does act in certain ways
such as helping an elderly person across the street or being magnanimous to one’s enemy,
even though these are not required. To display compassion and magnanimity reflects well
on a person’s character and is a reason for doing it.
All things considered, a person’s character is something of value. A person with poor
character is often not only despised or pitied but also not considered to be the sort of
person who possesses the attitudes, behaviors, and values that an individual should want.
62

Reason-responsiveness is typically considered in respect to the metaphysical debate concerning free will
and determinism and relates to one account of compatiblism put forward by John Martin Fischer and Mark
Ravizza. This conception of reason-responsiveness focuses on the metaphysics of a responsibility and
control even under deterministic conditions. While this project’s use of reason-responsiveness could be
taken as a subspecies of this conception of reason-responsiveness, because my project’s focus is not on
metaphysics, all that is necessary for a person to be reason-responsive is simply to be responsive to a broad
range of rational considerations (Fischer and Ravizza 1998; McKenna 2009).
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Conversely, a person with good character is admired and possesses the sort of attitudes,
behaviors, and values that an individual should want.
That a person values good character, or at least does not want to have poor character,
makes it plausible that character can be thought of as regulating, even if in a limited way,
a person’s acts and behavior in a particular circumstance. However, some may consider
this conception of character as deviating too far from the notion of character as being a
representation of a person’s non-mortal worth. To alleviate this apprehension, I
acknowledge that ascription of good character cannot be accurately done from
observation of a single act. Just as in the case of virtues, a single act does not clearly
indicate whether a person has a good or bad character. So there needs to be caution about
acribing character to persons because of their act or particular action.63 Yet while people
often do incorrectly ascribe character from a single act, this does not mean or provide
conclusive evidence persons are not active about their choices, attitudes, behaviors, and
values or have reasons relating to their character for acting in certain situations.
If we return to examining a virtues-based institutional rule in academia, it becomes
clear how this institutional rule relies on character to refrain, restrain, or motivate a
student to use cognitive enhancers in the proper way. The use of cognitive enhancers for
reasons that are not reflective of the ideals of human excellence reflects poorly on
character, providing a reason for students to refrain from using cognitive enhancers in
this way. Because using cognitive enhancers for reasons reflective of the ideals of human
excellence is indicative of a student having a good character, it is a reason for a student to
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Incorrectly ascribing character to persons is a key element to the situationalists, such as Gilbert Harman
and John Doris, who hold that such things as character and character traits do not exist (Harman 2000;
Doris 2002; Doris 1998).
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use cognitive enhancers in this way. Character in this limited way can sensibly be
understood as regulating the acts of students.
4.4 Motivations as Relevant Consideration and Permissibility Condition
The second challenge is that because a student’s motivation is not readily accessible
or easily identifiable, this virtues-based institutional rule’s reliance on motivation is a
problem. Academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff cannot look at a
student’s assignment and ascertain if a student used a cognitive enhancer while working
on it. Even if it was known that a student used a cognitive enhancer, it is difficult to
determine motivations. For example, a student could tell administrators, faculty, and staff
that the cognitive enhancers were used for reasons reflective of the ideals of human
excellence, but that student could simply be deceptive about his actual motivations.
Alternatively, a student could tell administrators, faculty, and staff that he used cognitive
enhancers for reasons reflective of the ideals of human excellence when the student could
be genuinely and unintentionally unaware of his actual motivations. Therefore, by not
being readily accessible or easily identifiable to academia, a student’s motivation cannot
be a relevant consideration or the condition that determines a permissible use of a
cognitive enhancer, and, therefore, this virtues-based institutional rule cannot work in
non-ideal theory.
To respond, one reasonable assumption is that students do have motivations for acting
in general and do have motivations for using cognitive enhancers in particular. Because
students have reasons for using cognitive enhancers, although they are not readily
accessible or easily identifiable, it seems that motivations are still at least one
consideration in an evaluation of a student’s use of enhancements. To understand the
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extent of motivation’s role as a consideration, there needs to be an assessment of two
questions: If a person’s motivation is not readily accessible or easily identifiable, can it
be considered a relevant consideration? If a person’s motivation is not readily accessible
or easily identifiable, can it determine the permissibility of an action?
In respect to both questions, the answer is yes. Consider that although a person’s
motivation is not readily accessible or easily identifiable, it is still a relevant
consideration in the United States’ legal system.64 A person’s motivation is the
consideration used to determine whether an individual is charged with first-degree
murder instead of second-degree murder or is charged with felony drug possession
instead of misdemeanor drug possession. The difference between being charged with
first-degree murder and second-degree murder depends upon whether a person had the
intent (motivation) to kill another person. For drug possession, the difference between
being charged with a misdemeanor and felony depends upon whether a person had the
intent (motivation) to sell or distribute illegal drugs. Therefore, although a person’s
motivation might not be readily accessible or easily identifiable, that it is still considered
relevant in the United States’ legal system, in the world as it currently exists, makes it
plausible to be considered as relevant in the evaluation of a student’s use of cognitive
enhancers.
If student’s motivations can be taken as relevant considerations, it is reasonable that
they can also be taken as determining the permissibility of their use of cognitive
64

One might object and counter that it is “intent” and not “motivation” in that is used in the legal system.
However, since motivation has been defined in this research project as being the reason a person did a
particular act or behavior, then intent could be regarded as a type of motivation. This move is unlikely to
please philosophers working in theory of action, but this not a major problem since (i) nothing in this
research project’s account of action, reasons, and motivation suggests that it could not be altered into an
account that focuses on action, reason, and intention, similar to T.M. Scanlon’s account presented in What
We Owe to Each Other and (ii) this project focuses specifically on actions and motivations in the normative
and not the metaphysical issue (Scanlon 1998, 17-77; Davidson 1963).
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enhancers. Consider that motivations, while not readily accessible or easily identifiable,
are often the consideration that determines the permissibility of palliative sedation and
terminal sedation. Palliative sedation is when a physician uses sedation solely as
treatment for managing a patient’s intractable symptoms (Cellarius 2008; Lynch 2003).
Terminal sedation is a subspecies of palliative sedation and occurs in cases where the
only treatment left available for physicians to manage a patient’s refractory symptoms is
sedation and, as often was the case, life-sustaining treatment would be withdrawn or
withheld (Enck 1991: 2002).
Although palliative sedation and terminal sedation lead to the deep and continuous
sedation of the patient and might be seen as infringing upon a patient’s autonomy or as
hastening their death, in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and many other
countries these treatments are legally sanctioned specifically on the grounds that it is the
physician’s motivation for sedating the patient —palliative management of intractable
symptoms— that determines the physician’s actions as being permissible (Quill, Dresser
and Brock 1997).65 While a physician’s motivation is not readily accessible or easily
identifiable, it still can determine the permissibility of an action. Therefore, because
motivation is still the consideration that determines the permissibility of a physician’s
action in the practice of medicine and of the degree of a charge in the United States’ legal
system—in the world as it currently exists—this makes it plausible to consider a
student’s motivation as determining the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers.
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Empirical evidence does not conclusively show that opioids and sedation in fact speed up the dying
process in terminal patients (Sykes and Thorns 2003) (Morita, Tei and Inoue 2001). Moreover, 20 percent
of patients who receive palliative sedation at M.D. Anderson Cancer Center are eventually brought out of
sedation and discharged.
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In the case of implementing this virtues-based institutional rule in a non-ideal
conception of academia, although a student’s motivation is not immediately available or
straightforward to academic institutions, administrators, faculty, and staff, there are
reasons for thinking that this virtues-based institutional could still work if implemented.
4.5 Honor Code
The final challenge is that even if motivations and character are relevant
considerations in respect to student use of cognitive enhancers in non-ideal students and
academic institutions, there is no manner in which academic institutions, administrators,
faculty, and staff could enforce this virtues-based institutional rule. I concede that
enforcement of the rule is problematic; however, the view that because it relies on
motivation and character, there is no manner for enforcing the rule is not completely
accurate. In fact, currently existing academic institutions do use institutional rules that
focus on the motivations and character of students: honor codes.
In the case of honor codes concerning cheating, it is honor as a motivation that could
be a reason a student does not cheat. In many instances, students may refrain from
cheating for reasons of honor. Although cheating on an exam may allow them to beat
their follow students, many students will choose not to cheat because these actions reflect
poorly on their character. To perform certain actions such as cheating reflects poorly on
the character of that student.
There is in fact empirical evidence to show that honor codes are an effective method
for academic institutions to implement to reduce or prevent students from cheating.
Research by Donald McCabe, Linda Trevino, and Kenneth Butterfield has shown that
instances of students cheating in academia increased in a 30-year period from 1964 to
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1994 (McCabe, Trevino and Butterfield 2001; McCabe, Butterfield and Trevino 2003).66
Yet while there was an overall increase in cheating, McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield’s
research indicated that there is a considerable difference between the levels of cheating
occurring at academic institutions with honor codes and those without honor codes:
Clearly, code students [students at institutions with robust and endorsed
codes] sense that they are part of a special community that demands
compliance with standards in exchange for the many privileges associated
with honor codes. (McCabe, Trevino and Butterfield 1999, 230)
Students in academic institutions with honor codes felt that because they were given
special privileges such as un-proctored exams, it was of particular importance to follow
their institution’s honor codes. Not following the codes was taken to be disrespectful to
the institution and an indication of poor character in the student. Evidence from another
of McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield’s studies indicated that academic institutions with a
strong honor code shaped the attitudes and sentiments of students about the way they
approached their professional environment after graduation (McCabe, Trevino and
Butterfield 1996).
As McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield concluded:
The primary implication of this work is that cheating can be most
effectively addressed at the institutional level. On many campuses, the
fundamental elements of an honor code may be a particularly useful tool
for colleges and universities who seek to reduce cheating. (McCabe,
Trevino and Butterfield 2001, 228)
Honor codes are an institutional rule used in academic institutions existing under nonideal conditions to reduce or prevent student cheating, and they rely on motivations and
character. That honor codes are being effectively implemented in current academic
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Cheating was broadly stipulated as plagiarism, falsifying a bibliography, and failing to cite properly.
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institutions suggests that it is reasonable to think that this virtues-based institutional rule
could also be implemented as a method for governing student use of cognitive enhancers.
4.6 Virtues-based Institutional Rule as an Honor Code
If this virtues-based institutional rule were implemented, it would stipulate the
conditions under which a student’s use of cognitive enhancers results in their gaining or
losing respect in an academic institution. Although respect and character are distinct
conceptions, it is reasonable that to be worthy of respect in academia suggests that a
student needs to be regarded as a certain kind of character, broadly construed as a good
character or, put otherwise, as being the right sort of student. Under this virtues-based
institutional rule, by using cognitive enhancers for reasons of self-improvement, seeking
understanding, and accurate beliefs, a student accumulates good character—which in turn
is a condition for being respected or held in high esteem.
In greater detail, consider the roles that character and respect have in enforcing this
institutional rule. The motivations of self-improvement, seeking understanding, and
accurate beliefs are provided and emphasized as (i) the proper reasons for using cognitive
enhancers and (ii) as reasons for using cognitive enhancers that reflect well on an
individual’s character. A student’s use of a cogntive enhancer is linked to her character,
and in turn, this provides a reason of character for the student to have the proper
motivations when using enhancements. In addition, because good character is an
antecedent condition for a student to gain respect is another reason for students to have
the right reasons to use cognitive enhancers.
Although honoring a student is most prominently illustrated when a student is
respected or held in high esteem by academia, this virtues-based institutional rule sets the
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conditions under which students can gain or lose respect. Respect is a powerful way to
govern people’s conduct:
We don’t give soldiers bonuses for bravery, we give them medals; and
more important, we honor them. We give them the respect we know they
deserve. (Appiah 2010, 193)
The role of respect and the significance of being held in esteem by an institution not only
are ways to govern the conduct of soldiers but also in this instance provide a way to
govern and enforce student use of cognitive enhancers by specifying the stipulations for
being eligible or worthy of respect.
Therefore, similar to an honor code concerning cheating, this virtues-based
institutional rule would rely on character and respect to govern student use of cognitive
enhancers in academia. By providing the conditions for gaining, or at least not losing
respect, in terms of students’ character, which in turn depends upon students having the
motivations of self-improvement, seeking understanding, and accurate beliefs when using
cognitive enhancers, this virtues-based institutional rule offers a method for enforcing the
proper use of enhancements
4.7 Accountability of Character
If implemented in current academic institutions, this virtues-based institutional rule
can immediately govern student use of cognitive enhancers in current academic
institutions because it makes students accountable for their character. Although this
project’s focus narrowly centers on the use of enhancements, real students have an active
role in many of their choices, attitudes, behaviors, and values. This means they can
determine the sort of character they want to have by their actions. It also means that if
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students have, to some degree, an active role in their character development, then it is
reasonable to evaluate a student’s character.
Traditionally, character has always been greatly valued in academia. As a remark
attributed to Dean of Vanderbilt University Madison Sarratt illustrates:
Today I am going to give you two examinations, one in trigonometry and
one in honesty. I hope you will pass them both, but if you must fail one,
let it be trigonometry, for there are many good [people] in this world today
who cannot pass an examination in trigonometry, but there are no good
[people] in the world who cannot pass an examination in honesty.
Sarratt’s view is that while failing a trigonometry exam might be bad for the student in
the short term, cheating to pass the exam and displaying poor character is far worse.
Not only is it important for students to display good character in academia, but
students are also traditionally held accountable for their character. This accountability of
character is because being a student is to occupy a certain identity or role. A person can
have a multiplicity of identities or roles, from familial to social to professional. When a
person enters into an academic institution for undergraduate education, this individual
undergoes organization socialization, meaning that he or she takes on the identity or role
of a student (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Feldman 1981). Occupying the identity or role
not only means accepting certain values of an institution, such as the goals and aims of
education, but also having particular responsibilities (Strike 1983). At least one
responsibility of students is to display conduct reflective of good character.
Moreover, many existing academic institutions have rules that hold students
accountable for the character their actions reflect. To begin, consider student-athletes as a
clear example. Not only are student-athletes expected to maintain a certain level of
scholarly performance, but there are also clearly indicated rules about displaying good
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character in their particular sport or in activities outside the confines of the academic
institution.67 Students not participating in collegiate athletics are also held to rules
concerning character. For example, there are regular occurrences—when students are
confrontational with professors or other students, when they have extremely low GPAs,
or when they are failing a number of courses —in which a student is put on probation,
officially reprimanded, or expelled on the grounds that their conduct was not reflective of
the proper character of students and was in violation of the institution’s policies.
Even with institutional rules that do not directly relate to students’ character, there is
an underlying notion of good character as being an implicit reason for this rule. For
example, consider rules concerning plagiarism. That a student should not turn in another
person’s work or ideas and claim it as his own does not, at least initially, seem to be a
question of character. However, consider rules concerning plagiarism for those not in
academia and those who are students. If an individual is not in academia and plagiarizes
another person’s work or idea but does not publish it, seek profit, or violate copyright or
trademark laws, it is difficult to punish this person with any legal sanctions. Outside
academia, there are instances of plagiarism in which persons can legally be punished. At
best one might take a person who plagiarizes in this way as having poor character, but it
is difficult to hold them accountable for having poor character. In contrast, consider a
student who plagiarizes. Specifically, I am thinking of instances in which a student uses
another student’s work, not one that has been published or copyrighted. A student who
67 NCAA Bylaw 2.4: The Principles of Sportsmanship and Ethical Conduct. For intercollegiate
athletics to promote the character development of participants to enhance the integrity of higher
education and to promote civility in society, student-athletes, coaches, and all others associated
with these athletics programs and events should adhere to such fundamental values as respect,
fairness, civility, honesty and responsibility. These values should be manifest not only in athletics
participation but also in the broad spectrum of activities affecting the athletics program (National
Collegiate Athletic Association 2009).
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plagiarizes and is caught is punished even if (i) this student was not going to publish or
seek profit with this work and (ii) the student who was plagiarized allowed and gave
permission for this to happen. A student is punished for plagiarism because of
institutional rules prohibiting plagiarism, but at a more fundamental level, because
plagiarism does not reflect well on a student’s character. In other words, plagiarism is not
the kind of action that academia expects from students.
Under this virtues-based institutional rule, students are held accountable by an
academic institution and by their peers (or possibly even by themselves) for using
cognitive enhancers in a manner that reflects well on their character. A student who uses
a cognitive enhancer for reasons of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs reflects
good character and, all things being equal, is likely going to be respected by the academic
institution and her peers. Conversely, a student who uses cognitive enhancers for
improper reasons reflects poor character and, all things being equal, is likely not going to
be respected by the academic institution and her peers. According to this virtues-based
institutional rule, although it might be bad for a student to do poorly on an exam, it is
worse for a student’s character to use cognitive enhancers for improper reasons because
this reflects poorly on their character. It is important for students that they not only use
cognitive enhancers for the right reasons but that uses of these enhancements do reflect
on their character. This institutional rule governs student use of enhancements by holding
them accountable for the character that certain uses of enhancements entail.
4.8 Differences Between Honor Codes and Virtues-based Institutional Rule
The case for this virtues-based institutional rule being implemented in existing
academic institutions is that it provides a method of enforcing that students use cognitive
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enhancers for the right reasons on the grounds that it is similar to an honor codes.
However, it needs to be noted that there are two significant differences between honor
codes and this virtues-based rule. First, they differ in regard to the actions they are meant
to govern. Specifically, an honor code concerning cheating—taken as plagiarism,
falsifying a bibliography, and failing to cite properly— governs actions that are clearly
regarded as being prohibited by most reasonable people. Yet it is not clear that having an
improper motivation for using a cognitive enhancer is an action that even most
reasonable people take as something to prohibit. Even if cheating and the improper use of
enhancements are taken as being prohibited actions, the reasons why do seem relevantly
different. This is likely to impact the importance students regard there to be in following
a virtues-based rule and also on administrators, faculty, and staff enforcing this rule.68
Second, honor codes and this virtues-based rule differ in the clarity of the
repercussions that violations will have on students. Consider this clarity simply in regard
to a student’s esteem and character. Under normal conditions, a student with good
character and esteem who is caught cheating loses esteem in their standing with the
academic institution and their peers as well as generally being regarded as having poor
character. Yet if a student were found to have violated this virtues-based rule, it is not at
all clear how it would impact this student’s esteem or character. Moreover, in conjunction
with the previous difference, there is an issue in assessing hard cases of virtues-based rule
violations. For example, the student is held in high esteem and has good character but is
simply experimenting with using enhancements, or this student only uses an enhancement
improperly once, or this student is held in high esteem and has good character in all other
68

In fact, that faculty often take an individualized or selective approach toward student cheating has been
shown to be a reason that students rates of cheating have increased over the years (McCabe, Butterfield and
Trevino 2003).

155

domains of academia except that he or she consistently uses cognitive enhancers
improperly. As these instances show, a significant difference between honor codes and
this virtues-based rule is the clarity of the repercussions for violations.
These differences point to certain disadvantages in implementing a virtues-based
institutional rule to govern and guide student use of cognitive enhancers. Certainly there
are other institutional rules that are more feasible. An institutional rule that simply
stipulates the use of a cognitive enhancer as being permitted or prohibited without relying
on considerations of motivation and character (or even respect) is more feasible and
provides a single determinate answer.
It cannot be overlooked that a virtues-based institutional rule differs significantly
from an honor code and that it is not the most feasible rule to implement in current
academic institutions. Yet this virtues-based institutional rule still provides the following
advantages: first, as I examine in the following section, it is able to handle concerns about
the medicalization of cognitive enhancers in academia. Second, it offers a mature
approach that develops the way students think about the use of enhancements in
academia. Third, with it one resists oversimplifying issues of enhancement in academia.
4.9 Medicalization of Cognitive Enhancers
One concern about the use of enhancements in academia is medicalization, defined as
“a process in which non-medical problems become defined and treated as medical
problems, usually in terms of illness and spending” (Conrad, Mackie and Mehrotra 2010,
1943). According to Peter Conrad (2007; 2010), medicalization is a social process, and in
principle is neither good nor bad. Whether medicalization is judged as being good or bad
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depends on many considerations such as consequences, rules, motivations, and relevant
impact on economics and institutional practices.
For Conrad, medicalization is bad when it is over-medicalization, meaning that
individuals, communities, and government healthcare systems are burdened with costs for
treating questionable medical conditions or disorders (Conrad 2007: Conrad, Mackie and
Mehrotra 2010). An example of over-medicalization is categorizing pains associated with
normal aging as being Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) instead of simply
holding them to be normal pains that occur in the aging process.69 Patients seeking
treatment for CRPS burden a healthcare system via processing, regulatory, and
transaction costs.
In the case of the medicalization of pharmaceuticals, Carl Elliot (2003) contends that
medicalization is bad when using these enhancements leads to people making and
maintaining choices that are inauthentic to their own values; for example, when a person
relies on anti-depressants or an anti-anxiety pharmaceutical to be more outgoing or to
endure a situation, even if this goes against their own values.70 Jonathan Lehrer recounts
a story of a psychiatrist who was taken aback by a patient’s response when asked if the
anti-depressants were working:
“Yes, they [anti-depressants] are working great … I feel so much better.
But I’m still married to the same alcoholic son of a bitch. It’s just now
he’s tolerable” (Lehrer 2010, 42).71
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I take this example from Erik Parens who, in turn, was suggested this example by an anonymous
reviewer because it clearly is an instance of over-medicalization (Parens 2011).
70
Although depression and anxiety disorders have some symptom overlap, they are not the same. A
common problem for even advanced clinicians is making an accurate diagnosis. This is a matter of serious
concern because anti-depressants and anti-anxiety pharmaceuticals, when prescribed for inaccurate
diagnoses, often have the paradoxical effect on a patient (e.g., anti-depressants for anxiety often make a
patient’s anxiety disorders worse and anti-anxiety pharmaceuticals for depression often make a patient’s
depression worse).
71
This quote is also used by Erik’s Parens ( 2011).
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In this case, the patient is being inauthentic to her values by using these pharmaceuticals.
Also, for many psychiatrists, medicalization is bad when normal emotional states
such as shyness or sadness are regarded as being conditions or disorders that require
medical treatment. One problem I encounter often is that when physicians give patients a
diagnosis of cancer, they often immediately prescribe anti-depressants. Yet this blocks
the grieving process since the patient is not depressed because they have depression; they
are depressed because they cancer. By medicalizing sadness and preventing patients from
going through the normal and natural grieving process, many patients are unprepared for
the physical and emotional difficulties of chemotherapy or making end-of-life decisions.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for thinking that under certain conditions, turning a
non-medical problem into a medical problem is good. For example, turning childbirth
into a medical condition has resulted in fewer risks and better outcomes for both mothers
and newborns (Conrad, Mackie and Mehrotra 2010). For psychiatrists and psychologists,
the reliance on pharmacology instead of psychotherapeutic treatments (“talking” or
behavioral therapies) is not always wrong in-and-of-itself and often better helps patients.
Erik Parens summarizes this view:72
If a pharmacological and psychotherapeutic means can both achieve the
same end —improving how one experiences herself and the world— then
it is irrational and perhaps inhumane to prefer the more strenuous and
expensive means. It’s irrational not to take a shortcut when improving
human well-being is the destination. (Parens 2011, 5)
For the moment, this research project remains neutral on whether the medicalization
of cognitive enhancers is to be regarded, all things considered, as good or bad.73 While
neutral on this question, because this virtues-based approach and institutional rule does
72

This is not Erik Parens’ view. Like this research project, he holds a more moderated and nuanced view of
regarding when medicalization is regarded as good or bad.
73
I return to this concern in the final chapter.
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make it more permissible for students to use cognitive enhancers in academia, the
following sections focus on addressing concerns about the medicalization of cognitive
enhancers in academia.
A concern about the medicalization of cognitive enhancers in implementing this
virtues-based approach and institutional rule is that it will likely result in three
misconceptions. Addressing these misconceptions is important since they are likely to
occur (whether the medicalization of cognitive enhancers in academia turns out to be
good or bad). The first misconception is that the medicalization of cognitive enhancers
will lead students to misunderstand the notion of proficient functioning of cognitive
capacities. Students may come to think that unless their cognitive capacities of focus or
concentration are functioning at above-proficient levels, they have a medical impairment.
While this leads to many different problems, at least one problem is the inevitable burden
there will be on the health system. It was estimated that in 2005, spending on behavioral
disorder medication, the classification under which cognitive enhancers often fall, was
$4657.5 million (Conrad, Mackie and Mehrotra 2010, 1946). Clearly not all of the
$4657.5 million was on pharmaceuticals for enhancement, but it cannot be denied that
spending on pharmaceuticals for enhancement did contribute to this amount. In
comparison, in 2010, there were 1,529,560 new reported cancer cases and 569,490 people
died from cancer in the United States (Jemal, et al. 2010) (Carter and Nguyen 2012).
While cancer resulted in all of these deaths, the 2010 National Cancer Institute’s fiscal
budget for cancer research was only $1.5 billon (National Institutes of Health and the
Department of Health and Human Services 2012). One might wonder whether instead of
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spending money on pharmaceuticals for enhancement, the money would have been better
served going to cancer research.
The second misconception is about the value of academia. The medicalization of
cognitive enhancements leads to hyper-competitive students accepting misconceptions
not only about the goals of academia—which this research project mentioned at the
beginning of the chapter—but also in respect to academic achievement.74 Medicalizing
students’ use of cognitive enhancers is likely to contribute further to the misconception
that the value of academia for the student is on academic achievement rather than on
them attaining understanding. Put otherwise, for students, the misconception does not
focus on their development of an ability to draw upon and connect information and facts
from academia to apply to their own life experiences but rather on whether they got A’s
in their course.
The third misconception, the most dangerous, is that the medicalization of cognitive
enhancers is likely to lead to students believing, incorrectly, that these cognitive
enhancers carry little to no risk to their health or well-being. This misconception is
dangerous because cognitive enhancers are highly addictive pharmaceuticals. The rates at
which students in academia are using them without medical supervision is increasing, and
an honest assessment of our understanding of addiction, in both a medical and nonmedical sense, shows it to be rather basic. Only within the past ten years has our
understanding of the neuroscience of the dopamine system’s involvement in decisionmaking started to become clear. This dopamine system interacts with the reward center of
the brain. Cognitive enhancers rely on and often rewire a person’s dopamine system,
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Michael Sandel touches on this hyper-competitive notion, holding that enhancements are often used to
pursue a misguided notion of perfection (Sandel 2007).
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which has implications—not yet fully understood by neuroscience or pharmacology—for
the likelihood of addiction (Smith and Farah 2011).
Also, it is necessary to be aware that the use of pharmaceuticals, even in situations
where they are used exclusively as treatment, often exposes people to unpredicted—and
surprisingly disturbing—risks. For example, 6 to 14 percent of patients receiving
Dopamine Replacement Therapy (DRT) develop impulse control disorders such as
pathological gambling, compulsive buying, and hypersexuality (Ambermoon, et al. 2010;
Weintraub, et al. 2010; Carter, Ambermoon and Hall 2011). This risk was unknown for
many years, but recently, the implications of this risk have been gaining attention, such as
in the case of a prominent community member in Tasmania engaging in prostitution with
underage girls only after starting DRT and when there was no previous criminal record or
inappropriate interest in young girls (Porter 2011). In the case of cognitive enhancers, it is
likely that long-term use of cognitive enhancers could result in side effects and health
risks that are currently unknown.
Whether or not the medicalization of cognitive enhancers is good, these three
misconceptions pose significant concerns. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that
these misconceptions are going to occur. I contend that this research project’s virtuesbased approach and institutional rule offer one way to handle these misconceptions.
4.9.1 Virtues, Misconceptions, and the Medicalization of Cognitive Enhancers
The virtues-based approach and institutional rule provides a moderated and nuanced
way to handle the three misconceptions about the medicalization of cognitive enhancers.
However, before describing this, it needs to be noted that distinguishing between medical
and non-medical problems is not always an empirical, fact-based process. For a long
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period of modern medicine, homosexuality was considered a psychiatric condition or
disorder. It was not until a majority of psychiatrists voted that it was not a mental
disorder that it was removed from the medical canon as a condition or disorder. In this
case, a majority of psychiatrists agreed, and correctly so I believe, that being a
homosexual was not a condition or disorder requiring medical treatment. Yet notice that
while these psychiatrists’ votes were cast on the grounds of their professional experience,
it is not as if this decision, for lack of a better term, was based on the empirical findings
of the time.
Also contributing to the problem of distinguishing sharply between medical and nonmedical problems is that societal values and advances in biomedical technologies and
medical procedures often work in conjunction to dictate indirectly the circumstances in
which a problem will be medicalized. The recent prominence of erectile dysfunction
(ED) as a medical condition or disorder illustrates the complexity and ambiguity of
societal values and biomedical technologies and medical procedures working indirectly to
medicalize something. Unlike what was traditionally regarded as impotence for
psychological reasons, ED occurs when a man is physiologically not able to develop or
maintain an erection for sexual intercourse. It is clear that having the ability to develop or
maintain an erection is rather important for society and for most men. There are many
conditions under which ED is a medical condition or disorder, resulting from prostrate
cancer or diabetes. However, considering human evolution, it is not at all evident that
human males past their reproductive prime were physiologically meant to be able to
develop and maintain an erection. ED was not a problem until society advanced to the
point where men living beyond their reproductive prime became common. That there was
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a pharmacological treatment for ED as well as value in still being able to have a sexual
relationship even past a man’s reproductive prime led to the medicalization of ED.
As the examples of homosexuality and ED demonstrate, there is immense difficulty
in distinguishing medical from non-medical problems not only on empirical grounds but
also because societal values and advances in biomedical technologies and medical
procedures often indirectly (or directly) dictate what things are to be medicalized.
In respect to the use of cognitive enhancers, it is also necessary to understand that as
neuroscience research into the human brain progresses, it becomes clear that what is
considered a normal range of proficient-functioning levels of cognitive capacities is
always changing. Consider that while cognitive enhancers were created to treat ADHD
and LD, it is only because reading, writing, and academics are highly valued by our
society that we think of these as medical conditions or disorders. Some have argued that
it is not so much that persons with ADHD and LD have medical conditions or disorders
but that human neurology has simply not adapted to the need for these abilities to read
and write (Stein 2008; Buchanan 2008). Human beings have only been reading for five
thousand years; in terms of evolution, this is a relatively short period (Miller 2010).
Therefore, distinguishing between medical and non-medical problems is not always an
empirical, fact-based process, and societal values often indirectly (or directly) dictate
what things are to be medicalized. Yet this does not mean that making a non-medical
problem into a medical problem is something that, at least prima facie, should be
rejected.
Returning to this virtues-based approach and institutional rule, I show how it offers a
moderated and nuanced way to handle the three misconceptions about the medicalization
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of cognitive enhancers. In regard to the first misconception, notice that a virtuous
student’s impetuses for using cognitive enhancers do not center on having a deficiency or
on considering that proficient functioning levels of cognitive capacities are deficiencies,
but rather they focus on having the proper motivations in academia. Under this virtuesbased institutional rule, the reasons for students using cognitive enhancers are not
focused on students’ cognitive capacities and whether they’re proficient or need to be
enhanced. Instead, students’ reasons for using these enhancements are focused on the
proper motivations and character for students in academia.
Under normal conditions, the focus on proper motivation and character for students
does not call for medical attention but instead calls for self-reflection. Under this virtuesbased approach and institutional rule, students should not immediately converge on their
healthcare providers for pharmaceutical enhancement but rather reflect on their own
motivation and character. Students begin first by asking themselves whether their
motivations for using cognitive enhancers are for seeking understanding or accurate
beliefs or self-improvement, and whether their current use of cognitive enhancers reflects
good character. This virtues-based approach and institutional rule would cut down on
students excessively seeking enhancements from healthcare providers, thereby lessening
the burden on the healthcare system.75
The second misconception is that medicalization of cognitive enhancers fosters a
hyper-competitive notion of academic achievement. To see how this virtues-based
approach and institutional rule handles this misconception, reconsider the goal of
academia for this approach. The goal of academia under ideal and non-ideal conditions is
75

One might think that this is unrealistic, but under the United Kingdom’s healthcare system, the use of
anti-depressants is reserved only for patients with acute depression. All other cases involving depression
first must undergo counseling and exercise therapy.
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to attain understanding and not simply to obtain knowledge. The goal of academia is for
students to strive toward developing an ability to connect, draw upon, and then apply
relevant information and facts learned in academia to one’s life experience. This goal of
academia goes a long way to addressing the misperception of academia being solely
about academic achievement. If attaining understanding is the goal of academia and
something students should strive to attain, then academic achievement is lessened in
importance. This, in turn, does seem to be more consistent with the value of education as
being instrumentally beneficial and good for its own sake.
Also, this virtues-based approach indicates, even if in an indirect way, what students
in academic institutions should be doing with the information and facts learned. Whether
pursuing highly theoretical or practical, impactful work, the purpose of an education is to
contribute to life experiences. It is likely that if institutional rules were prominently about
the goal of academia and desired virtues of students—the virtues of seeking
understanding and accurate beliefs—the rules would be of great benefit for students,
administrators, staff, and faculty. Students would be able to understand clearly the value
of education as something instrumental and good for its own sake, and those working in
academia would be less likely to develop the typical apathy toward students. At a
minimum, this virtuous approach and the virtues of students clearly indicate that the
unexamined life is a missed opportunity.76
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This is the minimum understanding of the value of education for students according to this virtues-based
approach and institutional rule. While I think this claim is correct, I am personally suspicious of persons
who make claims about the value of the examined life. My suspicion is not because the claim about the
unexamined life is incorrect; rather I have found those who often rely on this claim to be the most
disingenuous of persons. I think but do not argue here that instead of focusing on examination of one’s life,
those in education should instead emphasis a point Christopher Hitchens makes in phrasing Horace Mann’s
famous quote: “Until you have done something for humanity you should be ashamed to die” (Hitchens
2012).
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The final misconception resulting from the medicalization of cognitive enhancers is
that students believe using enhancements is risk free. This virtues-based approach and
institutional rule takes a moderated approach in handling this misconception because the
risks (both known and unknown) and benefits are not only regarded as relevant
information in a given situation, but the risks and benefits are assessed in respect to the
virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. The use of cognitive enhancers
under certain conditions poses a significant risk to some students’ health, so if they are to
be used, then it is sensible that students have the proper motivation for using them. This
is supported by this approach’s consistent view that pharmaceutical enhancements are
not, by any stretch of the imagination, “smart pills.” Still, when assessing the risks and
benefits of student use of cognitive enhancers, one should not underestimate the benefits,
even if moderate, that result from using these enhancements. Cognitive enhancers have
been shown to help surgeons and other emergency department medical professionals
maintain high levels of alertness and concentration in extreme circumstances for an
extended period (Warren, et al. 2009; Carter, Ambermoon and Hall 2011).
There is still the concern that amidst notions of balancing risk and benefits as
considerations for using these enhancements, I have overlooked the potential—more
accurately the probability—of addiction resulting from the medicalization of cognitive
enhancers. I think that addiction is an important problem and a serious issue in respect to
the use of cognitive enhancers. However, I refrain from making anything more than
minimal claims about the risk of addiction and the medicalization of cognitive enhancers.
There are reasons for thinking that, as they currently stand, medicine, neuroscience, and
philosophy do not provide a clear, conceptual way to understand addiction in regard to
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human neurology and responsibility. In the medical and neuroscience community, there
is a tendency to consider addiction in respect to physiological causes, favoring
neuroscience mechanistic explanations. Yet this is a problem because it removes or at
least weakens the role that psychological causes have in cases of addiction. Weakness of
will is still dependent on human agency, whether human agency is considered as being
deliberative, conscious, automatic, or automastistic (Levy and Bayne 2004a; 2004b).
Physiological causes do not always outweigh the fact that, by our nature, humans do act
for reasons. Medical and neuroscience understandings of addiction need to better account
for these reasons. Alternatively, for those in philosophy, there is often a tendency to favor
a conceptual understanding of addiction in terms of psychological causes. This is also a
problem because philosophical accounts of addiction and personal responsibility often
understate the physiological effects of addiction on the human brain. For these reasons, I
refrain from making anything more than minimal claims about the risk of addiction and
the medicalization of cognitive enhancers.
The risk of addiction is a concern for the medicalization of cognitive enhancers, but
one feasible salutation is to implement educational programs and information for faculty,
staff, and students about the risk of addiction when using cognitive enhancers. Also
important is acknowledging that there should not be an overestimation or an
underestimation of the risk of addiction. In this way, this virtues-based approach and
institutional rule functions to provide equilibrium between the overestimation and
underestimation of cognitive enhancers and addiction. A virtuous student would likely
attempt to find what Buddhism regards as the “the middle path” and refers to as the
“golden mean.” The use of cognitive enhancers requires a middle path between
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overestimation and underestimation of the risks of addiction. While there are benefits to
using cognitive enhancers, there are also risks, including addiction, and this virtues-based
institutional rule attempts to provide a balance for student use of cognitive enhancers.
Therefore, even if the medicalization of cognitive enhancers results in these three
misconceptions for students, I contend that this virtues-based approach and institutional
rule offer a moderated and nuanced way to handle them.
4.10 Advancing Enhancement in Academia
This research project now examines at least one way this virtues-based approach and
institutional rule advances enhancement in academia: it offers a mature approach. For
Kant, it was during the Enlightenment that humanity realized the role of reason as being
able to serve as the guide for morality:
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.
Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the
guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not
lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without
the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere
aude! Have courage to use your own understanding! (Kant 2010)
Maturity is having the resolution and courage to rely on reason rather than be guided by
authority.
This virtues-based approach and institutional rule is mature in that it asks for us to
have the resolution and courage to rely on students to be able to decide the
appropriateness of using cognitive enhancers in academia. However, unlike Kant, it does
not hold that deciding the appropriateness of using cognitive enhancers in academia is a
matter that can be completely left up to students’ discretionary judgment. Instead, it
suggests that we need the resolution and courage to change academia’s institutional rules
and policies for governing and guiding student use of enhancements in academia. We
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need to change academia’s institutional rules and policies about enhancement in respect
to the ideals of human excellence. In other words, instead of focusing on trying to
determine decisively whether the use of enhancements is cheating or whether they are
permitted or prohibited, this research project attempts to focus on developing the way
students think about the use of enhancements in academia.
Again, considering that the relationship between academia, institutional rules, and
students is dynamic, a change in rules and policies has profound effects on students.77
The manner in which students think about and use cognitive enhancers is at least partially
shaped by academia’s institutional rules and policies. If students are not using cognitive
enhancers in the proper circumstances or for the right reasons, then it is necessary to
change these rules and policies to facilitate the way students think about enhancements.
As presented in Chapter Three, institutions are integral to molding the ways students
think. Institutional rules create an expectation of a pattern of behavior for students by
structuring and developing students’ motivation, and this shapes the ethos of students.
For academic institutions, implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is likely to
have profound implications on the way students think about cognitive enhancers. It
would likely shape students’ processes of reasoning about cognitive enhancers in two
ways: First, this virtues-based rule makes motivations and character prominent rational
considerations for students when reasoning about cognitive enhancers; second, this rule
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Consider the diverse claims and arguments made in this research project: (1) the goals of academia are
developing students’ intellectual capacities to, first, attain understanding and, second, achieve commercial
or economic placement; (2) academia’s institutional rules regulate which actions of students are permitted
and prohibited; (3) academia’s institutional rules also structure and develop motivations by providing
expectations of a pattern of behavior and directing interactions and/or being internalized and becoming an
element of a student’s psychology; (4) even if academia does not have a responsibility to develop virtues in
students, it still works to facilitate these virtues in students; (5) the environment is integral in supporting
and assisting human cognition, and institutions are integral in supporting and assisting a person’s cognition
and intellectual capacities and in shaping their attitudes and sentiments.
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can create an automatic mental process even if students are only sub-optimally aware of
motivation and character as considerations for evaluating the use of cognitive
enhancers.78
4.10.1 Shaping Students’ Reasoning: Rational Considerations
This virtues-based institutional rule shapes students’ processes of reasoning about
cognitive enhancers by making their motivations, such as seeking understanding and
accurate beliefs, and character become prominent rational considerations for when they
deliberate using cognitive enhancers. By prominent rational considerations, I mean that a
student, at a minimum, regards using cognitive enhancers for reasons of seeking
understanding and accurate beliefs or how the use of these enhancements reflects on his
character as being significant in their process of reasoning.
Institutions are integral to molding how students think. If implemented in an
academic institution, this virtues-based institutional rule would emphasize motivations
and character as prominent rational considerations because motivations determine the
permissibility of using cognitive enhancers.
That it is a student’s motivation that makes the use of cognitive enhancers permissible
suggests that a reasonable student would have to at least regard motivations as being
significant in the process of reasoning about enhancements. That motivations play a
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Before demonstrating how this virtues-based institutional rule could shape the way students think about
cognitive enhancers, I need to make certain points of clarification to avoid confusion. Since this chapter is
on this virtues-based institutional rule being implemented in non-ideal conditions, and the investigation is
currently focused on how this rule develops students in existing academic institutions into the right sort of
student by shaping the way they think about cognitive enhancers, I make the following modest clarifying
points on practical reasoning. In the following section, the focus is on a student’s rational procedure for
thinking about cognitive enhancers. For emphasis on this rational procedure, I often use “process of
reasoning” instead of practical reasoning. However, even with the focus being on students’ processes of
reasoning, it is not necessary that students be fully aware of this process (Streumer 2010).
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significant role in deliberation further suggests that it is likely that a student will reflect
upon her own motivations and assess whether they meet the permissibility condition.
By allowing for the motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs to be
prominent rational considerations in a student’s process of reasoning about using
cognitive enhancers, this virtues-based institutional rule is similar to Aristotle’s notion of
virtues in practical reasoning (Kamtekar 2004). Practical reasoning is an active process in
which virtues are a significant rational consideration. According to Aristotle, virtue is the
mean between excess and deficiency and rationally determined by practical wisdom:
Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative
to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of
practical wisdom would determine it. (NE 2.5 1106b36-1107a1)
A virtue can be understood as a rational consideration that is active in the process of
practical reasoning (Kamtekar 2004). For a person to become virtuous, virtues must be
actively considered when reasoning in a particular situation. For example, for a person to
have the virtue of compassion, the motivation of sympathy (or alleviation of suffering)
must have a prominent role in his process of reasoning. In a manner similar to Aristotle,
this virtues-based institutional rule works to make these motivations, specifically seeking
understanding and accurate beliefs, as rational considerations that a student must consider
when deliberating on the use of enhancements.
Under this virtues-based institutional rule, students, at least initially, would consider
the motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs as being prominent rational
considerations in their process of reasoning about cognitive enhancers. This likely will
result in students having to reflect on what their motivations actually are for using
cognitive enhancers. As students progress through their academic career, they will likely
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become more cognizant of their motivations for using cognitive enhancers and, in doing
so, become aware of how this use is reflective of their character. This, in turn, allows for
reasons of character to become prominent rational considerations for a student’s process
of reasoning about the use of cognitive enhancers.
Pausing for the moment, notice that under this virtues-based institutional rule, the
claim is that motivations and character are likely to become prominent rational
considerations in a student’s process of reasoning, not that motivations and character will
always be most the important considerations or that this rule makes students have these
considerations. To illustrate, consider T.M. Scanlon’s (1998) distinction between
standard normative reasons and operative reasons in respect to explanation (and, in turn,
justification). Standard normative reasons are those that support the explanation or
justification of persons for holding a belief or doing an action in general (i.e., this is a
good reason for persons to hold this belief or do an action). Operative reasons differ in
that they are reasons that support a particular person’s explanation or justification for a
belief or an action (i.e., this is the reason for that person’s belief or action).79
It is possible to use the framework of Scanlon’s distinction to formulate a useful
distinction and apply it to student use of enhancements in academia. I contend that there
is a distinction between permissible reasons and operative reasons. According to this
virtues-based institutional rule, seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are
permissible reasons: these are the reasons that permit a student to use a cognitive
enhancer. However, students do have operative reasons, their own particular reasons for
wanting to use cognitive enhancers.
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(Scanlon 1998, 18-20).
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Because seeking understanding and accurate beliefs determine the permissibility of
using cognitive enhancers, a student has to at least consider whether their operative
reasons are also permissible reasons. This student may choose to take a particular
operative reason as being important in a given situation. Still, under this virtues-based
institutional rule, a reasonable student has to at least compare their operative reasons
against the permissible reasons. This comparison makes permissible reasons, the
motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs, the prominent rational
considerations in a student’s process of reasoning about the use of cognitive enhancers.
This virtues-based institutional rule does not make students have these motivations but
works to develop these motivations as having a significant role in students’ processes of
reasoning about enhancements.
4.10.2 Shaping Students’ Reasoning: Automatic Mental Process
If implemented, this virtues-based institutional rule not only shapes students to regard
motivations and character as prominent rational considerations in their process of
reasoning; it is also likely to affect this process of reasoning in a profound but less
explicit way. Contemporary research in neuroscience and social psychology indicate
that—in general—humans are often not consciously aware of their reasons for acting, and
many actions are not consciously controlled (Levy 2007; Wegner 2002; Bargh and
Chartrand 1999). This research has not shown that conscious control of actions or
reasoning is illusory but rather focuses on neuroscience and social psychology to examine
the role automaticity has in human cognition.80 People have automatic mental processes,
meaning cognitive processes for assessing information and undertaking certain acts,
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Although some, such as Daniel Wegner, hold this position, I do not (Wegner 2002).
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mindsets, or affective orientations without a conscious or intentional deliberation (Bargh
and Chartrand 1999, 464).81 These automatic mental processes are part of our human
neurological “hardwiring.” For example, there is an automatic mental process referred to
as the perceptual-behavioral link82 in which a person unconsciously and unintentionally
mimics the behavior of another person during social interaction (Bargh and Chartrand
1999; Lakin, Chartrand and Arkin 2008; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009).
According to Bargh and Chartrand, it is the environment that provides conditions for
developing automaticity:
The necessary and sufficient ingredients for automation are frequency and
consistency of use of the same set of component mental processes under
the same circumstances–regardless of whether the frequency and
consistency occur because of a desire to attain a skill, or whether they
occur just because we tended in the past to make the same choices or to do
the same thing each time. These processes also become automated, but
because we did not start out intending to make them that we way, we are
not aware that they have been and so, when that process operates
automatically in that situation, we aren’t aware of it. (Bargh and Chartrand
1999, 469)
The consistency and frequency of a person’s circumstances dictates the likelihood of an
individual developing a particular automatic mental process. Research indicates that the
development of automatic mental processes are a way of off-loading mental tasks to
preserve the energy these conscious deliberations require for processing time (Levy 2007;
Wegner 2002; Bargh and Chartrand 1999). This is not all that shocking considering that
many activities, with a range of complexity, can be done automatically: turning on one’s
computer, eating and conversing with others, driving to work, filing paperwork while
reading, driving home after work, etc.
81

Intentional mental process is the cognitive process for consciously and intentionally responding to a
certain range of rational considerations for undertaking certain acts, mindsets, or affective orientations
(Bargh and Chartrand 1999).
82
Also called “behavioral coordination,” “movement synchrony,” or “behavior matching” in the literature.
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Yet as these examples illustrate, these automatic mental processes are not solely
behavioral but also extend into the realm of human reasoning: deliberation and evaluative
judgments. Research by Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) demonstrates the prevalence and
reliance of automatic mental processes for evaluating acts, events, and people. For
example, when shown five-second clips of professors teaching, people were rather
successful in predicting these professors’ student-evaluation scores. Drawing upon a
range of situational, sensory, and other considerations, a person can quickly evaluate acts,
events, and people. However, people are not consciously aware of this process of
reasoning in the automatic evaluation of acts, events, and people, and automatic
evaluations often do reflect the values of a particular person (Dijksterhuis, et al. 2006).
This research in neuroscience and social psychology impacts this virtues-based
institutional rule because it is plausible that were such a rule implemented, it could lead
to students developing an automatic mental process about the use of cognitive enhancers.
If implemented, this virtues-based institutional rule is likely to result in an environment in
which the motivations of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs are taken—in being
the motivations that determine permissibility—as prominent rational considerations in a
student’s process of reasoning about cognitive enhancers. With consistency and
frequency, students can be able to develop an automatic mental process such that the
appropriate use of cognitive enhancers is for reasons of proper motivation and character,
all without the student being consciously aware of this process.
Initially, the claim that students can develop an automatic mental process about the
appropriate use of cognitive enhancers seems difficult to accept. Yet imagine the
following situations. In the first situation, Edith, who has developed an automatic mental
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process about the appropriate use of cognitive enhancers, happens to cross paths with
Oliver in the library. During their conservation, Oliver offers Edith cognitive enhancers.
In this brief encounter, Edith does not have to time to consciously deliberate but politely
turns down the offer. Edith politely declines because her automatic mental process made
a rapid evaluation of Oliver and the situational circumstances, including her motivations,
and made a “snap judgment.”
In the second situation, Edith wakes up in her dorm on campus during fall break.
There are no classes and she has the day to herself. Without any reflection, she gets up,
takes a cognitive enhancer and immediately begins working on her coursework. In both
of these situations, Edith’s use of cognitive enhancers is consistent with the appropriate
use as stipulated by this virtues-based institutional rule in her academic institution. In the
first situation, she does not use them when she is not certain of situational information or
her motivations; in the second situation, she uses a cognitive enhancer appropriately and
is only sub-optimally aware of her process of reasoning. Moreover, it might also turn out
that Edith, even given time for reflection, might not be able to articulate her
considerations for her decision.
One might be concerned that Edith’s inability to articulate her reasons for her actions
means that she didn’t go through a process of reasoning. Yet even if Edith were unable to
articulate her reasons, it is plausible that she went through an automatic process of
reasoning about the appropriate use of cognitive enhancers that was developed through
consistent and frequent experience of this virtues-based institutional rule. Humans are
able to make rapid and often accurate evaluations of a situation without conscious
awareness of their reasons for doing so. In an experiment called the Iowa Gambling Task,
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participants could choose cards from two decks of cards, either being rewarded or losing
money, and participants were frequently asked about their decision-making process while
measurements of their bodily responses were taken (Bechara, et al. 1997; Bechara et al.
2005; Maia and McClelland 2004; Maia and McClelland 2005; Levy 2007). The cards
chosen from deck “A” always resulted in a loss of money, whereas cards from deck “B”
always resulted in a reward. This experiment suggested that a person’s bodily responses
often indicated a person’s switch in strategy, moving from deck “A” to deck “B”, before
the person was able consciously to provide a reason for doing so.
There are controversies surrounding the conclusions that certain researchers have
drawn from this experiment in respect to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (a person’s
body provides signals that guide beneficial decision-making) and processes of reasoning
(Levy 2007). Yet for the purposes of this chapter, what this experiment does suggest is
that in certain situations, likely many situations, a person’s evaluations are done without
her consciously being aware of it. Thus, it is more than possible that were Edith to
develop an automatic mental process for evaluating the appropriate use of cognitive
enhancers, she could make a choice about the use of an enhancement and not be
consciously aware of it.83
This virtues-based institutional rule in academic institutions could shape students’
processes of reasoning about the use of cognitive enhancers. This shaping of students’
process reasoning can be explicit, by making motivation and character prominent rational
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This implication is likely to make many people uncomfortable since the assumption is that if there is
anything that a person has complete control over it is their reasoning process. Yet it is important to note
that the claim is not that humans have no control over their reasoning processes but simply a modest claim,
backed by empirical evidence, that humans simply do not have complete or absolute control over their
reasoning process. Were it the case that humans did have complete control, then the suggested attempts to
suppress certain thoughts would not clinically be shown to be so futile (Wegner 1989).
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considerations, or implicit, by working so that students develop an automatic mental
process about the appropriate use of cognitive enhancers. By shaping students’ practical
reasoning in this way, students currently in academic institutions would begin to think
about the use of enhancements as the kind of student wanted in academia would. The
kind of student to want in academia, the right sort of student, does not use cognitive
enhancers in all situations regardless of the circumstances, or only for reasons of
instrumental benefit, or because the institutional rules, for example, permit them. The
right sort of student is able to consider the relevant information in a given situation,
assess the relevant considerations, and act accordingly.
Although this virtues-based institutional rule would shape the way academic
institutions think about using cognitive enhancers, it does not mean that under this rule
students would become virtuous. It also does not mean that after implementing this rule,
students will always make the correct assessments about the appropriate use of cognitive
enhancers. Instead, implementing this virtues-based institutional rule offers a way for
motivation and character to be included within the discussion of enhancement in
academia. The importance of including motivation and character is illustrated by the fact
that we are not troubled (or at least are troubled less) by the thought of a virtuous student
using a cognitive enhancer because, in part, they have the right reasons for using them,
and this is reflective of good character. The uneasiness about the use of cognitive
enhancers among students in academic institutions currently is because the students are
thought to lack proper motivations and the good character to use cognitive enhancers
appropriately.
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Although many students in our existing academic institutions are likely to lack proper
motivation or good character when using cognitive enhancers, this does not diminish the
importance of these considerations. Administrators, faculty, and staff in academia should
work to implement institutional rules that, at a minimum, strive toward promoting the
motivations and character that strive toward attaining understanding. As Xunzi
eloquently states, academia is the way to develop and transform students to think about
things (here the use of enhancements) so that they do so in the correct manner:
If the man in the street applies himself to training and studying,
concentrates his mind and will, and considers and examines things
carefully, continuing his efforts over a long period of time and
accumulating good acts without stop, then he can achieve a godlike
understanding and form a triad with heaven and earth. (Tzun, Man's
Nature is Evil 1963, 170)
According to this research project, we want to have students use cognitive enhancers in
the same way that the kind of students we want in academia would use them. We want
students to use cognitive enhancers for the right motivations and in a way reflective of
good character. To do this, we need to have the resolution and courage to change our
institutional rules and policies to transform existing students into the kind of students we
want by relying on the ideals of human excellence.
4.11 Resisting Simplification
I conclude this chapter by discussing the final advantage of this virtues-based
approach and institutional rule. By acknowledging the complexity of enhancement use in
academia, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule understand that there are
limitations to the amount of clarity that can be brought to issues of enhancement in
academia. Enhancement in academia is inherently complex, and one should resist
simplification. For the moment, put aside this virtues-based approach and institutional
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rule and consider the following example as illustrating at least some of the ambiguity and
complexity.
Nora and David both have an exam in their Wittgenstein course in two weeks. Nora
is a senior with an impeccable GPA, and if she gets an “A” on the exam, she likely will
graduate magna cum laude. Graduating magna cum laude is not only a highly respected
academic achievement, but it is also an academic achievement that greatly improves her
chances of getting into a top-tier medical school. Nora has a legal prescription for
cognitive enhancers that is specifically for enhancement purposes from a neurologist.
Typically she enjoys academic activities and learning, but currently she has difficulty
understanding Wittgenstein’s arguments and is often distracted by all of her prep work
for the Medical College Admission Test.
David is a senior who does not have an impeccable GPA and most certainly will not
graduate magna cum laude. David does not like Wittgenstein or any academic activities,
for the most part. What David does enjoy is crunching numbers on spreadsheets, and he
already has a job lined up contingent upon graduating. To graduate all David needs is a
“D” on his Wittgenstein exam. David does have a legal prescription for cognitive
enhancers, but these enhancements give him a headache, and the efficacy of these
enhancements in understanding Wittgenstein is not proven.
Two weeks ahead of this Wittgenstein exam, both Nora and David have to decide
whether or not to use cognitive enhancers and begin studying for the exam. What should
Nora and David do?
Nora and David’s case illustrates caution against claims that it is easy to identify the
important considerations for whether or not to use a cognitive enhancer. Is it the
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consequences of graduating magna cum laude and going to medical school or simply
graduating? Is it having a legally obtained prescription or that this legal prescription is
being used for enhancement? Or is it Nora and David’s motivations for using cognitive
enhancers? Opaque motivations are serious problems in student use of enhancements
because some evidence has shown that students rely on self-diagnosis of ADHD as a
rationalization for using cognitive enhancers (Judson and Langdon 2009).
The difficulty in identifying considerations does not suggest that these institutional
rules are unable to govern the use of enhancement. Instead, this difficulty suggests
caution for any approach or institutional rule attempting to always and in every case
claim that it has identified the most important consideration for students. Such an
approach or institutional rule presumes to have identified the most important
consideration, and therefore, it has weighted rather than weighed considerations. Neil
Levy, drawing on the work of Robert Nozick, explains the difference between weighting
and weighing reasons84:
We weigh reasons when we try to find out how significant they are for us,
given our beliefs, values, plans, goals, and desires. We weight reasons
when we assign them a weight and thereby significance for us, either
ignoring any pre-existing weight they might have had or varying it. (Levy
2007, 234)
An approach or institutional rule that weights a particular consideration for all cases is
likely to result in student use of enhancements as being either strictly permitted or
prohibited. Implementing such a strict institutional rule is problematic. First, strict
institutional rules overlook the complexity for students in a given situation. For example,
if an institutional rule permits student use of enhancements in all cases, then risks to a
student’s health and information in that given situation are overlooked and not considered
84

(Nozick 1981).
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significant. Conversely, if an institutional rule prohibits student use of enhancements in
all cases, then the benefits they might provide are overlooked and not considered. Yet
Nora and David’s cases show that it’s important to allow for a broad range of
considerations and relevant information.
Moreover, consider Nora and David in their particular circumstances. Imagine that
Nora only considered the consequences of graduating magna cum laude or that David
only considered whether he had legally obtained his prescription. One would think that
both Nora and David misjudged or failed to account for all the considerations and
relevant information in their circumstances. Just as there are concerns about institutional
rules that do not account for a broad range of considerations and relevant information, so
one would have concerns if Nora and David did not account for these either.
The second problem is that were an institutional rule to permit or prohibit the use of
cognitive enhancers in all cases, then generally speaking there would be many instances
in which students would be permitted to use enhancers for bad reasons and students with
good motivations would be prohibited from using cognitive enhancers. Yet as argued in
this research project, the reasons that students use cognitive enhancers are important:
motivations do matter. A student’s motivation for using cognitive enhancers is reflective
of his character, and both motivation and character are important in academia.
I do concede that this virtues-based institutional rule does not always provide a single,
determinate answer as to whether the use of a cognitive enhancer is permitted or
prohibited. However, an advantage of this rule is that it acknowledges the complexity of
enhancement use in academia. A component of this virtues-based institutional rule is that
it offers an ethical outlook. In certain situations, motivations and character may not
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always be the most important consideration for a particular student (e.g., Nora and
David). However, by focusing on motivation and character, the significance for
implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is not in arriving at a single,
determinate answer about enhancement; the significance is that this rule aims to develop
students in existing academic institutions into the kind of student we want in academia.
Although specifying this kind of student in detail is difficult, it is reasonable—even
under non-ideal conditions—to generally take this student to be one who persistently
inquires about the information and facts given in academia, assesses these beliefs in
respect to the world as it is currently known, and applies the information and facts
learned in academia to his life. In a narrow sense, this kind of student neither takes
cognitive enhancers to augment their capacities regardless of cost nor takes these
enhancements in all situations. This student understands that motivations and character
are relevant considerations in their decision of whether or not to use an enhancement.
This kind of student is one who would use cognitive enhancers for the right reasons.
This virtues-based approach and institutional rule might be incorrect, implausible, or
infeasible for governing and guiding student use of cognitive enhancers. Yet this research
project’s virtues-based approach and institutional rule does not attempt to reduce the
ambiguity and complexity in the discussion of enhancement in academia. While it does
not offer a single, determinate answer in all cases, it does allow for the reasons a student
is using cognitive enhancers to be a relevant consideration. Moreover, it allows for
motivation and character to be included in the discussion of enhancement in academia.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
“Abashed the Devil stood, and felt how awful goodness is, and saw Virtue
in her shape how lovely.”
— John Milton, Paradise Lost
5.1 Re-examining the Question of Cheating
This research project outlined three questions and centered on two goals. For the
moment, leaving out the question of cheating, I want to consider these questions and
goals. The first question was whether student use of cognitive enhancers was
permissible. I argued that under existing institutional rules and policies, a student is
permitted to use cognitive enhancers. The third question was what the institutional rules
should be regarding student use of cognitive enhancers. I offered a virtues-based
institutional rule: Students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers if their reasons for
using these enhancements are reflective of ideals of human excellence.
The first goal of this research project was to identify problems with the contemporary
discussion of enhancement in academia. One problem is that questions about cheating do
not properly frame all the considerations in this discussion. As I have argued, while this
is an interesting question, it should not frame or be considered the only question in
respect to the use of enhancements in academia. The other problem is that existing
institutional rules and policies of academic institutions do not decisively determine the
permissibility of student use of cognitive-enhancing drugs and seem to conclude that the
use of cognitive enhancers is permitted because nothing explicitly prohibits their use.
The second goal of this research project was to offer a systematic approach towards
enhancement in academia. I suggested that one approach is from the ideals of human
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excellence or virtues. I stipulated a virtues-based approach in which the use of cognitive
enhancers is permissible on the grounds that the virtuous student has the right
motivations for using cognitive enhancers. A virtuous student, at a minimum, would have
the virtues of seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. These virtues, as motivations,
are good reasons for using cognitive enhancers and reflective of good character. This
virtues-based approach generated an institutional rule for governing student use of
enhancement in academia on an ideal conception of academia. Next, I considered this
virtues-based institutional rule under non-ideal conditions and held that it could be
implemented in existing academic institutions because in many ways, it is similar to an
honor code. This virtues-based institutional rule and an honor code both rely on
motivations and character for governing and guiding students.
While these are two of the questions and the goals for this research project, I now
want to return to the question that was the intellectual impetus for this research project: Is
a student who uses cognitive enhancers cheating? If we re-examine the question of
cheating within the context of existing institutional rules and policies for governing
student use of cognitive enhancers in academia, it becomes clear why this question
shouldn’t always frame issues of permissibility. Under existing institutional rules and
policies in academia, a student who uses cognitive enhancers cannot decisively be
determined to be cheating, and as long these enhancements were legally obtained, it is
permissible for students to use them.
Within the context of existing institutional rules and policies, I contend that this
virtues-based approach and institutional rule would advance enhancement in academia in
two ways. First, it provides a better justification for the permissibility of using
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enhancements than do existing institutional rules and policies; second, it offers a way to
acknowledge and support significant concerns about the use of enhancements in
academia regarding fairness and improving well-being.
However, before illustrating why the question of cheating shouldn’t frame issues of
permissibility, it is important to understand why this question is so often relied upon to
frame issues of permissibility. The question of cheating offers a familiar and
straightforward conceptual framework for evaluating the permissibility of enhancement
in academia. It is familiar because the use of enhancements in athletics is also commonly
framed as being a question of cheating: Is an athlete cheating when using a biomedical
technology or medical procedure during a sports competition? For many people, their
first encounter with biomedical technologies and medical procedures used for
enhancement is in athletics and is typically framed as a question of cheating. Recent and
rather public revelations and investigations into prominent athletes such as Lance
Armstrong, Barry Bonds, Marion Jones, Mark McGuire, and many others illustrated the
context in which the permissibility of enhancements is discussed.
Also, it is admittedly easy to think about enhancements in academia in the same way
as enhancements in athletics. For example, a student using a cognitive enhancer is
cheating in the same way that an athlete is cheating by using a performance-enhancing
drug such as steroids; or alternatively, a student using cognitive enhancers is not cheating
in the same way that an athlete using performance-enhancing technologies or medical
procedures such as sleeping in a hyperbaric oxygen chamber is not cheating.85 I think but
do not argue here that the overlap between academia and athletics is often exaggerated
85

Hard-cased hyperbaric oxygen chamber’s provide 100% oxygen and have been used to assist patients
after surgeries. Soft-cased hyperbaric chambers that professional athletes use only provide 40% oxygen,
and it is not clear how much they do help the athletes.
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greatly, and analogies between academia and athletics reinforce misperceptions about
biomedical technologies or medical procedures. Yet it cannot be ignored that people
naturally frame the permissibility of student use of enhancements in academia to
something seemingly similar—the use of enhancements in athletics—and familiar as a
question of cheating.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the question of cheating also provides a
straightforward conceptual framework for evaluating a student’s use of cognitive
enhancers. This conceptual framework focuses on evaluating students’ discrete acts (did a
student use a cognitive enhancer?) and holds that cheating is an act regarded as being
wrong under normal conditions. Thus, this conceptual framework provides a
straightforward way of thinking about enhancement in academia: a student who uses a
cognitive enhancer is cheating and is wrong to do so.
However, by re-examining the question of cheating, specifically its conceptual
framework, it becomes clear that framing the use of enhancements in academia as
cheating does not encapsulate many salient considerations. First, because focusing on
students’ acts is rather straightforward, too much is left out of the assessment. For the
sake of argument, let’s assume that using a cognitive enhancer in academia is cheating
and that a student was caught using an enhancement. Now, evaluating the student’s act is
straightforward, and it would seem irrelevant for assessment purposes to consider the
student’s year in the academic institution. Yet this information might change the
assessment of this student. If the student were a senior, then their cheating seems worse
because, unlike freshmen, more is expected of seniors. In this case, while either a
freshman or senior would have been wrong to use cognitive enhancers, it seems
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reasonable that the severity of the assessment of the student would change depending on
the student’s academic level.
Second, an act (or action) that is cheating is considered wrong under normal
conditions. A reason it is wrong is that under normal conditions, there is a rule
prohibiting it. It is reasonable to hold that under normal (existing) conditions, there would
be institutional rules or policies stipulating, or at least indicating, that the use of cognitive
enhancers is cheating.86 Yet few academic institutions87 have a rule or policy stipulating
that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer is cheating.
By re-examining the question of cheating, it becomes evident that there are
significant problems with framing the permissibility of student use of enhancements in
academia in regards to cheating. The framework of the question of cheating does not
include salient considerations such as information relevant in that given situation, and
there are few, if any, existing academic institutional rules or policies that stipulate that
student use of enhancement as cheating.
The question of cheating does not resolve issues of permissibility for student use of
enhancements in academia. This again pushes for further re-examination of existing
institutional rules or policies about enhancements in academia. Most, if not all academic
institutions do have rules that prohibit a student from using an illegal drug during
academic activities.
Although students are not permitted to use illegally obtained pharmaceuticals, I have
argued that relying on a legal prescription or the notion of misusing cognitive enhancers
86

The familiarity between assessing the use of enhancements in athletics and academia is unhelpful. A
particular sport often has explicit institutional rules and policies (I would include etiquette as policy) that
constitute a certain act as cheating.
87
I know of no academic institution that directly stipulates that the use of cognitive enhancers is cheating,
but it is possible that there exist at least one or two that do have such a rule.
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leads problems establishing permissibility. First, a legal prescription is often an unreliable
factor for determining the permissibility of a student’s use of cognitive enhancers because
obtaining a legal prescription rests on a difficult diagnosis by a medical professional or,
in many cases, on a particular medical professional’s personal discretion regarding
enhancement. Second, an institutional rule concerning illegal drugs that relies on a
conception of misuse supposes that off-label use of prescription pharmaceuticals always
constitutes misuse. This perception of misuse is inaccurate because off-label use of
pharmaceuticals is a common, accepted, and often-necessary practice in medicine. The
point is not that off-label use of cognitive enhancers is always justified, but rather that it
is not clear that just because the use of these cognitive enhancers is off label, it
automatically makes it a misuse (Dresser and Frader 2009). Therefore, if an academic
institution operates under existing institutional rules and policies, it does seem
permissible for students to use legally obtained cognitive enhancers.
This re-examination of the question of cheating within existing rules and policies
shows that a student is permitted to use cognitive enhancers and is not cheating in doing
so. Now consider if this virtues-based institutional rule were implemented in existing
academic institutions that are operating with these rules and policies. According to this
rule, a student is permitted to use cognitive enhancers as long as (i) these prescription
pharmaceuticals were legally obtained and (ii) a student’s reasons for using them were
for self-improvement, or seeking understanding and accurate beliefs. This virtues-based
institutional rule is consistent with existing rules and policies in academic institutions and
does not consider students to be cheating when using an enhancement.
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Now consider that in respect to the contemporary discussion of enhancement in
academia, this virtues-based approach and institutional rule advances in two ways. First,
it provides a better justification for the permissibility of using enhancements than do
existing rules and policies; second, it offers a way to acknowledge and support concerns
about fairness and improving well-being.
5.2 Permissibility by Default
To begin, consider the justification for permissibility as provided by existing rules
and policies: students are permitted to use cognitive enhancers because unless they are
illegally obtained, there are no institutional rules and policies that directly govern or
prohibit them. The permissibility of using enhancements in academia is what I refer to as
permissibility by default. Generally speaking, the justification for students being
permitted to use enhancements in academia is that there are no institutional rules or
policies that prohibit them from doing so. In the case of enhancement in academia,
permissibility by default is a problem.
To be clear, I am not claiming that permissibility by default is always a problem. In
many circumstances, permissibility by default is an acceptable justification. Institutions
and institutional rules cannot stipulate all permissible actions. Yet there are some
circumstances in which permissibility by default is not a good justification.
The following example illustrates the difference in circumstances in which
permissibility by default is, and then is not, considered a good justification. Imagine that
Oliver is sitting in his Wittgenstein class daydreaming. Oliver is not breaking a rule by
daydreaming because there is no institutional rule that prohibits Oliver from
daydreaming, making permissibility by default an acceptable justification. Now imagine
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that Oliver is using a cognitive enhancer instead of daydreaming. The lack of institutional
rules or policies prohibiting Oliver from using a cognitive enhancer is the justification for
Oliver being permitted to use enhancements.
However, a relevant difference is that permissibility by default does seem to be a
good reason for Oliver being permitted to daydream, but it does not seem to be a good
reason for him to use cognitive enhancers. Cognitive enhancers are powerful
psychotropic pharmaceutical agents that impact—both positively and negatively— a
student’s neurological system, overall health, academic career, and well-being. The
impacts for students who use cognitive enhancers in academia are such that the
circumstances under which a student uses an enhancement at least needs a good reason
for justification— rather than simply the lack of an institutional rule prohibiting them. In
respect to student use of enhancements, permissibility by default does not seem to be a
good reason for justifying permissibility.
Some might think that needing a good reason for the justification of using
enhancements in academia is too demanding. If existing rules and policies permit the use
of enhancements, even if it is permissibility by default, then students should be allowed
to use cognitive enhancers as they see fit. This position could be further supported by
drawing on John Stuart Mill’s notion of experiment of living. For Mill, the individuality
of a person, the freedom to choose his or her own actions, is a central component for
well-being:
If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not
because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode … it is only
the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, welldeveloped humans. (Mill 2008, 86-87)
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A reason against setting strict limitations on permissible actions is because of the value of
personal freedom and our infallibility. In this way, people are all engaged in experiments
of living. As Mill notes,
[S]o is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free
scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others;
and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically,
when any one thinks fit to try them. (Mill 2008, 72)
In respect to students and cognitive enhancers, one could hold a view that as long as
students do not injure others and there is no institutional rule directly prohibiting them
from using cognitive enhancers, then permissibility by default is the reason for justifying
permissibility. Moreover, that there is no institutional prohibition is also the means for
justifying the permissibility of cognitive enhancers. In this way, the use of enhancements
in academia can be thought of as an experiment of living.
This view is philosophically strong and matches many inclinations people may have
about the use of enhancement. Preserving students’ well-being by not restricting their
freedom of choice is not only instrumentally beneficial but also good for its own sake.
However, despite the initial appeal of this view, the circumstances of students in
academia and their use of enhancements provide reasons for doubting this view.
First, individuality is a central element of a person’s well-being. However, as an
institution, academia is designed to regularly limit and restrict students’ freedom of
choice. Some of the ways it does so are rather mundane, such as only offering certain
courses or scheduling classes at certain times. Other ways are far more controversial,
such as speech codes or the expression of certain attitudes or beliefs, (e.g., overtly racist
or misogynistic speech or beliefs).
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It might be that some of the more controversial ways—and mundane ways as well—
turn out to be too limiting or restrictive of students’ freedom of choice. Nonetheless, that
academia has the institutional power to limit and restrict students’ individuality is not
controversial or surprising. When a person is a student in academia and occupying a
specific identity or role, the student is accountable for following these rules and policies
(Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Feldman 1981; Strike 1983). Moreover, as previously
mentioned, occupying the identity or role of a student means that a student is accountable
to certain rules and policies that other persons outside the institution are not. So the view
that limiting or restricting students’ freedom to use cognitive enhancers is incorrect
because it infringes on students’ individuality seems to misunderstand academia as an
institution and the responsibilities of being a student at such an institution.
The second reason is that there are significant difficulties when thinking about student
use of enhancements as being an experiment in living. By definition, an experiment is a
procedure to test a hypothesis or make a discovery. In this experiment in living view, the
hypothesis is that allowing all students to use cognitive enhancers will be practically
beneficial for some students and that it increases students’ individuality. However, when
setting up a legitimate experiment, it is also prudent to consider the past history of an
experiment. The past history of accepted and promoted pharmaceutical enhancements
poses a problem because it has been disastrous. Previously touted and accepted cognitive
enhancers such as cocaine and amphetamines have been empirically proven to be more
harmful than beneficial when used as cognitive enhancements (Bell, Lucke and Hall
2012). At the beginning of the twentieth-century, cocaine was regularly promoted for its
ability to augment mental performance, increase focus, and provide high levels of energy
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(Spillane 2000). The promotion and acceptance of cocaine was due in part to
overestimating its properties of cognitive enhancement. After cocaine fell out of favor,
amphetamines were regarded as the next pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement and were
introduced to those outside of the military after World War II (Rasmussen 2008). During
World War II and even currently, amphetamines were used to maintain or improve
soldiers’ levels of alertness and counteract fatigue. Following World War II,
amphetamines were introduced to the general population by returning soldiers and, as
with cocaine previously, were embraced for a wide range of uses. In Great Britain in the
1960s,
About one third of amphetamine prescriptions were for weight loss, one
third for clear-cut psychiatric disorders (depression, anxiety), and the
remaining third for ambiguous, mostly psychiatric and psychosomatic
complaints (tiredness, nonspecific pain). (Rasmussen 2008, 977)
While cocaine and amphetamines were once accepted and promoted as pharmaceutical
cognitive enhancers, empirical evidence shows little benefit and substantial, unwarranted
health risks. To be clear, a past result is not a clear indication that current or future
pharmaceutical enhancements will fail. Nonetheless, the history of cognitive enhancers
does suggest that making them permissible for all students to use will end poorly.
The view that permitting all students to use cognitive enhancements in academia
endorses students’ individuality as an element of well-being and is an experiment of
living has strong appeal. However, it overlooks that as an institution¸ academia limits
students’ freedom of choice; also, in respect to cognitive enhancers, it does not seem
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prudent or sensitive considering past history to allow students to be phase 1 participants
for pharmaceutical cognitive enhancements.88
This is not to claim that cognitive enhancers should be prohibited but rather that if
students are going to be permitted to use cognitive enhancers, then permissibility needs to
be justified by something more than default. I am not claiming that (i) permissibility by
default is always a bad reason for justification, (ii) limiting or restricting students’
freedom of choice is always a good thing, or (iii) harmful and negative impacts on
students’ health or well-being are always cause for restricting the permissibility of certain
actions. Instead, the argument is that because of the circumstances of academia,
permissibility of cognitive enhancers by default is simply not a good justification for
existing rules and policies.
I suggest that this virtues-based approach and institutional rule offers a better
justification than permissibility by default. According to the virtues-based approach, a
virtuous student chooses to use cognitive enhancers after assessing the relevant
information and considerations in a situation. In a given situation, the virtuous student
assesses the relevant considerations pertaining to existing rules or policies, consequences
(benefits versus risks), and their motivations. Permissibility rests upon the virtuous
student having sufficiently proper motivations of self-improvement, or seeking
understanding or accurate beliefs, for using cognitive enhancers. That these motivations
are regarded as being good reasons for using cognitive enhancers and reflect well on the
character of the student makes using cognitive enhancers permissible. This claim about
permissibility is rather modest; in comparison to permissibility by default, it offers a
88

A phase 1 drug trial only tests for safety and is neither curative nor considered a therapeutic treatment.
However, many patients hold the “therapeutic misconception” and mistakenly enroll in phase 1 trials
thinking they may be cured of their disease.
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better justification for permissibility. I am not arguing that a virtues-based approach is the
only way to justify the permissibility of cognitive enhancers. However, having
permissibility be determined by motivations of self-improvement, or seeking
understanding and accurate beliefs, does seem like a good justification for permissibility.
Therefore, the first benefit of implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is that it
offers a better justification for the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers under
existing rules and policies.
5.3 Concerns of Fairness and Well-being
The second benefit of implementing this virtues-based institutional rule is that it
supports concerns about fairness and improving well-being. I regard these concerns as
being central, if not the impetuses, for the arguments that were attempting to answer the
question of cheating. To demonstrate how fairness and improving well-being could be the
central concerns in answering the question of cheating, consider the following. If one
could show that the use of cognitive enhancers is decisively determined to be cheating (or
not), then academia and academic institutional rules and policies would have to be altered
in respect to this conclusion. If students using cognitive enhancers were cheating because
the enhancers provide an unfair competitive advantage, existing institutional rules and
policies would need to address concerns of enhancement and fairness. Alternatively, if
students using cognitive enhancers were not cheating because these enhancements
resulted in better goods, services, and scientific discoveries, then existing institutional
rules and policies would have to address concerns about improving well-being. In the
following, beginning with those who think that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer

196

is cheating, I show in detail how this virtues-based approach and institutional rule are
able to acknowledge and support concerns about fairness and improvement of well-being.
For those who think that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer is cheating, their
central concern is often about fairness. Their mistake is addressing fairness in terms of
competitive advantage at the level of a student rather than at the institutional level. To
consider cheating at the level of a student requires providing a relevant distinction
between the advantages provided by cognitive enhancers from those provided by coffee,
caffeine-based energy drinks, laptops, and quiet apartments.
Assessing a student’s use of cognitive enhancers in respect to competitive advantage
does not indicate whether using this enhancement is wrong. If drinking coffee improves
focus and concentration and this provides a competitive advantage, it does not follow that
a student is wrong to drink it. Similarly, while using a cognitive enhancer improves focus
and concentration and this provides a competitive advantage, it does not follow that a
student is wrong to use it. This conclusion, however, does not mean that concerns about
fairness are without merit. There is a sense, even if only as an intuition or pre-reflective
judgment, that something about using cognitive enhancers is unfair.
The strength of this intuition indicates the need to address these concerns about
fairness and the use of enhancements not at the level of a student but instead at the level
of distributive justice.89 One could hold that because access to cognitive enhancers is
often largely determined by the social lottery — meaning the reasons a student was born
into one socio-economic class was luck rather than merit — then certain students will
systematically be provided greater access than others.

89

Arthur Caplan argues that an unfair distribution does not mean that it is wrong to use (Caplan 2009).
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How is a virtues-based approach and institutional rule meant to govern and guide
student use of cognitive enhancers to acknowledge and support these complex notions of
fairness? It is admittedly difficult for an institutional rule focusing on governing and
guiding the use of enhancements at the level of students always to acknowledge and
support concerns about fairness or about a pattern of inequity in distribution. Yet it is not
impossible; because it is focused on governing and guiding students does not mean an
institutional rule is unable to account for concerns about the fairness. By allowing for
fairness to be regarded as relevant information in a student’s assessment of whether or
not to use an enhancement, this virtues-based institutional rule recognizes fairness as
being important. Identifying a concern is a way to support a concern.
One modest way this virtues-based institutional rule can allow for considerations of
fairness to be supported is by relying on the notion of a virtuous student. A virtuous
student would consider fairness to be a relevant consideration. A pattern of inequity in
the distribution of these enhancements is a relevant consideration for a virtuous student
because his concern is not only about whether or not he is permitted to use an
enhancement but also about how using this enhancement reflects on the sort of person he
is. A virtuous student might choose not to use an enhancement because his use reinforces
a pattern of inequity. Moreover, fairness could be understood in a context besides a
pattern of an inequity to access and instead as a consideration about material resources. A
virtuous student is not going to use enhancements if his use of an enhancement deprives
another student that needed this psychotropic pharmaceutical as treatment for a condition
or disorder. The following example illustrates the manner in which a virtues-based
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institutional rule could incorporate concerns of fairness and use them to govern and guide
real, non-virtuous, students.
Imagine Edith and Teresa are not only roommates but also in the same Wittgenstein
class. Edith and Teresa prepare for an exam and both use cognitive enhancers. The
difference is that Edith uses hers for enhancement and Teresa uses hers for treatment of a
condition or disorder. Although both just ran out of their cognitive enhancers, they are
preparing to get their prescriptions filled. However, because of a recent shortage, Edith
and Teresa find out that their local pharmacy does not have enough cognitive enhancers
in stock for both prescriptions to be refilled. Since this situation involves the use of
cognitive enhancers and Edith is using them for enhancement, she adopts the ethical
outlook of a virtuous student.
Were Edith to get her prescription filled, she would neither have cheated nor done
anything impermissible. But by adopting the ethical outlook of a virtuous student, she
makes fairness relevant in her given situation. A virtuous person would, at a minimum,
consider the lack of material resources in her assessment and in following this virtuesbased institutional rule, so would Edith. This virtues-based institutional rule
acknowledges and supports concerns of fairness regarding the use of enhancements in
academia.
For those who think that a student who uses a cognitive enhancer is not cheating, the
challenge in valuing education solely for instrumental benefits misrepresents all the
reasons that it is valued. However, although this argument was incorrect in expressing the
value of enhancement solely in instrumental terms, a central concern for this argument is
articulating the value of these cognitive enhancers in improving well-being for humanity.
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By this I mean that enhancements, even those that only provide moderate augmentation
such as cognitive enhancers, could make all of our lives better. By definition,
enhancement is something good. Improving our capacities of focus and concentration,
generally speaking, is a good thing. Beyond the walls of academic institutions,
particularly in the United States and other developed nations, improving one’s capacities
of focus and concentration specifically for education is instrumentally beneficial and
good for its own sake.
Administrators, staff, faculty, and institutional rules and policies should not overlook
the significance of permitting students to use enhancements because augmenting
students’ capacities of focus and concentration, even if only moderately, could likely
result in assisting the development of intellectual capacities and understanding. Advances
in technologies, broadly ranging from faster computers to Internet access to recent
discoveries in neuroscience to child development regarding learning, have already been
shown to be tremendously beneficial to students in academia.90 The greater enrollment of
students currently in academia shows that advances in technologies can be beneficial for
students. The benefits of cognitive enhancers for students if they augment capacities of
focus and concentration, even if moderately, would likely be great.
This virtues-based institutional rule accounts for this concern because a virtuous
student knows that in certain situations, these cognitive enhancers can assist them. This
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Case in point: it has been established, with twenty years of testing and documentation, that I am learning
disabled to the point that I have legal protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In fact, not only
is the level of severity of my phonological learning disability rather rare, but the level of academic
achievement is quite unique. That I have made it this far is a credit to technological advances; computers
and software; institutional changes in educational programs in middle school, high school, and
undergraduate studies; and advances in neuroscience. Sadly, this credit has to be tampered because I cannot
credit a single university or department in my post-undergraduate career that was accepting and
understanding of the difficulties of this disability. This, at least to me, is an indication that academia has
quite a ways to go to meet the needs of disabled students.
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virtues-based approach allows for the consequences—in this case the benefits—of using
enhancements to be a consideration for a virtuous student. For reasons of making the
topic manageable, this project has explicated the relevancy of consequences only in a
limited way. Nonetheless, that cognitive enhancers could result in better goods, services,
and scientific discoveries would be a relevant consideration, even for an ideal virtuous
student. Consider that depending on the relevant information in a given situation, a
virtuous student might choose to use a cognitive enhancer because the consequences of
doing so are of such a magnitude. The virtues-based approach and institutional rule do
not hold that consequences should not be a relevant consideration, only that it is not
consequences alone that would be considered by a virtuous person. Thus, this virtuesbased approach and institutional rule supports concerns about improving well-being by
making the consequences a significant consideration in respect to using enhancements.
Therefore, by starting with a re-examination of the question of cheating, it is clear
that under existing academic institutional rules and policies, the use of cognitive
enhancers is not cheating and, as long as they are legally obtained, is permissible. This
virtues-based approach and institutional rule is not only consistent with existing rules and
policies regarding the use of cognitive enhancers but provides two benefits if
implemented in current academic institutions. First, it provides a better justification for
the permissibility of using cognitive enhancers, and, second, it acknowledges and
supports concerns about fairness and improving well-being.
5.4 The Virtuous Approach Towards Cognitive Enhancers
According to Aristotle, a “discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as
the subject matter admits of” (NE 1.3 1094b12-13). The discussion of enhancement in
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academia—focusing on the subject matter of permissibility, cheating, and what the
institutional rules should be—is not only ambiguous and complex but one we should
resist simplifying. Not only is education something that is good both instrumentally and
for its own sake; the ideals of human excellence are as well. J. B. Schneed holds that,
[V]irtue is natural to humans, not in the sense that it need be learned or
that it is easy to acquire, but in the sense that virtuous agents individually,
as well as the community they compose, benefit from virtue. This fact
indicates our social nature. Living alone, and living without virtue, are
both harmful to us. (Schneed 1997, 178)
Considering the value of education and virtues, it is reasonable to want students in
academia to possess certain virtues. Were these students to use cognitive enhancers, it
would be for reasons of self-improvement, or seeking understanding and accurate beliefs.
Whether or not a student could develop these virtues is important. The assessment of a
person or their actions is not complete if the person’s motivation and character are not
included as relevant considerations. It seems that the assessment of student use of
enhancements in academia should be no different. Whether this virtues-based approach is
correct or not, any future investigation into enhancement in academia must at some point
examine the motivations and character of students.
This virtues-based approach and institutional rule does not always bring clarity and
simplicity or, in fact, settle all matters pertaining to enhancement in academia. Yet what
this research project has shown is that in respect to issues of enhancement, we should
navigate a middle path. We need a path that goes between broad acceptance or rejection,
unreflective reception or acquiescence of student use of enhancement in academia. In this
research project, I have suggested that the ideals of human excellence or virtues approach
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offers not only interesting and unique insights but also a way that compromises between
extreme positions regarding student use of cognitive enhancers.
5.5 The Virtuous Approach Towards Neuroenhancement
This research project focused rather narrowly on the issue of student use of cognitive
enhancements in academia. Attention was centered on the psychotropic pharmaceuticals
that augment a person or their capacities of focus and concentration. However,
pharmaceuticals are also used as enhancements for a person’s memory and moral
capacities. Some pharmaceuticals such as 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine
(MDMA) and propranolol have been shown to be memory attenuating (Cukor, et al.
2009; Lanni, et al. 2008). 91 Oxytocin and vasopressin have been shown to increase
attachment bonding between mammals. In some circumstances, it has been suggested that
propranolol suppresses implicit racial bias (Terbeck, et al. 2012; Keverne and Curley
2004; Savulescu and Sandberg 2008).
Discussion about the ethical application and limitations of these pharmaceuticals
(broadly referred to as neuroenhancements) has generated many interesting and differing
positions. Even if one were roughly to group positions in respect to whether they think
neuroenhancements should be permitted or prohibited, there is a wide range of positions.
For those who think that neuroenhancements are permissible, their position is usually
grounded in reasons relating to the benefits these pharmaceuticals offer. Some such as
Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg, and Guy Kahane argue, according to their welfarist
approach, that if these neuroenhancements increase the chances of a person leading the
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Mentanine has been used in Germany for nearly 25 years to treat memory loss in the elderly and
Alzheimer’s disease, but it has not been tested on persons whose memory is functioning proficiently
(Lipton 2006).
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good life, they should be made available (Savulescu, Sandberg and Kahane 2011; Kahane
and Savulescu 2009). Others such as Thomas Douglas (2008) argue that augmenting a
person’s moral capacities via neuroenhancement is no different from and possibly better
than traditional methods such as education for developing an individual’s moral
capacities. Going a step further, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2008) argue that
society has a moral imperative to focus on developing and making available moral
neuroenhancements to improve the character of humanity.
For those who think that neuroenhancements are impermissible, their positions are
usually grounded on reasons relating to pharmaceutical manipulation of the human
condition. Some such as Michael Sandel (2007) argue that the use of neuroenhancements
is a sign of human hubris because it illustrates a refusal to accept certain limitations in
our abilities. Others such as Francis Fukuyama (2002) go one step further and argue that
neuroenhancement poses the greatest threat to humanity because in manipulating
ourselves, there is a chance that humanity will lose the properties that make us unique.
In regard to these memory and moral neuroenhancements, I have only provided
positions on opposite ends of the permissibility spectrum.92 Yet any attempt to
understand the role, application, and limitations of neuroenhancement is going to be
confounded by three problems: complexity, philosophical overextension, and the
potential for biases in explanation.
As neuroscience progresses, its research and discoveries provide a rich but complex
picture of the human brain. Recent empirical studies and research challenge fundamental
notions about our lives, such as human volition. Consider personal self-control, the
92

In respect to moral enhancements, some such as John Harris Chris Zarpentine contend that we should not
be so certain that pharmaceuticals would work better than traditional methods of moral development
(Harris 2011; Zarpentine 2012).
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ability to refrain from certain behavior. In what is referred to as ego-deletion, a person
refraining from one kind of action, such as not eating a cookie or keeping a straight face
while watching a funny video, has a marked decreased ability for self-control in other
situations, such as grip strength or problem-solving (Baumeister, et al. 1998; Baumeister
2002; Schmeichel and Baumeister 2004; Vohs and Heatherton 2000). While it is not
controversial to think that self-control is often dependent on social situations, what is
surprising is that self-control is only a finite resource and, in some cases, not simply a
matter of one’s own volition. In addition, there are certain psychiatric conditions such as
Tourette’s syndrome, Anorexia Nervosa, and some instances of Borderline personality
disorder that result in compulsive desires building up and, crudely put, overriding an
individual’s volition. What is interesting is the broad range of compulsive actions, not
simply behaviors, that occurs: experiencing a tic, desiring to not eat, and deliberately
ingesting sharp objects (Leckman, King and Cohen 1999; Klein 2012; Kwok, Matorin
and Kahn 2012; Campbell and Aulisio 2012; Henderson 2005).
My point is not to argue that people lack free will (although we might) but rather to
illustrate that neuroscience has shown that many fundamental notions about the human
experience, such as volitional control, are complex and unable to be neatly categorized.
The second problem is that philosophers have a tendency to overextend the claims
that recent research and advances in neuroscience support. For example, consider Joshua
Greene and Jonathan Haidt’s work on the neuroscience of moral judgment. Greene relies
on fMRIs of participants when they are providing answers to moral dilemmas (Trolley
and Footbridge cases), and Haidt has examined students’ responses to moral violations
from across different cultures and educational levels (Greene, et al. 2001; Greene 2003;
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Haidt, Koller and Dias 1993; Haidt 2003; Schnall, et al. 2008). Both Green and Haidt
have argued as the basis of their research on the neuroscience of moral judgment, what
Neil Levy refers to as the deflationary account of morality (Levy 2007). By Haidt and
Greene’s accounts, morality is reducible to intuition, which in turn is only an affective,
not rational, response that is the result of biological and evolutionary hardwiring. If moral
judgments are based upon intuitions, which are emotional and part of evolutionary
hardwiring, then it is not evident that they track morally relevant features in the world. If
this is the case, then theories of morality that are rationally based, such as deontology or
those of Kant, or theories that hold that there can be reflective equilibrium between
theory and intuition, such as those of Rawls, seem to be unjustified. If a person’s moral
intuitions are merely the product of evolutionary hardwiring, then deontologists or
Kantian thinkers cannot hold that morality and moral judgment are fundamentally reasonbased. If a person’s moral intuitions are merely the product of evolutionary hardwiring,
then it seems there cannot be, as Rawls (1999) claims, reflective equilibrium between our
theories and intuitions. For Greene and Haidt, a deflationary account of morality holds
that being moral is merely a part of our evolutionary hardwiring.
Nevertheless, while Greene and Haidt’s work shows that intuitions are often the result
of biological and evolutionary hardwiring and affect moral judgments, it is not clear how
this research supports Greene and Haidt’s conclusions about morality and moral theories.
Kahane and Shackel argue that Greene has methodological flaws that result in his work
not sufficiently appreciating the “step from philosophical discourse to the ascription of
belief to lay persons” (Kahane and Shackel 2010, 580). Neil Levy (2007) contends that
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neuroscience has shown that intuitions, even if emotional and not rational, are relevant
considerations that guide decisions and moral judgments.
While I remain neutral on this debate about the neuroscience of moral judgment and
moral theory, I believe that Greene and Haidt’s work is indicative of an overextension of
neuroscience to support conclusions, particularly philosophical conclusions. It is not yet
clear that Greene and Haidt’s research shows that deontological or Kant’s moral theory is
not justified or that intuitions or theory cannot achieve reflective equilibrium.
The final problem, which combines complexity and philosophical overextension, is
what I refer to as the potential for biases in explanation. It has been shown that even
when presented with a good explanation that uses no neuroscience research and a bad
explanation that relies on irrelevant neuroscience research, persons prefer the bad
neuroscience explanation (Weisberg, et al. 2008). This is not surprising since people
commonly prefer certain types of explanations despite a type of explanation being
fundamentally flawed when used to explain a particular thing (Keil 2006). What is
troubling is that people are more likely to exonerate a person’s behavior and actions if
they are explained in respect to physiological causes such as the neurology of the brain
than if they are explained in respect to psychological causes (Monterosso, Royzman and
Schwartz 2005). Monterosso, Royzman and Schwartz (2005, 2012) refer to this
phenomenon as naïve dualism, the idea that in the human brain, psychological and
physiological causes are categorically distinct. Stephen J. Morse (2005) contends that this
is a significant problem when neuroscience mechanistic explanations (physiological
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causes) are given credit over reason-giving explanations (psychological causes) when
assessing legal responsibility.93
All three of these problems are present to some degree when attempting to understand
the ethics, role, application, and limitations of neuroenhancements. Our current
understanding of neurology shows that we barely understand human cognition let alone
our cognitive, memory, or moral capacities.94 The role that our executive function and
memory play in cognition and a pharmaceutical’s effect on these capacities and cognition
will be complicated. Moreover, caution is needed when assessing a pharmaceutical’s
affect on a person or on their cognitive, memory, or moral capacities so as to not
overextend this evidence when being applied for (or against) particular philosophical
positions.
In an assessment of the ethics of neuroenhancement, there is a great potential for one
to present a biased explanation. When using empirical evidence about the effects of
pharmaceuticals on a person’s cognitive, memory, and—in particular—moral capacities,
it is easy to rely on neuroscience mechanistic explanations (physiological causes) rather
93

There is another problem, and this concerns the role of clinicians (medical professionals) and advances in
neuroscience and neuroenhancement, in particular issues centering on patients’ responsibility and care. I
suggest but do not argue here for adapting Eran Klein’s framework of strong neuroskepticism as a way for
clinicians to approach handling such issues (Klein 2011). In respect to neuroenhancement, Jayne C. Lucke
(2012) contends that there is a need to study the attitudes of students, parents, and medical professionals
about the use of cognitive enhancers to make the proper and appropriate guidelines and policies. Not only
do I endorse Lucke’s proposal, but I have already taken preliminary steps in this direction. My study with
Robert E. Enck, M.D., and John Bossaer, Pharm.D. (2013), was the first study to examine the attitudes of
those training to be medical professionals and only the second study to examine the attitudes of those
working in the medical profession about cognitive enhancers. At the University of Texas MD Anderson, I
am currently conducting an attitudinal survey that examines medical professionals’ attitudes concerning
cognitive enhancers, the treatment-enhancement distinction, and off-label prescribing practices. This
study’s findings will have interesting implications for developing institutional rules and policies for
medical professionals about cognitive enhancers, but it also is likely to facilitate the use of cognitive
enhancers on chemotherapy-related cognitive dysfunction, crudely referred to as “chemo brain” (Boykoff,
Moieni and Subramanian 2009; Hede 2008; Raffa, et al. 2006).
94
To illustrate, consider Capgras Delusions, a condition or disorder in which a person believes that their
loved one or family have been killed and replaced by aliens, robots, or imposters (Ellis and Lewis 2001).
This condition or disorder is the result of an impairment, injury, or disease to the brain’s facial recognition
system.
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than reason-giving explanations (psychological causes). This is because of the
complexity of our lives; in other words, there are good reasons for and against a person
using neuroenhancements. Consider, on one hand, that altering a person’s memories in
some situations or assisting people in building more attachment to others or suppressing
implicit racism would benefit people’s lives and are good reasons for using
neuroenhancements. However, on the other hand, it is important to note that
pharmaceutically induced attachment is not the same thing as attachment that occurs from
love or respect, and chemically suppressing implicit racism or promoting moral behavior
seems to bypass difficult matters of personal responsibility and are good reasons against
using neuroenhancements.
I suggest that at least one reason for applying the ideals of human excellence or
virtues approach to neuroenhancement is that it adequately handles these three problems.
The approach handles these problems by focusing less on biomedical technologies,
medical procedures, and neuroscience and instead focusing more on the motivations and
character of persons. This approach is consistent with other philosophical positions and is
at least one element of the normative account of enhancement. Moreover, this approach
centers on reason-giving explanations, focusing on motivation and character, and
contends that there are good reasons both for and against the use of neuroenhancements
in a given situation.
In detail, this ideals of human excellence or virtues approach holds that biomedical
technologies and medical procedures can only go so far in enhancing a person or their
capacities. This approach does not overestimate recent research and advances by arguing
that by taking an enhancement, a person will be smarter or more morally good. Instead of
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starting with questions about pharmaceuticals augmenting our capacities or applying the
most recent research and advances in neuroscience, the ideals of human excellence or
virtues approach begins by examining a person’s motivation and character. What are the
appropriate reasons for using these neuroenhancements, and how does using them reflect
on a person’s character? There is value in examining our motivations and character
regardless of whether or not one does so in order to use a pharmaceutical.
If we cannot determine the appropriate motivations for using these
neuroenhancements, then one needs to ask about the reasons an ideal virtuous person
would have for using these pharmaceuticals. It is reasonable to hold that in a given
situation, a virtuous person would assess all the information in her circumstances and the
relevant considerations and then act accordingly for the right reasons when using a
neuroenhancement. The virtuous person, even if an ideal, illustrates that depending on the
information and relevant considerations in a given situation, there are good reasons for
and against using a neuroenhancement.
If people do not have the correct motivations for using neuroenhancement, then the
next step is to consider changing certain institutional rules to re-structure and develop the
proper motivations and character of people in respect to using these neuroenhancements.
If certain institutional rules are changed, then it seems that a person could come to use
neuroenhancements that attenuate their memory, strengthen their bonds of attachment, or
suppress implicit racial bias for the right reasons as a matter of character. Therefore, as
with cognitive enhancers in academia, concerns about the use of neuroenhancements are,
in fact, concerns about motivation and character.
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Whether it is about the use of cognitive enhancers in academia or
neuroenhancements, the ideals of human excellence or virtues matter. All too often,
discussions regarding the permissibility of biomedical technologies and medical
procedures have focused too narrowly on consequences and rules being the only relevant
considerations. Yet as Mo Tzu points out,
Whoever criticizes others must have some alternative to offer them. To
criticize and yet offer no alternative is like trying to stop flood with flood
or put out fire with fire. It will surely have no effect. (M. Tzu 1963, 39-40)
Therefore, while still retaining consequences and rules as relevant considerations, I
offered in this research project a way for motivation and character also to be included.
Moreover, I provide a way for the permissibility of using biomedical technologies and
medical procedures for enhancement to be grounded in the ideals of human excellence as
well as a way of linking an individual’s use of enhancements to his or her motivation and
character.
This ideals of human excellence or virtues approach is only one approach toward the
ethics of enhancement, but it merits serious consideration because it offers interesting and
unique insights and helps to explain at least one element of a normative account of
enhancement. Although biomedical technologies and medical procedures will continue to
progress parallel with issues of permissibility, the significance of a person’s motivation
and character remains fundamental in the ethics of enhancement.
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